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Abstract 
 
Samuel Beckett is often thought of as an experimental writer but little critical 
attention has been paid to the question of what the term ‘experimental’ means 
when applied to Beckett’s work (and arguably literature in general). One might 
suggest that to call Beckett an experimental writer is to identify him as a member 
of the avant-garde, placing his writing in opposition to more commercially-
orientated, ‘mainstream’ works of literature. Alternatively, the term might be taken 
to highlight Beckett’s formal innovations – his capacity to change conceptions of 
what literature is and does. This study, though, will specify another way in which 
we might understand Beckett’s writing to be experimental. Drawing on Beckett’s 
engagement with experimental and therapeutic psychology, the study suggests 
that Beckett’s works might be seen as experiments in a more scientific sense. 
Through readings of his later works for page, stage and screen, the chapters of 
this study suggest that Beckett’s writing can contribute to our knowledge of 
psychological concepts such as perception, attention and mental imagery. 
Beckett’s works, I argue, might be defined as experimental insofar as they 
position and stimulate human bodies in ways that allow us to better understand 
our complex, but partial, experiences of the world. 
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Introduction 
Literary Experiments and the Work of Samuel Beckett 
 
In the Routledge Companion to Experimental Literature (2012), the literary 
experiment is defined as largely separate from the scientific experiment. In their 
introduction, the editors suggest that in the volume ‘the modifier experimental is 
used more or less interchangeably with avant-garde and sometimes innovative’ 
(Bray, Gibbons and McHale 2012, 1, emphasis in original). The difference in 
these modifiers, for the editors, is a matter of connotations. The term ‘avant-
garde’, for example, has been ‘allied with political radicalism’, whereas 
‘experimental has scientific connotations’ (1-2). The authors argue that ‘the 
language of experiment is a relative novelty in literary discourse’, suggesting that 
the term was first adopted as a descriptor of literary innovation at the end of the 
nineteenth century, but was embraced more fully in the early twentieth (2, 
emphasis in original). It is due to use of the term in this period, they argue, that 
‘we continue to regard unconventional, cutting-edge literature as “experimental”’ 
(2). From this perspective, literary experiments were going on long before the 
‘experimental’ tag was applied to them; a new modifier was merely applied to an 
old process. The editors cite the eighteenth-century novel as a literary innovation 
that, in hindsight, ‘we would surely be disposed to call “experimental”’, though the 
term was not available at the time (2). The reason for this new modifier, the editors 
speculate, was cultural. It was a reaction to the growth of science: 
To call literature experimental is in some sense to aspire to compete 
with science, challenging science’s privileged status in modernity and 
reclaiming some of the prestige ceded by literature to science since 
the nineteenth century (2, emphasis in original). 
The identification between literary and scientific experiments, the editors 
suppose, works on a basis of analogy. The modifier, by this account, 
demonstrates how literature, like science, can fit into a narrative of cultural 
progress: ‘experiment promises to extend the boundaries of knowledge, or in 
this case, of artistic practice. Strongly associated with modernity, it implies 
rejection of hide-bound traditions, values and forms’ (2). The analogy, then, 
goes something like this: where the experimental scientist extends the 
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boundaries of knowledge, the experimental writer extends the boundaries of 
artistic practice. Both, in this sense, are able to overthrow the old and embrace 
the new. What remains questionable, however, is whether this analogy offers 
any real insight into how challenging literature is written and received.  
One problem many have with the term ‘experimental’ is its older 
connotations of artistic failure. The earliest example of the term being used to 
describe aesthetic productions in the Oxford English Dictionary refers to a 
comment made by John Ruskin, in 1857.1 Here it is used to describe the 
necessary failures in the work of a developing artist: 
It stands to reason that a young man's work cannot be perfect. It must be 
more or less ignorant; it must be more or less feeble; it is likely that it 
may be more or less experimental, and if experimental, here and there 
mistaken (Ruskin 1868, 35, emphasis in original). 
In Ruskin’s sense, an experimental work is one that is not quite the finished 
article. There is the suggestion that experimentation will inevitably produce 
flawed art but these flaws must be tolerated by the public if a young artist is to 
mature. This early sense of the descriptor continues to colour the idea of 
experimental literature into the late twentieth century and beyond. The editors of 
the Routledge Companion cite the writer B. S. Johnson’s objection to the term: 
‘I object to the term experimental being applied to my own work. Certainly, I 
make experiments, but the unsuccessful ones are quietly hidden away and what 
I choose to publish is in my own terms successful’ (Johnson 1973, 19). In 
Ruskin and Johnson’s sense we get a slightly different analogy. Here, 
experimentation (artistic, literary or scientific) is the trialling process that comes 
before the finished product. It is a process that is necessary to – but should not 
be confused with – artistic achievement, or the acquisition of scientific 
knowledge. Thus, the concept of aesthetic experimentation is caught between 
two analogies. In one sense to call a work experimental is to say that it extends 
the boundaries of artistic practice, and is thereby valuable in itself. In another, to 
call a work experimental is to say that it is only valuable insofar as it later leads 
to a successful finished work. The editors of the Routledge Companion find that, 
in the latter sense, ‘experimental’ has become a ‘term of dismissal and 
                                                          
1 Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. ‘experimental’, accessed November 22, 2016, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66532?redirectedFrom=experimental#eid 
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condescension’ (3). Their volume aims to ‘rescue’ the term from this context by 
emphasising the sense in which the literary experiment is unconventional and 
cutting-edge (3). In the sense that they use it, literary experiments name the 
process ‘of change and renewal’ by which literature re-invents itself (1). The 
terms avant-garde,2 experimental and innovative are amalgamated into the 
single term ‘experimental’. This term, it is hoped, will be instilled with 
‘connotations of edginess, renovation and aesthetic adventure’ (3). In this 
context, experimental literature can be ‘irreducibly diverse’ (1). A literary 
experiment merely has to ask the ontological questions that mainstream 
literature is ‘dedicated to repressing’: ‘What is literature and what could it be? 
What are its functions its limitations its possibilities’ (1)?  
This thesis will set itself up in opposition to this broad definition of 
experimental literature. Some very interesting insights may come from the 
amalgamation of the terms avant-garde, innovative and experimental within a 
broad volume such as the Routledge Companion. But I think it is important that 
the terms do not lose their particularity. The editors point out that ‘aesthetic 
avant-gardism continues to be allied with political radicalism in a number of 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century artistic and literary movements’ (1-2). If these 
movements are allied more with ‘political radicalism’ than with scientific 
experimentation, why label them ‘experimental’ and not avant-garde? Similarly, 
it will be my contention that twentieth-century literature had a relationship with 
scientific experimentation that went beyond the contest for cultural privilege. 
Rather than the all-encompassing version of experimental literature put forward 
in the Routledge Companion, I will identify a more limited tradition of literary 
experimentation. The editors of the Routledge Companion make a distinction 
between the scientific experiment’s promise to ‘extend the boundaries of 
knowledge’ and the literary experiment’s promise to extend the boundaries of 
‘artistic practice’. This thesis will scrutinise this distinction and suggest that the 
experimentation of a literary work lies not only in its capacity to extend the 
                                                          
2 The term avant-garde stands out here insofar as it seems to contextualise the work it describes to a 
much greater degree. Innovative is a term we might apply to an isolated work but avant-garde seems to 
associate the work it describes with a collection of contemporaneous works that are thought of as 
innovative or “ahead of their time”. This can be seen in the way in which we use avant-garde as a 
collective noun to denominate ‘the pioneers or innovators in any art in a particular period’ (OED Online, 
s.v. ‘avant-garde’, accessed 22 November, 2016, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13610?redirectedFrom=avant-garde#eid) 
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boundaries of artistic practice, but also in its potential to produce knowledge. 
The literary experiment, as I frame it here, should conduct a sustained 
investigation of a particular phenomenon or topic in in a way that enhances our 
understandings of it. A literary experiment, by this account, could not only 
change our understanding of what literature is and does but might also change 
the way we think about a range of other topics from perception to political 
agency. 
This conception of the literary experiment is not altogether new. The 
editors of the Routledge Companion cite Émile Zola’s essay ‘The Experimental 
Novel’ (1880) as the point at which ‘the model of the scientific experiment 
becomes available to describe literary innovation’ (2). Zola certainly used the 
term experimental to describe literature. However, it is misleading to suggest 
that his use of the term is merely describing literary innovation. Zola’s 
‘experimental literature’ is not merely concerned with challenging literary 
conventions. For Zola, the literary experiment did not just aim to extend the 
boundaries of artistic practice; it aimed to produce knowledge. Zola’s 
fundamental concern was with the distinction between observation and 
experiment. He did not like the notion that the naturalist novel was a product of 
pure observation – that it was ‘satisfied with photographing’ (Zola 1893, 9). 
Instead, he argued that the naturalist novelist performed experiments. The 
process of the novelist, for Zola, consists firstly in observing ‘facts in nature’ (9). 
What comes next, however, is a process of experimentation: taking the 
observed facts and ‘acting upon them by the modification of circumstances and 
surroundings without deviation from the laws of nature’ (9). Thus anyone might 
observe the day-to-day behaviour of a friend, but the novelist’s experiment 
would be in imaginatively changing this friend’s circumstances and 
surroundings in order to see what happens. If this process is carried out, for 
Zola, the novelist has produced knowledge: ‘Finally, you possess knowledge of 
the man, scientific knowledge of him in both his individual and social relations’ 
(9). 
For Zola, then, the naturalist novel is not just comparable to the scientific 
experiment; it is itself a branch of experimental science. This was, I think, a new 
idea in literature but as early as 1836 the landscape painter John Constable had 
asked why painting ‘may not be considered as a branch of natural philosophy, 
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of which pictures are but the experiments’ (Thornes 1999, 51). In the nineteenth 
century, then, writers and artists were not just drawing loose analogies between 
artistic and scientific experimentation on the grounds of a common interest in 
innovation. Rather, they were questioning the distinction between the two. Now, 
I find it hard to accept that the versions of artistic creativity described by Zola 
and Constable are acts of scientific experimentation exactly. Zola’s 
experimental novelist, for example, imagines how individuals would react given 
the modification of their ‘circumstances and surroundings’. What an individual 
does in these modified circumstances is merely what the novelist thinks would 
happen – not what happens in practice. It is hard to see how Zola’s 
experimental novelist can get beyond the prediction stage. Moreover, there is 
still a defensible argument to suggest that the analogy between artistic practice 
and scientific experimentation was produced by the artists themselves with a 
view to claiming some of the prestige that science has acquired through the 
course of modernity. Nevertheless, in the sense that Zola and Constable use it, 
‘experimental’ is not interchangeable with innovative and nor does its use imply 
that the work described is not quite the finished product. Instead it implies the 
capacity to produce knowledge. 
 
Literature and Experimental Psychology 
 
The late nineteenth century also saw a development in experimental science 
that is crucial for the idea of a literary experiment: the emergence of 
experimental psychology.3 This development was of such importance because, 
with it, science began to study the topics that had long been of concern to 
literary writers. Scientists began to look for means by which to investigate how 
the human experiences, and performs in, the world. Furthermore, there came a 
surge of interest in the linguistic processes that make the production and 
reception of literature possible. Tim Armstrong writes: ‘psychological 
experimenters considered the possibility of forcing conscious process in writing 
to its limits. Moments of linguistic breakdown or systematic overload and the 
                                                          
3 This inception was punctuated in 1879 with Wilhelm Wundt’s establishment of the world’s first 
psychological laboratory at the University of Leipzig. At this time William James also founded a 
psychological laboratory at Harvard (Barry, Maude and Salisbury 2016, 2). 
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linguistic pathologies which mark the limits of language production became 
crucial’ (Armstrong 1998, 194). This new type of scientific experimentation 
brought with it a great potential for overlap with literature. Not only did early 
psychologists draw on works of literature when developing their theories, but 
the production and reception of literary works became a topic of psychological 
study in its own right. The experimental psychologist June E. Downey, for 
example, published books on ‘imaginal reactions to poetry’ (1911) and the 
‘psychology of literature’ (1929). This influence worked both ways. Literary 
writers had long been covering the scientific experiment thematically – Swift’s 
Gulliver’s Travels (1725) being particularly good proof of this. But at this point 
the practice of psychology began to influence the way in which literature was 
written. A number of critics have recognised this trend. Judith Ryan, for 
example, has argued that the years 1880-1940 saw the development of a 
‘certain kind of modernist literature which responded creatively to the new 
psychologies of the time’ (Ryan 1991, 4-5).4 This literature, Ryan continues, is 
never ‘a mere container for empiricist thought. Rather, it engages with 
psychological empiricism through ‘formal innovations’ (4). The very fabric of the 
literary text is seen to be influenced by the methods of experimental 
psychology. 
Ryan finds a particularly strong example of this trend in the modernist 
writer Gertrude Stein. As is fairly well known, Stein spent a portion of her early 
life working at the Harvard Psychological Laboratory. Here she was under the 
tutelage of some of the key figures in early experimental psychology, namely 
Hugo Münsterberg and William James. Her time in the lab manifests in some 
experiments – partly carried out with partner Leon Solomons – on ‘human 
automatism’. These experiments (the findings of which were published in early 
volumes of the Psychological Review) were what we might now call tests of 
selective and divided attention.5 By this I mean that Stein and Solomons 
                                                          
4 Ryan, here, is not referring exclusively to experimental psychology but psychological experimentation 
does feature in her argument. 
5 At the time, the experiments had a very specific stated purpose. They set out to test the nineteenth-
century notion that the automatic and ‘subconscious’ behaviour of hysterical patients could be 
attributed to a ‘second personality’ (Solomons and Stein 1896, 492). In their investigation, Stein and 
Solomons used methods of distraction in order to bring out involuntary movements in normal patients. 
These movements, Solomons and Stein hoped, would definitely resemble the exhibitions of the ‘second 
personality’ described in hysterical patients. They wanted to eliminate the distinction being made at the 
time between the hysteric’s performance of a ‘second personality’ and the ‘automatic movements’ of 
the ordinary person: essentially disproving the ‘second personality’ thesis. 
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attempted to find out whether a subject could perform one task automatically 
while their attention was ‘occupied as fully as possible’ by another’ (497).6 For 
example, in one experiment the subject is asked to listen for and write down 
certain dictated words while attention is ‘occupied as fully as possible in 
reading’ a novel (497). The subject is also asked to keep his pencil moving 
when no words are being dictated. At first, it is observed, the subject is too 
‘painfully conscious’ of the writing task to comprehend what he is reading. 
Through training, though, the subject acquires a facility for ‘rapidly shifting 
attention from reading to writing and back’ (497). This is said to involve ‘the 
formation of a motor impulse’ and a ‘feeling of effort’ (497). But, as the task 
goes on, both the motor impulse and the feeling of effort are described to go 
away and, for Solomons at least, the act of writing becomes ‘real automatism’ 
(497). This usually occurs, it is observed, at points when the novel becomes 
particularly engrossing: ‘Every once in a while the story grows interesting and 
we return to ourselves with a start to find that we have been going on writing 
just the same’ (499-500). It is concluded that, under certain conditions, writing 
can be produced automatically. It should be stressed that these conclusions 
were largely those of Solomons. Stein’s role in the first set of experiments was 
mainly that of an assistant. She was, it seems, more sceptical about the the 
notion of automatic writing. Stein would, a few years later, carry out some 
experiments on her own which are described in the article ‘Cultivated Human 
Automatism’ (1898). In these experiments ‘automatic writing’ has a more limited 
definition. It does not consist in the production of words and sentences. Instead 
a planchette is used for the production of ‘circles, the figure eight, a long curve 
or an m-figure’ (Stein 1898, 296). In her experiments, Stein’s definition of 
automatic writing was more akin to automatic movement. Indeed, as Steven 
Meyer points out, Stein more or less consistently held the view that ‘if 
movements were automatic they would not produce writing and if, on the other 
hand, they did produce writing they were not automatic’ (Meyer 2001, 226). The 
experiments Stein produced, though, open up some crucial questions. To what 
extent, they ask, do the practices of reading and writing occupy attention? And, 
                                                          
6 The research of Solomons and Stein would inspire later experiments on divided attention. Spelke, Hirst 
and Neisser, for example, draw on the methods of Solomons and Stein in a series of experiments which 
test whether, through practice, subjects can acquire the ability to simultaneously perform two tasks that 
are initially very hard to combine (Spelke, Hirst and Neisser 1976, 216). 
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how far are these practices distinct from other types of bodily movement and 
expression?  
There are numerous ways in which Stein’s encounters with scientific 
method might be interpreted to have informed her later literary practice. An 
illuminating, if slightly blunt, interpretation was made by the prominent 
behaviourist psychologist B. F. Skinner. In an article for The Atlantic Monthly, 
Skinner suggested that in her work Tender Buttons (1914) Stein merely 
reproduced the ‘automatic’ writing of her earlier psychological experiments 
(Skinner 1934, 55). Skinner notes that Stein described the writing she produced 
in the lab as ‘ordinarily unintelligible’ (55). From this he asserts that Stein ‘could 
not have failed to notice’ the resemblances between this writing and the 
‘unintelligible product’ that is Tender Buttons (55). Puzzling Skinner, though, is 
the question of why Stein would choose to publish this product ‘as a serious 
artistic experiment’ (55). Skinner’s article gives a sense of the potential for 
convergence between literary and scientific experimentation in the early 
twentieth century. He recognises Tender Buttons as the product of a scientific 
experiment but his concern is that it will not be recognised as such by all 
readers. Thus the article betrays an anxiety that the experiment of the scientist 
can be confused with the experiment of the writer. Here, Skinner invokes Stein’s 
association with Pablo Picasso and Henri Matisse, suggesting that her 
engagement with these artists prompted her to confuse her earlier scientific 
experiments with art: ‘with such an experience behind one, it is not difficult to 
accept as art what one has hitherto dismissed as the interesting and rather 
surprising result of an experiment’ (55). In Skinner’s version of events, Stein 
made a definite methodological break when she left the science lab and started 
a literary career. However, developments within the artistic world led her – 
mistakenly in Skinner’s opinion – to see artistic value in the products of her 
scientific experimentation. An alternative account would suggest that Stein did 
not make such a stark move away from scientific experimentation. This would 
be to suggest that the practices of science and literature were not mutually 
exclusive – that writing offered Stein ample opportunity for scientific 
experimentation. Steven Meyer gives a detailed account of this: 
Instead of being modelled on scientific experimentation, her [Stein’s] 
writing turns out to be a form of experimental science itself. It is not just 
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that her ideas about writing were influenced by science; she reconfigured 
science as writing and performed scientific experiments in writing (Meyer 
2001, xxi, emphasis in original). 
For Meyer, Stein’s move to literature should not be seen as a complete 
methodological break. Rather writing is seen, by Meyer, as a new form in which 
Stein could continue to perform ‘experimental science’.  
 
Samuel Beckett and the Psychological Experiment 
 
Stein’s literary experiments came to the attention of Samuel Beckett, and what 
Beckett recognised in Stein’s writing was the way in which it brought language 
down to earth, making it material and permeable. In a much-discussed 1937 
letter to Axel Kaun, Beckett contrasted James Joyce’s ‘apotheosis of the word’ 
with Stein’s ‘Logographs’ in which ‘the texture of the language has at least 
become porous’ (Beckett 1983, 172). What I think Beckett apprehends in Stein 
are, in Armstrong’s phrase, ‘moments of linguistic breakdown or systematic 
overload’ – moments in which the capacity of language to make sense is 
stretched. Stein’s writing, for Beckett, is notable for its capacity to change 
understandings of what language is and does. It does not extend the 
boundaries of artistic practice so much as it interrogates our conception of a 
particular topic: language. In this way Beckett’s understanding of Stein’s writing 
is close to my understanding of a literary experiment. Stein though, Beckett 
speculates, produced this effect ‘quite by chance’ and retained a fairly naive 
view of language: ‘the unfortunate lady (is she still alive?) is doubtlessly still in 
love with her vehicle’ (172).  
For his own part, Beckett suggests that he wants to bring the word into 
disrepute ‘with full knowledge and intent’ (172-3). In the same letter, he 
suggests that language appears to him ‘like a veil which one has to tear apart in 
order to get to those things (or the Nothingness) lying behind it’ (171). There are 
a number of directions in which this idea could be taken and I would argue that 
these directions correspond to significant developments in the history of Beckett 
criticism. In the Kaun letter Beckett states that language is material and 
questions what lies behind this ‘terrible materiality’ (172). But what does Beckett 
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think lies behind language? In one phase of Beckett criticism, it might have 
been thought an immaterial space of the mind. This phase is what Ulrika Maude 
calls ‘the first wave of Beckett scholarship’, which ‘read Beckett as a 
transcendental writer who subscribed to a Cartesian dualism’ (Maude 2009, 1).7 
Alternatively, one might accentuate Beckett’s speculation that there is nothing 
behind language and adopt the more poststructuralist view exemplified in 
studies such as Steven Connor’s Repetition, Theory and Text (1988), and 
Leslie Hill’s Beckett’s Fiction: In Different Words (1990). This would be to argue 
that Beckett (aporetically) apprehends the absence of a transcendent meaning, 
and is concerned with the interminable play of language and signs – the 
instability of verbal meaning. In this study, though, I want to follow a more 
recent trend in Beckett scholarship. This trend, represented by critics such as 
Anthony Uhlmann (2006) Ulrika Maude (2009), Laura Salisbury (2012) and Dirk 
Van Hulle (2014) might be thought of as less word-centric insofar as it thinks 
beyond readings of Beckett that portray him as a kind of nominalist. In these 
studies, Beckett’s work does not pursue some metaphysical essence behind the 
veil of language, and neither does it wholly accept that there is nothing beyond 
language and discourse. Instead, Beckett’s interest in language forms one part 
of a wider investigation of human experience. In this line of thought, Beckett is 
concerned with the failure of linguistic meaning, but also with other kinds of 
meaning that might exist alongside, or emerge out of, this failure. Beckett’s 
concern with speech and writing, here, can co-exist with interests in other kinds 
of human activity.8 
 This interest in human activity, I contend, is where we might find a close 
relationship between Beckett’s work and the practices of experimental 
psychology. Armstrong is right to point out that experimental psychology has 
always been interested in the ‘limits of language’ (how language is, or is not, 
understood, produced or learned) but much psychological research has 
obviously also been carried out on a variety of non-verbal aspects of human 
                                                          
7 Here, we might look to works by critics such as Hugh Kenner (1959), John Fletcher (1967), and 
Lawrence Harvey (1970).  
8 Another approach that has been taken, here, is the consideration of Beckett’s relationship with 
phenomenology. This is a concern that I will touch on in this study. For a more detailed account, though, 
one can look to Maude and Feldman’s 2009 collection Beckett and Phenomenology. Alternatively, for an 
approach that is more focused on Beckett’s drama, see Stanton B. Garner Jr.’s discussion of Beckett 
in Bodied Spaces: Phenomenology and Performance in Contemporary Drama (Garner Jr. 1994, 18-38); or 
Anna McMullan’s Performing Embodiment in Samuel Beckett’s Drama (2012). 
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experience. In this study, for instance, I will assay the ways in which 
psychologists have gone about studying processes such as visual and auditory 
perception, selective attention and mental imagery. Though I will point out some 
differences, it is my contention that there are striking similarities between 
experimental psychology’s investigation of these processes and the practices of 
Beckett. But if this is the case, one might ask, from where did this commonality 
derive? Certainly Beckett’s personal engagement with early psychology was not 
as substantial as Stein’s. The evidence for Beckett’s interest in experimental 
psychology is limited to some notes taken from R. S. Woodworth’s 
Contemporary Schools of Psychology (1931) and Jean Paul Sartre’s 
L’Imagination (1936) (Feldman 2006, 102-113; Van Hulle and Nixon 2013, 210-
11). Woodworth offers a broad summary of early psychological theories and 
methods, while Sartre’s study briefly outlines early psychological approaches to 
the image. Thus, especially during his later life, Beckett’s knowledge of 
experimental psychology was presumably both minimal and outdated. 
Nevertheless, engagements with experimental psychology have been 
recognised throughout the oeuvre. Matthew Feldman has argued that ‘the entire 
opening exchange in Murphy is an artistic rendering’ of Beckett’s 1930s notes 
on Gestalt psychology’ (Feldman 2009, 103). And Laura Salisbury has 
suggested that, in later works such as Watt (largely written during the Second 
World War but first published in 1953) and Molloy (1951), Beckett challenges 
Gestaltists by ‘drawing attention to the sheer fatiguing work involved in sifting 
figure from ground’ (Salisbury 2010, 357). Similarly, as we will see momentarily, 
Ulrika Maude has argued that Beckett’s late drama consistently draws on the 
behaviourist psychology pioneered by John Broadus Watson (Maude 2014, 85-
87). To say that Beckett’s work engages with experimental psychology, then, 
would not be novel or controversial.   
However, my interest lies in the extent to which the psychological 
experiment comes to inform Beckett’s own experimental methods, and 
ultimately what these methods can be seen to achieve. One school of thought 
on the subject would suggest that, for Beckett, psychology merely acted as 
‘fodder for the writing process’ (Feldman 2006, 102). This is the view put 
forward by Rubin Rabinovitz who highlights a tension between Beckett’s 
introspective methods and those used by psychologists: 
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Modern psychologists seldom use introspection when gathering data for 
analysis. Given that individuals have direct access only to their own 
minds, introspection does not provide the intersubjectively verifiable data 
necessary for scientific generalizations. Hence psychologists prefer to 
observe others. (Rabinovitz 1992, 184). 
Thus, for Rabinovitz, the modern psychologist observes others and analyses 
their behaviour in order to make ‘scientific generalizations’. For Beckett though, 
Rabinovitz continues, this method was unsuitable. This is because Beckett’s 
literature is concerned with ‘the most profound levels of mental reality’ and in 
these levels there ‘are issues that can no longer be dealt with logically’: 
The mind deals with flurries of fleeting images confused, distorted, and 
disorganized. Consequently, there comes a time when Beckett turns 
away from rational methods and employs a more subjective approach 
(185). 
Rabinovitz suggests that, in Beckett’s oeuvre, there is a preference for the 
observation of inner self over the observation of others. Psychological concepts, 
from this perspective, might have served as inspiration but they could not give 
Beckett the insight into the ‘profound levels of mental reality’ that his art 
required. Rabinovitz concludes: ‘though Beckett sometimes touches on a wide 
range of psychological concepts, he is also ready to abandon them when they 
become superfluous’ (186).9 
I agree with some aspects of Rabinovitz’s argument. I will not be arguing, 
for example, that Beckett’s work is concerned with producing ‘physical models 
to describe mental reality’ (184). Nevertheless, there are a number of points that 
this thesis will take issue with. First, Rabinovitz seems to make the assumption 
that Beckett is exclusively concerned with ‘the most profound levels of mental 
reality’. I am not sure this is the case. I agree that some of Beckett’s ‘characters 
are engaged in solitary quests that represent journeys of self-discovery’, and 
that some ‘of the disputes between shadowy figures can be interpreted as inner 
arguments within a single mind’ (185). But I don’t think this means Beckett’s 
                                                          
9 Other critics have argued that Beckett’s work is openly hostile to certain aspects of experimental 
psychology. Horst Breuer, for example, has argued that Beckett ‘irreverently avails himself’ of the 
mechanical approach of the scientist and ‘satirizes the academic earnest’ of psychological experiments 
(Breuer 2006, 316). 
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work completely eschews an interest in how subjects interact with the external 
world.10 Indeed, I will argue that this process becomes a central theme in 
Beckett’s work. More simply, if Beckett is purely interested in introspection and 
uninterested in the external world, why produce work for others? To some 
extent, Beckett’s putting his work out there must imply a need to find out how 
particular stimuli affect the external world. To take one example (which I discuss 
in chapter 1), Beckett’s stipulation that the speech in Not I should be ‘addressed 
less to the understanding than to the nerves of the audience’ suggests an 
engagement with the audience’s physiological and psychological response to 
the given stimulus (Harmon 1998, 283). Thus, I do not think Beckett’s process is 
so far removed from that of Rabinovitz’s ‘modern psychologist’. Second, partly 
because of the time at which he was writing, I think Rabinovitz gives a 
problematically limited account of ‘the modern psychologist’. He seems to 
define the psychologist by the attitude taken towards introspection, suggesting 
that, by definition, the modern psychologist is largely uninterested in 
introspection. This may be true for a behaviourist such as John Broadus 
Watson but it certainly does not hold for psychology as a whole. Methods of 
introspection were practiced by early psychologists such as William James, 
Wilhelm Wundt and Edward Titchener, all of whom Beckett read about in 
Woodworth (Trinity College Dublin MS 10971/7; TCD MS 10971/8). Though, as 
I will discuss, the advent of behaviourism saw these methods fall out of fashion 
in the early to mid-twentieth century, they are now recognised to have made an 
important contribution to modern psychology. In a recent survey of the practices 
of scientific psychology, for example, Tim Shallice and Richard Cooper call the 
phenomenological work carried out by early psychologists: ‘islands of progress 
in a sea of ignorance’ (Shallice and Cooper 2011, 3). Shallice and Cooper go on 
to bemoan the fact that the ‘ideology of behaviourism’ meant that these 
advances were ignored for a large part of the twentieth century (3). Rabinovitz’s 
notion of ‘modern’ psychology probably reflects mid twentieth-century 
psychology’s discounting of introspection. But, for psychology as it stands 
today, introspection is not such a dirty word. As we will see, particularly with 
regards to the topic of mental imagery, introspection has been an important, if 
not central, part of experimental psychology throughout its history. More 
                                                          
10 Chapter 6 will cover this question in more detail. I will discuss, for example, Dirk Van Hulle’s (2014) 
view that Beckett’s work anticipates ideas relating to ‘the extended mind’. 
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fundamentally, for both the aesthetic and the psychological experimenter, 
introspection is a source of ideas. In the genesis of their experiments, each 
necessarily draws on their own experience for inspiration and then envisions 
how a particular experiment would work in the laboratory, or on page, stage or 
screen. Thus, I do not think Beckett can be distanced from psychology on the 
grounds that Rabinovitz uses. This thesis will be a re-assessment of the 
relationship between Beckett’s process and the process of the experimental 
psychologist. I hope that it also contributes to a wider discussion of twentieth-
century literature’s relation to the scientific experiment. 
 
Beckett, Experimental Psychology and Psychoanalysis 
 
It is important to note that Beckett’s reading of experimental psychology ran 
closely alongside his study and experience of psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy. Indeed, in Beckett’s reading, psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy were nowhere near so far removed from experimental 
psychology as they are often thought to be.11 In Woodworth’s book, for 
example, psychoanalysis is defined as a school of psychology along with 
behaviourism and Gestalt. Like behaviourism, Beckett noted, psychoanalysis 
was a ‘reaction against “consciousness” psychology of 19th century’ and, he 
continues, both approaches sought to ‘humanise psychology’ (TCD MS 
10971/7/7). It is my contention, then, that Beckett did not read psychoanalysis 
and experimental psychology as distinct disciplines but as different ways of 
investigating human experience, each having particular strengths and 
weaknesses. In this way, he did not have to decide between behaviourism, 
psychoanalysis, and any other school, but could merely pick out the bits that he 
found interesting from each. Furthermore, as Matthew Feldman points out, 
‘Beckett’s notes on psychology must be viewed in terms of a larger self-
education process during the interwar years’, which took in philosophy, theology 
                                                          
11 It is commonly recognised that there was a split between therapeutic and experimental psychology at 
the end of the nineteenth century (Rylance 2000, 5-6). As well as the establishment of psychological 
laboratories across the world, the period saw what Rylance terms the ‘growth of therapeutic sub-
specialization’ (5-6). In effect, the practice of treating those with psychological ailments or pathologies, 
and that of attaining psychological knowledge through experimentation grew apart and became 
different professions.  
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and other branches of science (Feldman 2006, 78). ‘No inflexible barrier’, 
Feldman argues, ‘should be erected to separate the “Philosophy-” from 
“Psychology Notes”’; and neither set of notes should be severed from the ‘vital 
period in which they were transcribed’ (80). Beckett’s study of psychology, then, 
may well be seen as one part of a broad intellectual survey which enabled him 
to eventually find his own methods of experimentation. But with this being said, I 
want to argue that psychology offered Beckett a particularly important set of 
ideas. Psychology introduced Beckett, not only to a collection of methods with 
which to explore conscious experience, but also to the idea that human activity 
extended beyond consciousness. This is evident at the beginning of the 
Woodworth notes. Psychoanalysis, Beckett writes, practices the ‘apotheosis of 
unconscious’, while behaviourism moves towards the ‘rejection of 
consciousness altogether’ (TCD MS 10971/7/7). Beckett knew that psychology 
was, historically, interested in consciousness. He would go on to note the 
methods by which introspectionist psychologists such as Edward Titchener had 
sought to explore conscious experience empirically. However, it is crucial to 
note that psychology showed Beckett a number of methods by which one could 
study human activity without focusing on consciousness. 
Of course, different schools of psychology sought to do this in very 
different ways. Psychoanalysis, Beckett learned, worked with the view that 
much of one’s psychic material is repressed and so ordinarily unavailable to 
conscious experience. Thus, in the analytic situation, through methods such as 
relaxation and ‘talking out’, one aimed to ‘repeat as a current experience that 
which has been repressed’ (10971/7/13). Behaviourist psychology, by contrast, 
took its cues from physiology and sought to study human performance without 
reference to conscious experience. As Beckett noted, this approach was given 
great impetus by Ivan Pavlov’s finding of the ‘conditioned reflex’ in his famous 
experiments with dogs (10971/7/8). In Pavlov’s experiments, dogs were 
exposed to a certain sound every time they were given food and eventually the 
sound alone was enough to make the dogs salivate. Consequently, the sound 
became an instrument with which to exert control over the dogs (Woodworth 
2013, 56-58). Watson’s behaviourism, Beckett noted, applied the ‘conditioned 
reflex concept to all human habit formation’ (TCD MS 10971/7/8).  The crucial 
point here is that the individual (human or animal) responds to many stimuli 
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without having to think about it. Thus, as Watson put it, human activity can be 
studied, not in terms of consciousness, but ‘in terms of stimulus and response, 
in terms of habit formation, in terms of habit integration and the like’ (Watson 
1913, 166-7).   
Of these approaches, Beckett criticism has evidently tended to 
acknowledge the influence of the former over the latter. There is an expansive 
body of commentary that considers Beckett’s relationship with psychoanalysis,12 
but considerably fewer critics have addressed the significance of behaviourism 
and other branches of experimental psychology. There are two main reasons 
for this. First, historically, literary critics have been more interested in literature’s 
relationship with psychoanalysis than with other branches of psychology. Judith 
Ryan writes: ‘when we think of the relation between psychology and literature 
most of us think of Freudian psychology or one of its more recent modifications, 
such as that of [Jacques] Lacan’ (Ryan 1991,1).13 Second, in the case of 
Beckett, there is good biographical evidence to highlight the author’s interest in 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. It has long been known, for example, that 
Beckett undertook psychotherapy with Wilfred Bion at the recommendation of 
his friend Geoffrey Thompson (Feldman 2006, 88). Moreover, Beckett’s 
‘Psychology Notes’ were compiled during the time of these sessions, and the 
overall weighting of the notes shows a clear bias towards psychoanalysis. As 
Feldman observes, it is only the presence of notes taken from Woodworth’s 
book that allows us to call this ‘corpus of material the “Psychology Notes” rather 
than the “Psychoanalysis Notes”’ (102). In spite of this imbalance, I argue that it 
would be unwise to discount the importance of other forms of psychology to 
Beckett’s work. To be clear, I do not see this as a matter of either/or. The 
practices of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy were undoubtedly influential for 
Beckett, and they continue to help us come to an understanding of Beckett’s 
texts (as well as literature more generally). This, though, should not lead us to 
                                                          
12 To give a few examples: Barbara Shapiro (1969); Didier Anzieu (1994); Phil Baker (1997), J.D. O’Hara 
(1997) Ciaran Ross (2011). Also, we might look to a special issue of Samuel Beckett Today/Aujourd'hui 
entitled Beckett & La Psychanalyse & Psychoanalysis (Houppermans Buning and Butler 1996). 
13 On a similar note, Rylance observes: ‘for many cultural historians and literary critics, psychoanalysis 
has long been considered the branch of psychology most suited to humanistic enquiry. In part, this is a 
reaction to the ascendancy of experimentalism, because psychoanalysis has been seen to have a more 
“personalist” orientation, next to the steely science’ (Rylance 2000, 8). Though, as books such as Ryan’s 
and Rylance’s exemplify, the relationship between literature and other branches of psychology has 
received more attention from the 1990s onwards. 
21 
 
ignore the relationship between literary writers such as Beckett and 
experimental psychology. In the context of Beckett’s work, it is my argument 
that the approaches were frequently drawn together by a common interest. In 
psychoanalysis, as in experimental psychology, there is a concern with 
positioning and stimulating the human body in ways that facilitate new 
understandings of experience and performance. In psychoanalysis, as I discuss 
in chapters 1, 2 and 3, this manifested in particular stipulations regarding the 
therapeutic setting. Here the aim was to induce experience which might bring to 
the level of consciousness that which had been repressed. In experimental 
psychology, though, the idea was taken further. Experimenters have continually 
found new and innovative ways of testing and manipulating the human body, 
with the ultimate aim of finding out what the human can do and how this 
performance is experienced. Through experimentation, the psychologist aims to 
bring to light hitherto unknown capacities, effects and affective responses. This 
is the tradition in which I want to place Beckett’s work and, in the final part of 
this introduction, I will begin to demonstrate this through a reading of the 
television play Ghost Trio (1976). 
 
Stimulus-Response and the Influence of Psychoanalysis in Ghost Trio 
 
Ghost Trio, I argue, incorporates Beckett’s interest in both the inter-personal 
investigation of subjectivity that proceeds within psychotherapy, and the more 
objective approach of the behaviourist stimulus-response experiment. There is 
some critical precedence for this reading. Critics such as Catherine Russell 
(1989) have recognised the play’s resonances with psychoanalytic theory 
(particularly that of Lacan), while more recent critics have noticed the influence 
of behaviourism throughout Beckett’s later drama. Ulrika Maude, for example, 
recognises the influence of behaviourism in the way that Beckett subjects ‘his 
characters to stimulus-response experiments’ (Maude 2013, 85). Maude, here, 
points to 1963’s Play in which the three protagonists appear to be ‘trained to 
spew out language at the instigation of the beam of a spotlight, conditioned to 
speak when the light hits’ the giant urns in which they reside (86). I find the link 
with behaviourism convincing here but one might also recognise elements from 
Beckett’s study of psychoanalysis. As Beckett noted, the ‘free association’ or 
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‘talking-out’ method was fundamental to psychoanalytic practice and this 
undoubtedly resonates with the verbal expulsions of Play (TCD MS 
10971/7/13). Similarly, in Ghost Trio, Beckett’s protagonist seems to be 
subjected to a kind of stimulus-response experiment but one can still see the 
influence of psychoanalysis. In the play, a female voice (V) observes and 
commentates on the behaviour of a male figure (F). In part 1 of the play, the 
‘Pre-action’, V introduces the ‘familiar chamber’ and the few things within it: a 
window, a door, a pallet, the floor (Beckett 2006, 409). She seems to have 
complete control over this space. Critics such as Graley Herren (2007) and 
Colin Gardner (2012) have compared this controlled environment to that of the 
television studio. I would add to this the setting of a scientific laboratory. In a 
description of Pavlov’s conditioning experiments, Woodworth describes 
Pavlov’s use of ‘a special conditioned reflex laboratory’ for his experiments 
(Woodworth 2013 58). The conditioned response, it was observed, could be 
‘inhibited by any distracting stimulus such as disturbs the dog or makes him 
investigate’ (58, emphasis in original). With this in mind, Pavlov made ‘elaborate 
provisions for excluding extraneous sights, sounds, odors, gusts of air, etc. (58). 
The environment in Ghost Trio also seems set up to exclude extraneous 
distractions. More generally, the defining of the environment is also important in 
the context of an experiment because it allows for the study to be repeated and 
the results verified. There is emphasis on the idea that the action to follow is not 
limited to one geographical position but can be repeated anywhere if the same 
elements are put in place. I am not trying to argue, here, that the scene of 
Ghost Trio is a Pavlovian laboratory (there are numerous interpretations one 
could make) but I would suggest that elements within the ‘Pre-action’ recall the 
approaches taken by Pavlov and Watson. 
What one might also question with regards to the Pre-action, is whether 
the audience are themselves subjects in a stimulus-response experiment. At the 
beginning of the play, V seems to address a television audience directly: 
Good evening. Mine is a faint voice. Kindly tune accordingly. (Pause.) 
Good evening. Mine is a faint voice. Kindly tune accordingly. (Pause.) It 
will not be raised, nor lowered, whatever happens (Beckett 2006, 408). 
The behaviour of the television audience is brought into question here. When 
asked to ‘kindly tune accordingly’ it is implied that there is the possibility that the 
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addressee could be unkind and not tune accordingly. If the addressee is 
assumed to be a television viewer, Beckett seems to be drawing attention to the 
viewer’s freedom to adjust the settings on the television set. Colin Gardner 
suggests something of this when he argues that Ghost Trio ‘introduces the idea 
of the televisual mise en scène as a pure abstract object, something which may 
in principle be manipulated by the viewer through controlling volume, colour, 
hue and brightness’ (Gardner 2012, 126). But the possibility for manipulation 
works both ways. There is also a sense in which V’s request speaks to the 
television’s capacity to control the human subject. When V states that her voice 
is faint and asks her addressee to ‘tune accordingly’ there is the implication that 
her voice can only remain faint if the volume is not increased. If the voice is 
going to be faint, the addressee must co-operate. However, as Steven Connor 
suggests the ‘optimum’ volume demanded is ‘slightly uncomfortable’ (Connor 
2014, 79). In the usual way, one uses the volume so as not to strain to hear 
what is being said on the television. V is asking her addressee to set the volume 
to a level at which they will have to strain. The voice is asking the addressee to 
do something quite unintuitive and giving no reason for her demand. She does 
not explain why her voice is faint, only emphasises that it should be so. The 
atmosphere of the opening of the play is experimental in a sense that goes 
beyond formal innovation. Beckett is experimenting with the television’s 
capacity to manipulate its audience.14 Here, Beckett seems to explore a tension 
identified by Jonathan Crary between two attitudes towards the television 
viewer. On the one hand, the conviction that ‘television viewers constitute a 
hypothetical community of rational and volitional subjects’ (Crary 1999, 72). On 
the other, the position ‘that human subjects have determinate 
psychophysiological capacities and functions that might be susceptible to 
technological management’ (72). 
                                                          
14 The concern with manipulating behaviour raises a question of observation and measurement. As 
Jonathan Bignell notes Beckett’s work for television addresses ‘the dynamics of viewership’ but Beckett 
himself does not seem to have been interested in the detail of how actual viewers responded to his 
plays (Bignell 2009, 176). However, Bignell’s work shows the extent to which the responses of viewers to 
Beckett’s works for television were being observed and measured by the institutions that screened 
them (176-87). At this point, the concern was largely with the audience’s impressions of the play 
(whether they liked it or not). Works such as Ghost Trio, though, point to a different type of viewer 
research which seeks to observe responses more exactly and directly (measuring, for example whether 
the sound is turned up or down).  
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The link with the stimulus-response experiment becomes even more 
salient in the second part of the play. The ‘Action’, presents V’s attempt to fulfil 
Watson’s stated aim of predicting responses to certain stimuli. Through 
stimulus-response experiments, Watson argued, psychologists could ‘learn 
general and particular methods by which behaviour may be controlled’ (Watson 
1913, 166-7). In this account, learning how to control human behaviour must be 
carried out through a process of observation. The individual is exposed to 
certain stimuli with responses being monitored. If this is done enough, the 
school will eventually ascertain: ‘such data and laws that, given the stimulus 
psychology can predict the response; or, on the other hand, given the response, 
it can specify the nature of the effective stimulus’ (167). This process of 
predicting responses to certain stimuli is played out in Ghost Trio. V is able to 
predict the behaviour of F when he is exposed to a certain sound. V tells us that 
F ‘will now think he hears her’ (Beckett 2006, 410). A sound has been 
introduced but the audience is not exposed to the sound that F hears. It is clear 
only that it is a sound which F associates with an anonymous ‘her’. V has 
control over the application of this sound and also knows that it is not ‘her’ in 
reality. There is an element of conditioning in this. V has identified a sound that 
F associates with ‘her’. The use of this sound alone now prompts F to exhibit 
the behaviour appropriate to hearing her. This behaviour takes the form of a 
movement: F ‘raises head sharply, turns still crouched to door, fleeting face, 
tense pose. 5 seconds’ (410). Importantly, the prompting of this behaviour is 
repeatable. V gives the stimulus twice and both times it gets the same 
response. After the second response, V is able to predict a series of 
movements that F will make around the chamber: ‘Now to door’ (F goes to 
door), ‘Open’ (F pushes door open), ‘Now to window’ (F goes to window), 
‘Open’ (F pushes window open) (410). This is Watson’s ideal. V seems to have 
acquired the knowledge of F’s behaviour to be able to predict his responses to a 
certain situation. So much is this the case that it might appear as though V has 
total control over F. However, this level of prediction and control does not 
persist. After going to the pallet, as V predicted, F goes to a mirror and looks at 
his face in it. V gives a ‘[surprised] Ah!’ She has not predicted this (410-11).  
Now, within the experimental environment, the fact that V has not been able to 
predict F’s behaviour completely is not a major problem. V, it seems, is still 
ascertaining empirical data about the habits of F through continued observation. 
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Thus, the change in behaviour may be seen to aid the establishment of more 
thorough models of prediction and control. 
 Things become more complicated, though, when one considers the 
mirror to which F is drawn. First it should be noted that V did not introduce the 
mirror when she was outlining the environment in the Pre-action. Unlike Pavlov, 
who made sure that any ‘distracting stimulus’ was removed from his laboratory, 
V has allowed an alien object to interfere with her controlled environment. We 
do not know how the mirror has got into the chamber and its mysterious 
presence gives the space an uncontrollable specificity. But of course F’s 
interest in the mirror also hints at his own self-reflection.15 There is the sense 
that we are moving from the objective approach of behaviourism towards the 
more inter-personal investigations of psychoanalysis. This coincides with an 
increased focus on F. At the beginning of the play, we are invited to speak of F 
largely in terms of behaviour. F is presented mainly through a long shot and the 
emphasis is on what he does: 
F is seated upon a stool, bowed forward, face hidden, clutching with both 
hands a small cassette (Beckett 2006, 409).  
However, in the second part of the play we see a close-up of F’s face in the 
mirror, and at the end of the play the face becomes the focal point: 
With growing music move in slowly to close up of head bowed right down 
over cassette now held in arms and invisible. Hold till end of Largo. 
Silence. F Raises head. Face seen clearly for second time. 10 seconds 
(413-4). 
In the published text Beckett gives no direction to illuminate F’s expression. 
However, in the German production he breaks into a smile, of sorts. I will 
address the question of facial expression in Beckett’s drama more thoroughly in 
chapter two but here I merely want to suggest that the increasing focus on the 
face in Ghost Trio indicates a move away from the stimulus-response 
experiment towards the psychoanalytic case history. We move away from V’s 
concern with F’s behaviour and are instead given a more intimate perspective 
on F. Key here, is the question of who the ‘her’ that F thinks he hears might be 
                                                          
15 Russell, here, discusses Beckett’s use of the mirror in light of Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage 
(Russell 1989, 25). 
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– a lost love perhaps – and how he feels as he waits for her. But the link with 
psychoanalysis is stronger than this. As Friedrich Kittler observes, the case 
histories of psychoanalysis were distinguished from literary productions by the 
fact that they interrogated the ‘depths of the soul’ without portraying ‘the 
identities of the persons described to readers’ (Kittler 1990, 287). They sought 
to reveal psychic realities while, for mainly practical reasons, concealing 
biographical detail. Ghost Trio works in this tradition. F is an anonymous figure 
and we know nothing of his background, but we do observe him as he awaits a 
lost other and, by the end of the play, his face is presented in intimate detail.16 
In Beckett’s literary experiment, elements of the behaviourist stimulus-response 
experiment are interwoven with elements of the psychoanalytic case study. 
 
The Scope of the Study 
 
Ghost Trio is positioned at the heart of this study’s period of focus and it 
encapsulates many of the concerns that will run through this thesis. To some 
extent it can be seen as an experiment on how we perceive and attend to 
sensory information. We have seen the extent to which the play is concerned 
with the ways in which both F and the audience see and hear. The first section 
of the study will consider this element of Beckett’s work further through the 
reading of three theatrical works of the 1970s: Not I (1972), That Time (1976) 
and Footfalls (1976). In chapter 1, I will consider the case of Not I, focusing on 
speech perception and comprehension. Chapter 2 discusses face reading and 
selective attention in the context of That Time. Finally, chapter 3 looks carefully 
at the concept of inattention in twentieth-century culture and argues that 
Footfalls contributes to the study of this concept. All of these works, I will argue, 
show perception and attention as effortful, straining, and partial processes. In 
this way, Beckett helps us understand the fallible labour involved in 
apprehending and comprehending the world. But, as was the case with Ghost 
Trio, it will also be my argument that these plays engage with a tradition 
                                                          
16 A complication arises here when one considers how the face is conceived in Freudian psychoanalytic 
practice. I will consider this problem in more detail in chapter 2.  
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concerned with the representation of an individual’s life.17 Thus the section will 
consider how two aspects of modernity interact within Beckett’s plays: the 
modernity of information processing (how we perceive, attend to and perform in 
the world), and the modernity of self-authorship (how we construct ourselves as 
unified – and marketable – individuals). 
If the first section considers the ways in which we form impressions of 
the world in real time, the second focuses on how these impressions stay with 
us when the original sensory stimuli have been extinguished. These chapters all 
focus on the topic of mental imagery. In Ghost Trio, as we have seen, F thinks 
he hears a mysterious ‘her’. However, because this ‘her’ never materialises, 
there is a question of whether F is perceiving a sound which he thinks is ‘her’, or 
whether he is imagining or recalling the sound. It is this problematizing of the 
distinction between the percept and the mental image that animates the 
chapters of the second section. Chapter 4 assesses the ways in which the 
mental image has been defined in Beckett criticism, placing Beckett’s image 
between the aesthetic ideas of the Romantics, and more scientific attitudes 
towards mental imagery. This is punctuated by a reading of the 1982 television 
play Nacht und Träume. The approach defined in chapter 4 is then developed in 
chapter 5 in which I argue that the late prose texts Ill Seen Ill Said (1981) and 
Worstward Ho (1982) represent attempts to find a vocabulary with which to 
discuss the mental image. The study closes with a discussion of imagery and 
isolation in chapter 6.  Focusing on Company (1979), I will suggest that 
Beckettian isolation functions as a site of both phenomenological exploration 
and psychophysiological manipulation. Again, the chapter will consider the link 
between individuality and psychological investigation. I will question how 
Beckett’s concern with the process of mental imagery interacts with his interest 
in conceptions of the modern, isolated individual. 
A final point to make in this introduction is one of period and medium. 
Though this thesis will take in the entirety of Beckett’s oeuvre, I will concentrate 
mainly on a series of texts that begins with 1972’s Not I and runs through to 
Beckett’s very late works in the 1980s. I have chosen this late period of 
Beckett’s life because, by this time, he had produced work for a wide variety of 
                                                          
17 As Anna McMullan (2010) writes, ‘the need to be seen, or to tell or listen to the story of a life drives 
these plays’ (McMullan 2010, 108). 
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media. In addition to his famous works for page and stage,18 Beckett had, by 
the beginning of the period in question, worked with film (1965’s Film), radio (for 
example, 1959’s Embers) and television (Eh Joe in 1966). Thus, as well as 
using words as a vehicle with which to ‘get to those things (or the Nothingness) 
lying behind’ them, Beckett had long been working with the aesthetics of sound 
and vision. If these developments did not exactly allow Beckett to move beyond 
the ‘terrible materiality’ of words, they certainly presented him with alternatives. 
As we have seen, Ghost Trio employs words but it also uses the medium of 
television to experiment on topics such as sound, body movement, and facial 
expression. It will be my argument that Beckett’s adaptation to a variety of 
media in this period allowed him to experiment in a sense that goes beyond 
aesthetic innovation. Beckett’s aesthetic experiments, I suggest, have the 
potential to enrich our understanding of how the human perceives, attends to, 
and imagines the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Most famously on page, The Unnamable (1953) and on stage Waiting for Godot (1953).  
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Chapter 1 
Attention and Speech Perception in Not I 
 
In Suspensions of Perception (1999) Jonathan Crary argues that there was ‘an 
explosion of research and debate’ on the topic of attention in the late nineteenth 
century (Crary 1999, 23). This, for Crary, was crucial to the development of 
experimental psychology. Crary suggests that ‘attention is not just one of many 
topics examined experimentally by late nineteenth-century psychology’ (25). 
Instead, ‘a subject whose attentiveness was the site of observation, 
classification and measurement’ was presupposed in most of the discipline’s 
key areas of research (25). For Crary, this emphasis on attention marks a 
fundamental cultural shift. He argues that, in Western society, ‘new imperatives 
of attentiveness’ were emerging which aimed to make the perceiving body 
‘productive and orderly, whether as a student, worker or consumer’ (22-3). It is 
no coincidence, by Crary’s account, that psychological research on attention 
emerged alongside an economic system that demanded the ‘attentiveness of a 
subject in a wide range of new productive and spectacular tasks’ (29). 
‘Inattention’, Crary argues, ‘within a context of new forms of large scale 
industrialized production began to be treated as a danger and a serious 
problem’ (13). The ‘nascent field of scientific psychology’ worked within a 
culture where the human subject was asked to attend to ‘an endless sequence 
of new products, sources of stimulation, and streams of information’ (13-14).  
Moving into the twentieth century and beyond, Crary suggests, that ‘the 
problem of attention has remained more or less within the center of institutional 
empirical research’ since the 1880s (33). However, the empirical study of 
attention has undergone significant changes in the period between the end of 
the nineteenth century and today. First, the rise of behaviourism undoubtedly 
lessened the degree to which psychologists studied the concept of attention in 
the early twentieth century.19 Attention was problematic for behaviourists 
                                                          
19 Crary does rehearse the argument that the hegemony of behaviourism’ in the early twentieth century 
marginalized attention ‘as an explicit object of research’ (33-34). However, for Crary this was more a 
matter of ‘terminological polemics’, than methodological substance. He insists that concepts of 
attention were important to the methods of behaviourism as ‘the entire regime of stimulus-response 
research was founded on the attentive capacities of a human (or even animal) subject’ (34). 
30 
 
because, unlike overt responses, attentional processes are not directly 
observable. One cannot measure a drop in attentiveness to an object in the 
same way as, say, a drop in body temperature. Instead, the experimenter has to 
make inferences from behaviour, or ask for introspective reports. Thus, the 
concept of attention did not fit easily into the early twentieth-century 
behaviourist paradigm. The concept, however, becomes important again in the 
period after the Second World War. Crary glosses the suggestion that ‘problems 
related to the efficient human use of new technology during World War II were 
in part responsible for a new wave of research into attention’ (34). For example, 
there were practical needs for finding out how long human operators could 
remain attentive when scanning radar screens (34). Similarly, Shallice and 
Cooper point to ‘a modern approach to the area’ of selective attention that 
begins after the Second World War (Shallice and Cooper 2011, 29). The World 
Wars had seen the advent of aviation as a mode of war and it was desirable 
that the pilots operating planes kept contact with those on the ground. But, it 
was asked: ‘how many channels of contact can be maintained with a pilot’ (29)? 
As we will see, this question triggered a wave of research attempting to tackle 
questions of how we are able to focus on one particular task for an extended 
period of time, or attend to multiple tasks simultaneously.  
For a variety of theoretical and practical reasons, then, the concept of 
attention has been prominent in the history of experimental psychology. In the 
next three chapters, I want to consider the extent to which it has influenced 
twentieth-century aesthetic experimentation, particularly that of Samuel Beckett. 
Focusing on three of Beckett’s plays from the 1970s – Not I, That Time and 
Footfalls – this section will compare the way in which attention is approached in 
experimental psychology to the way in which it operates in Beckett’s work. The 
current chapter will begin by suggesting that Beckett’s approaches to attention 
and those of experimental psychology (as well as more psychoanalytic 
approaches) are rooted in the ideas of the German philosopher Arthur 
Schopenhauer. It will then move on to an extended discussion of Not I in which I 
consider the play both as a theatrical performance that makes certain 
attentional demands of its actors and audience, and as a narrative which 
attends to the life story of a protagonist in a particular way. The chapters that 
follow will then consider That Time and Footfalls alongside some more specific 
31 
 
aspects of attention: how we attend to faces and manage competing channels 
of stimuli in That Time, and inattention (how we miss things that are right in front 
of us) in Footfalls. At the heart of the section are two main concerns. First, the 
way in which both aesthetic and scientific interests in attentional processes fit 
into a wider modernity. Second, how Beckett’s concern with attention works 
alongside his other aesthetic, political and philosophical concerns. 
 
Schopenhauer, Attention and the Limits of Consciousness 
 
As well as emphasising the degree to which the rise of attention coincided with 
the advance of capitalism, Crary suggests that developments in philosophy over 
the course of the nineteenth century played a significant role in inspiring interest 
in the concept. A key protagonist in this, Crary suggests, was the German 
philosopher (and favourite of Beckett) Arthur Schopenhauer.20 Schopenhauer, 
Crary writes, was one of the first to emphasise ‘the unstable and specifically 
temporal nature of perception’ (Crary 1999, 55, emphasis in original). What 
Schopenhauer brought to nineteenth-century thought, then, was an increased 
awareness of the limitations of the human capacity to attend to the world. In the 
second edition of The World as Will and Representation (1844), he stressed the 
extent to which the human was only capable of concentrating on one thing at a 
time, and also that the human could only concentrate on one thing for a limited 
amount of time. ‘The intellect’, Schopenhauer writes, ‘apprehends only 
successively, and to grasp one thing it must give up another’ (Schopenhauer 
1966, 137). But even the one thing that is grasped cannot be held for very long:  
Just as the eye, when it gazes for a long time at one object is soon not 
able to see it distinctly any longer because the outlines run into one 
another, become confused, and finally everything becomes obscure, so 
also through long continued rumination on one thing, our thinking 
gradually becomes confused and dull, and ends in complete stupor (137-
8). 
                                                          
20 For an account of Beckett’s discursive engagement with Schopenhauer, see Pothast (2008) and Weller 
(2008). Or for more detail on Beckett’s reading of the philosopher, Van Hulle and Nixon (2013, 143-54). 
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These observations register what Crary calls, ‘the physiological conditions of 
knowledge’ – the idea that perception, thought and knowledge are subject to the 
materiality of the human body (Crary 1999, 56, emphasis in original). In contrast 
to Kantian theory, which posits a unifying mechanism that gives coherence to 
successive perceptions and reflections, Schopenhauer’s line of thought 
suggests that any semblance of intellectual coherence is contingent upon the 
workings of a will that is closely linked to the body, and of unstable character 
(Schopenhauer 1966, 140). Instead of a set of a priori principles, human 
experience is unified by, what Beckett calls in his ‘Philosophy Notes’, ‘the 
absolute unreason of objectless will’ (TCD MS 10967/252.1, emphasis in 
original). 
For Crary, the ideas of Schopenhauer not only worked towards ‘the 
overturning of a Kantian model of synthesis’ but also prompted an interrogation 
of the primacy of consciousness in human subjectivity (57). By emphasising, 
distraction, forgetfulness and the stupor, Schopenhauer pointed to the limits of 
conscious experience, opening up a line of thought which questioned the 
hitherto inevitable ‘congruence between subjectivity and a thinking “I”’ (58). In 
effect, Crary is making the argument that Schopenhauer’s work anticipates 
psychological movements such as psychoanalysis and behaviourism which 
emphasised non-conscious forms of human activity. But if Schopenhauer’s work 
gave impetus to the study of a non-conscious subjectivity, it was left for later 
psychologists, clinicians and artists to put this study into practice. For example, 
Schopenhauer writes: ‘the idea that is now vividly engrossing my attention is 
bound after a while to have slipped entirely from my memory’ (Schopenhauer 
1966, 137). This statement raises a number of questions: to what extent does 
his being engrossed by the idea imply obliviousness to other matters? For 
exactly how long does the idea engross attention? And when an idea has 
slipped from memory can it be retrieved in the future? These were the kinds of 
questions that would animate both experimental and therapeutic psychology, 
and also the aesthetic experiments of Samuel Beckett.  
 Experimental psychology has done much to address the questions raised 
in the Schopenhauer quotation. In terms of the failures of memory there is a 
psychological literature that goes back to the work of Herman Ebbinghaus 
(1885) which investigates the temporalities of forgetting. There also exists an 
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expansive body of work on vigilance which tests the way in which attention 
waivers over extended periods of time.21 Both of these approaches work under 
the paradigm that the human capacity to acquire, respond to, or store 
information is temporally-grounded and, in this respect, they can be seen to 
work in the tradition of Schopenhauer. But the influence of Schopenhauer is 
most noticeable in studies of selective, or divided attention. Since the end of the 
nineteenth century, experimenters have investigated the extent to which a 
subject’s attending to one task or stimulus implies the failure to register anything 
else. For early evidence of this, we only have to look back to the experiment of 
Stein and Solomons (discussed in the introduction) in which the subject was 
asked to listen for certain dictated words while their attention was occupied in 
reading.  And for more recent examples one can look to influential experiments 
by Donald Broadbent (1958) and Neisser and Becklen (1975) which tested 
whether subjects could select one perceptual channel and inhibit others. All of 
these experiments questioned whether the human ‘apprehends only 
successively’ or is able to pay attention to multiple things at once, but they also 
consider what humans perform without conscious attention: what tasks or 
stimuli can be carried out, or responded to, without the subject’s thinking about 
them. 
 Schopenhauer’s anticipation of psychoanalytic thinking is perhaps more 
commonly recognised. Much critical discussion has evaluated the continuities 
between Schopenhauer’s will and the Freudian unconscious.22 The 
resemblance between the two thinkers is most obvious in the degree to which 
each stresses what Sebastian Gardner calls the ‘superficiality of consciousness’ 
(Gardner 1999, 376). In a particularly evocative passage, Schopenhauer 
compares consciousness to a surface of water, suggesting that the most 
substantial workings of the mind occur beneath this surface but on occasion 
‘rise from those depths unexpectedly and to our own astonishment’ 
(Schopenhauer 1966, 135-6). But more than this, the unconscious part of the 
mind in Schopenhauer’s conception is given an agency that is, in some 
respects, analogous with the Freudian unconscious. For Schopenhauer, the 
unconscious part of the mind does not consist exclusively of inactive mental 
                                                          
21See, for example, Mackworth (1948). 
22 For example, Gupta (1975); Hamlyn (1988); Henry (1993); Janaway (2010). 
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contents, but also a will which has the role of ‘prohibiting the intellect from 
having certain representations, by absolutely preventing certain trains of 
thought from arising’ (208). As Gardner points out, this account comes very 
close to a Freudian model of repression, 23 and it is not hard to see why the link 
between Schopenhauer and Freud has been made so frequently. One has to be 
careful, though, not to overstate the connection. While acknowledging the points 
of contact between his own thought and Schopenhauer’s, Freud never 
suggested that Schopenhauer’s work had a major influence on psychoanalysis 
(Gupta 1975, 721; Hamlyn 1988, 5; Gardner 1999, 379). Indeed, though both 
emphasised the prevalence of the unconscious in human subjectivity, Freud’s 
work is more systematic, explanatory and, in a sense, scientific. As D. W. 
Hamlyn points out, Schopenhauer’s work has a particular but limited aim: it 
might be thought of as a ‘notable attempt to bring a great number of facets of 
experience under a unifying conception’ (Hamlyn 1988, 10). Schopenhauer, 
Hamyln continues, presents ‘a way of seeing things’ which may or may not ring 
true, ‘but he does not seek to explain particular phenomena’ in the manner of a 
scientist (10-11). Freud, by contrast, produced hypotheses regarding the laws 
and nature of the unconscious and worked with the assumption that these 
hypotheses could be evidenced and refined in the analytic situation. One might 
doubt Freud’s methodology but (along with the experimental psychologists) he 
is addressing questions of systematic detail in a way that Schopenhauer is not. 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy raises questions about the unconscious which 
Freud’s work attempts to answer through practice. 
 Beckett’s literary experimentation, I suggest, might usefully be placed in 
this tradition of practically investigating Schopenhauer’s ‘way of seeing things’. 
As was the case with experimental psychology, and psychoanalysis, Beckett’s 
aesthetic productions seem to explore the way in which the human apprehends 
only successively and is prone to missing things. But Beckett’s investigation 
was, of course, distinct from those of experimental psychology and 
psychoanalysis. Rather than seeking to establish exactly what the human 
subject is capable of doing (with or without conscious attention) in the manner 
of a behavioural psychologist, or attempting to define the structure of the 
unconscious with Freud, Beckett worked to enrich our understanding of the 
                                                          
23 I will return to this question of repression in chapter 3. 
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temporal nature of conscious experience. This interest can be traced back to 
the ‘Psychology Notes’. As well as engagements with psychoanalysis and 
behaviourism, Beckett’s notes evidence an interest in ‘Existential’ or 
‘Introspectionist’ psychology which was primarily concerned with the study of 
conscious experience. In this approach: ‘the essence of psychology is the 
description of the individual experience. Experience equals existence. Individual 
is an experiencer, not a performer’ (TCD MS 10971/7/8). Matthew Feldman 
argues that this approach was more ‘favourably received’ by Beckett than 
behaviourism, and what I think Beckett saw in the methods of introspective 
psychology was a way of exploring the unstable and temporally-defined 
experience that Schopenhauer conceptualised (Feldman 2006, 104). This 
manifests in Beckett’s note on the ‘impression method’: 
Impression Method for defining operation of sense organs by means of 
subject reactions to stimuli of various kinds. E.g. the “negative after-
image”: if you steadily look at a coloured spot for 20 or 30 seconds, & 
then turn your eyes upon a plain grey background, you see a spot of 
colour complementary to that of original spot - purple for green, blue for 
yellow, etc. (TCD MS 10971/7/7). 
A subject is required to steadily look at a spot for an extended period of time 
and this process of sustained viewing creates fluctuations and confusions in the 
subject’s vision. This, to some extent, enacts Schopenhauer’s account of vision. 
As in Schopenhauer’s account, an extended period of gazing results in things 
seeming to ‘run into one another’.  
Beckett’s interest, though, goes beyond questions of perception. Like 
Schopenhauer who pointed out the analogy between sustained perception and 
rumination, Beckett’s writing is interested in the analogy between strains of 
perception and strains of thought. This can be seen in the unpublished prose 
fragment ‘Long Observation of the Ray’ (1975-6). As the title of the piece 
suggests, the text is concerned with the sustained observation of a mysterious 
ray of light. The ray is notable for ‘its saltatoriality or erratic transfer from one 
point to another’ (University of Reading MS 2909/6). As the subject continuously 
stares at the ray, it appears to move or jump around. This recalls Beckett’s note 
about the ‘Impression Method’ insofar as concern lies with the effects of 
extended visual fixation. We are brought to question whether the ray is 
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objectively moving from one point to another, or whether this is an illusion 
produced by prolonged viewing. The eye, one might speculate, is strained 
because it has nowhere else to look. There are no ‘changes of scene’ so the 
eye is unable to re-focus, and this causes the ray’s ‘erratic transfer’ (UoR MS 
2909/6). However, this straining of the eye is mirrored in the thinking of the 
narrating subject, who is drawn to ruminate continually on the movements of the 
ray. As Steven Connor puts it, the ‘eye must “strain” as the mind “struggles”’ 
(Connor 1992, 93). Beckett’s experimentation, I want to suggest, would 
consistently interrogate these struggles and strains of perception and 
consciousness. If introspective psychology aimed at the ‘description’ of 
conscious experience, and psychoanalysis and behaviourism focused on what 
goes missing from this description, Beckett’s writing falls between these 
approaches. It investigates the conscious experience of missing something – 
the moments in which one becomes conscious that consciousness is straining 
to keep up with, or make sense of, the world. Thus, Beckett’s aesthetic 
experiments might be seen to follow Schopenhauer in investigating the 
subject’s capacity to attend to the limitations of conscious experience.  
 
Not I and the Problem of Attention 
 
Connor links ‘Long Observation of the Ray’ to the ‘ghostly experiments’ that 
Beckett produced for theatre (86-7). For Connor, ‘it is as though Beckett were 
observing the movements of the spotlight in Play at some post-theatrical point 
long after the three characters which it interrogates have vanished’ (86). This 
experimental treatment of the theatre goes beyond Play. Time and again, the 
theatre of the 1970s demands sustained observation of a single stimulus. One 
thinks of Listener’s face in That Time, May’s pacing in Footfalls, and particularly 
the speaking mouth in Not I. In the original version of Not I, of course, the mouth 
was accompanied by the hooded figure of the Auditor. In later versions, though, 
with Beckett’s approval, the figure was removed leaving an elevated mouth 
alone on stage. Beckett manipulated lighting conditions in an attempt, one might 
assume, to fix the audience’s eyes on this mouth. In the auditorium, as James 
Knowlson puts it, ‘everything is blacked out except for the illuminous mouth’ 
(Knowlson 1996, 592). Famously, Beckett and other directors of the play have 
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even requested that the exit signs be turned off (Oppenheim 1994, 111). If the 
theatrical production is successful, the only source of light should come from the 
mouth. 
In this stipulation of darkness, Beckett’s work engages with an aesthetic 
tradition that stretches back to, at least, the nineteenth century. Crary suggests 
that Richard Wagner was the first to use darkness as a way of exercising 
‘control over the attentiveness of an audience’ (Crary 1999, 251). For Crary, 
‘Wagner initiated the idea of near complete darkness as a way of heightening 
the intensity of lighting effects on stage and preventing peripheral distraction’ 
(251). Experimental psychology, though, gives a new perspective on this use of 
lighting. This can be seen in an experiment carried out in 1912 by Henry Foster 
Adams on an illusion known as the ‘autokinetic’ effect. The illusion works as 
follows: when only one source of light is available to the eyes, this source of 
light will appear to move around even though it is objectively still. Adams 
attempted to capture and measure this effect in an experimental environment. 
In the experiment, a stationary light was projected on the centre of a wall in a 
light-tight box at a distance of 200cm from the observer (Adams 1912, 3). The 
head of the observer was then secured ‘firmly in a mouth-bit head rest’ and all 
the lights were turned off (3). ‘After a sufficient interval had elapsed for him to 
get rid of the bright after-glow and after-images’, the subject focused on the light 
on the wall and pressed a key every time a ‘“noteworthy” thing happened to it’ 
(3). The (objectively stationary) light, it was found, moved around significantly 
for all observers (7).24  
Though there is no evidence that he knew of this particular experiment, 
Beckett’s reading of early twentieth-century psychology gave him some 
grounding in the method that Adams is using. Whatever the extent of Beckett’s 
knowledge, though, Not I certainly produces the same illusion. Countless 
audience members have observed that the mouth seems to move around in the 
darkness.25 Furthermore, Beckett’s means of producing this effect bear a 
striking resemblance to those of Adams. Like Adams, Beckett was keen that his 
stimulus should be presented in darkness at a fixed position. The stage 
                                                          
24 This method was also used in a landmark study in social psychology. Sherif (1935) found that the 
perception of the autokinetic movement was heavily susceptible to social influences.  
25 Accounts of this experience can be found in in a number of reviews. For example, Lyn Gardner (2013) 
recalls how the mouth appears to ‘hover and move’. 
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descriptions, for example, state that Mouth should be positioned ‘8 feet above 
stage level’ (Beckett 2006, 376). Also, Beckett was sure to leave a gap – 10 
seconds in this case – between the lights going off and the observer’s attention 
to the visual stimulus (376). Time is given for the audience to adjust to the 
darkness and get rid of any after-glows, and after-images. Finally, James 
Knowlson describes a key problem for any production of Not I. This is ‘ensuring 
that the actress playing Mouth does not move her mouth even a few 
centimetres out of a very tightly focussed spotlight’ (Knowlson 1996, 592). Both 
Beckett and Adams aim for objective stillness in the stimulus so as to 
emphasise the illusion of movement. However, there is nothing in the script to 
tell the audience that the mouth’s movement is an illusion. The audience is left 
to decide whether the mouth is objectively moving, or whether it is a trick of the 
eye. The effect Beckett produces and the methods he uses, then, recall the 
research of Adams. There is however, a major difference between Beckett’s 
play and Adams’s experiment. Adams is keen to measure the illusions – 
documenting exactly how far the light appears to move and how long one has to 
be in darkness before the illusion takes effect (5-6). Beckett, by contrast, is not 
interested in measuring the effect; he merely controls conditions so that an 
audience is exposed to it. This brings to mind the notes Beckett took on 
psychological existentialism. In works such as Not I and ‘Long Observation of 
the Ray’, Beckett is producing descriptions of subjective experience and 
theatrical spaces in which to investigate these experiences. In Not I Beckett 
produces a visual illusion that tells us something about human performance, 
namely what happens to vision when one, in Schopenhauer’s words, ‘gazes for 
a long time at one object’. The primary concern of Beckett’s play, however, is 
not with the effect of sustained observation on the observer’s performance. 
Instead, Beckett is interested in an experience in which the individual feels the 
strains of sustained focus and may begin to doubt their eyes – an experience in 
which one feels the partiality and materiality of their subjective impression of the 
world. 
Another point to make, here, concerns the nature of the work that 
darkness performs in Not I. Up to this point, I have tended to assume that 
darkness necessarily draws attention to an illuminated stimulus – that the 
darkness in Not I simply fixes attention on the illuminated mouth. This 
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assumption has also been seen in Crary’s account of Wagner’s use of darkness 
and it is observable in accounts of cinematic experience. For example, Steven 
Shaviro writes: 
The darkness of the movie theatre isolates me from the rest of the 
audience, and cuts off any possibility of “normal” perception. I cannot 
wilfully focus my attention on this or that. Instead, my gaze is arrested by 
the sole area of light, a flux of moving images (Shaviro 1993, 47). 
Time and again, darkness is assumed to fix attention and the gaze on the 
‘moving images’ that are illuminated. But can darkness also compete for 
attention? Put another way, rather than serving to focus attention on the 
illuminated stimulus, can darkness, in fact, draw attention away from that 
stimulus? I would suggest that the intensity of the darkness that Beckett 
stipulates for the auditorium is so effective that it can pull against the audience’s 
attention to the speaking mouth. Darkness here might be seen to function as 
what Stephen Kern has called ‘positive negative space’, a supposed 
background that threatens to overshadow the nominal foreground (Kern 2003, 
153).  
This effect of darkness can work in a number of ways. One can simply be 
taken in by the degree of darkness and become engaged in exploring the way 
in which darkness engulfs the body. For example, many observers report the 
inability to see their hands when put in front of their faces during the 
performance. Charles Spencer of the Daily Telegraph tells us that, in the 
performance, ‘you can’t see the hand in front of your face, just the moving lips 
as the speaker gabbles’ (Spencer 2014). Attention, here, seems to be divided 
between the speech itself and the effects of the darkness. Thus, even as 
Beckett seems to rid the theatrical environment of distractions by producing 
complete darkness, a problem of selective attention arises because the 
darkness itself becomes a channel that one might attend to. The darkness can 
also be a more chronic distraction. It can be terrifying and produce an impulse 
to get away from the performance. Indeed, it has been reported that conditions 
in the auditorium during Not I have induced panic attacks in members of 
contemporary audiences – presumably accustomed to the more partial 
darkness of the cinema (Lane 2014). In this way, the darkness in Not I does not 
necessarily serve to fix or control the audience’s attention. It does not, as Crary 
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puts it in reference to Wagner’s work, ‘impose a uniform mode of perception’ so 
as to produce ‘social unity’ (Crary 1999, 248). Rather, I think the darkness 
serves to splinter the audience. The potential for darkness to distract from the 
performance will depend on the individual audience member’s capacity to adapt 
to it. For some, the surrounding darkness will heighten the attention paid to the 
speaking mouth, but for others it will serve as a significant distraction from 
events on stage. Any appreciation of the play depends on the nature of an 
individual’s capacity (or incapacity) for sustained gazing and adaptation to 
darkness. Beckett is emphasising the physiological conditions of aesthetic 
experience and staging Schopenhauerian problems of attention. 
 
Strains of Speech 
 
In Not I, of course, Beckett does not just investigate the situation in which one 
tries to focus on an immobile, illuminated stimulus for an extended period of 
time. Rather we are presented with a mouth that speaks at a rapid pace. Thus 
the play is not only concerned with problems of attention but, more particularly, 
with our perception of, and attention to, speech. In what follows I will look at Not 
I as an experiment, firstly, on how speakers attends to their own speech and, 
secondly, the way in which this speech is encountered by others. Twentieth-
century experimental psychology would have much to say on these topics and 
experimenters were particularly inventive in devising methods with which to 
study the processes by which we produce, hear, see, and comprehend the 
spoken word. One such method is the experimental task known as speech 
shadowing, which has been prominent in psychological research since the 
1950s. The experimental psychologist William Marslen-Wilson describes his 
use of the task in the following way: 
Speech shadowing is an experimental task in which the subject is 
required to repeat (shadow) speech as he hears it. When the shadower 
is presented with a sentence, he will start to repeat it before he has 
heard all of it. The response latency to each word of a sentence can 
therefore be measured (Marslen-Wilson 1973, 522). 
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Shadowing, then, is a way of making the subject’s perception of speech 
observable and measurable. If a subject is merely asked to listen to speech 
silently, it is difficult to monitor the extent to which the speech is being focused 
on, or how it is being processed. Shadowing is a way of externalising the 
process of listening with the aim of studying it. But what is particularly 
interesting for our purposes is the way in which the shadower is both a 
perceiver and a producer of speech – they must perceive words and then say 
them. In his experiment, Marslen-Wilson wanted to measure the proximity at 
which it was possible to shadow continuous speech, and also test whether 
close-shadowing subjects understood what they were saying. The experiment 
asked whether ‘very close shadowing’ made use of ‘normal speech perceptual 
processes’ or activated ‘some minimal mode of speech processing’ (523). Put 
another way: were close shadowers simply parroting what they heard, as they 
heard it? Or, was the speech being processed on semantic and syntactic 
levels? In the experiment, ‘normal prose’ was presented binaurally through 
headphones at a ‘normal conversational rate’ of 160 words per minute (522). 
The results showed some variation between individuals. However, seven 
subjects were found capable of shadowing speech intelligibly at a mean delay 
of 350 milliseconds with an error rate of less than 7% (522). Marslen-Wilson 
calculates that these close shadowers were less than a syllable behind the 
original material.  
Next, subjects were given a different passage to shadow but this time the 
shadowing task was followed by a memory test. Through the memory test, 
Marslen-Wilson sought to find out the level at which these close shadowers 
were processing their speech: ‘if the close shadower is not using syntactic 
and/or semantic structure’, Marslen-Wilson states, then ‘he should not have 
available to him information that could only derive from these levels of analysis’ 
(522). As it happened, the memory test showed that syntactic/semantic 
information is ‘available to the shadower irrespective of his shadowing latency’ 
(523). Now, Marslen-Wilson recognises that shadowers could produce their 
output – repeat what they hear – on the basis of low-level, phonetic analysis 
and perform higher-level analysis of what had been spoken later. If this is the 
case, he reasons, their shadowing errors ‘should be constrained by the syllabic 
character of the material, but not by its semantic or syntactic character’ (523). In 
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fact, Marslen-Wilson argues, the errors suggested that, no matter how closely 
the passage was being shadowed, the shadower was processing the content on 
semantic and syntactic levels. He concludes that ‘the errors in general show 
that the subject’s output can be constrained by the preceding context up to and 
including the word immediately before the error’ (523). He goes on: ‘all the 
subjects analyse the material up to semantic level as they repeat it’ and this 
analysis ‘helps to determine the ongoing series of perceptual decisions’ 
underlying their shadowing performance – how one perceives the next word will 
depend on the way in which the previous words have been understood (523).   
The first point to make about Marslen-Wilson’s experiment is that he is 
less interested in the experiences of subjects than in what can be inferred from 
their performances. For example, we are not told whether the subjects felt 
themselves to be comprehending the words as they shadowed; Marslen-Wilson 
merely suggests that they showed evidence of comprehension when tested. In 
this way, Marslen-Wilson can be seen to work in a behavioural tradition that 
focuses on what processes the human can perform, with or without conscious 
awareness. We might contrast this approach to the one which seems dominant 
in the text of Not I. In Not I the protagonist of the text, we are told, speaks 
without being able to consciously follow what her words are saying. She is in a 
field on an April morning when all of a sudden things go dark and she starts to 
lose sentience. After a period in this state, she realizes: ‘words were coming…a 
voice she did not recognize…at first… so long since it had sounded…then 
finally had to admit…could be none other…than her own…certain vowel 
sounds…she had never heard elsewhere’ (Beckett 2006, 379). Here, the focus 
is not on the individual’s performance but her experience. Words come to the 
protagonist and she speaks them but she is not aware of comprehending the 
words on semantic or syntactic levels: we are told that she had ‘no idea… what 
she was saying’ (379). Though she can process sounds into words, the 
protagonist is not aware of the meanings that these words are forming. 
However, she is aware of the phonetic character of the speech: she can hear 
‘certain vowels sounds’ that distinguish her voice from the voices of others. 
Thus, as far as the protagonist is aware, she is analysing the speech 
phonetically but not semantically or syntactically. It is possible that the words 
the protagonist hears are being processed at higher levels without the 
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individual’s awareness. The text, though, focuses on the peculiar, immediate 
experience of a protagonist who can hear the sound of her own speech but has 
‘no idea’ what that speech is saying. Beckett’s protagonist is primarily an 
experiencer, not a performer. 
But beyond those of performance and experience, Marslen-Wilson’s 
shadowing experiment opens up questions of how we attend to different 
aspects of our own speech. In experimental psychology this question has been 
tackled most thoroughly by Willem Levelt (1983; 1989) and more recently 
Hartsuiker and Kolk (2001). Drawing on the phenomenological observation that 
humans frequently seek to correct or modify the words they have just spoken, 
psychological research has frequently emphasised that ‘speakers attend to 
what they are saying and how they say it’ (Levelt 1989, 497). Speakers, it is 
argued, are capable of monitoring every part of their speech from ‘the 
appropriateness of a given word or phrase in the current context’, to ‘semantic, 
syntactic, phonological, and prosodic aspects’ (Hartsuiker and Kolk 2001, 113-
4). However, they do not seem capable of attending to all of these aspects 
simultaneously. Rather the particular aspect of speech that one attends to 
seems to fluctuate depending on the context in which one is speaking (Levelt 
1989, 498). The context of the protagonist’s speech in Not I raises some 
interesting questions here. Rather than moving between levels, the 
protagonist’s attention seems to be stuck on phonological and tactile aspects of 
speech. The protagonist knows the voice is hers, we are told, because she can 
feel the words coming out of her: 
Suddenly she felt…gradually she felt…her lips moving…imagine!..her 
lips moving!..as of course till then she had not…and not alone the 
lips…the cheeks…the jaws…the whole face…all those contortions 
without which…no speech possible…and yet in the ordinary way…not 
felt at all…so intent one is…on what one is saying (Beckett 2006, 379). 
The protagonist can feel her own speech but not understand it. She is able to 
hear the sounds and feel where they are coming from, but not take in what is 
being said. Speech, here, is not heard as pure noise – the protagonist still 
recognises it as her own speech. Nevertheless, it is not understood in terms of 
grammatical meaning, but in terms of its sensory content. The protagonist has 
not decided to focus her attention purely on the feel of speech – she is trying to 
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‘make something of it’ – but her focus repeatedly goes back to the 
‘mouth…lips…cheeks…jaws’ (379-80). The narrator contrasts the protagonist’s 
speech in this situation with the ‘ordinary way’ of speaking in which one is ‘so 
intent’ on what is being said that speech is ‘not felt at all’. Beckett’s text, here, 
does not dispute the ‘ordinary way’ of speech monitoring proposed by Levelt, in 
which one’s attention switches between sensation and meaning, form and 
content.26 But it does present an extraordinary experience, in which a speaker’s 
attention is fixed on the sensations of speech, rather than the grammatical 
meaning. 
The text’s concern with how we attend to our own speech carries into the 
narration of the protagonist’s story, and also the way in which Beckett wanted 
the text to be spoken on stage. With regards to the first concern, the narrator of 
the text, Mouth, frequently seems to modify the words that she speaks. Levelt 
notes that this tendency is quite common: when speakers ‘make a mistake, or 
express something in a less felicitous way’, he argues, they frequently ‘interrupt 
themselves and make a repair’ (Levelt 1989, 458). This seems to be one of the 
defining characteristics of Mouth’s narration. For example, at first the 
protagonist is termed a ‘tiny little thing’, but a few phrases later this is modified 
to ‘tiny little girl’: ‘in a godfor-…what?..girl?..yes…tiny little girl’ (Beckett 2006, 
376). What one might question, here, is whether Mouth is modifying her own 
words, or, alternatively, there is some kind of editorial presence off stage 
working to make sure that the words Mouth uses are appropriate. The answer 
to this remains an enigma throughout the play. On one hand, use of the term 
‘what’ seems to suggest someone else is speaking to Mouth but, given that this 
supposed editorial presence never makes itself observable, one may also 
conclude that it is internal – a voice in the head. If one makes the latter 
interpretation, a contrast emerges between narrator and protagonist. Where the 
protagonist cannot attend to the content of her words, the narrator does so to 
the point of near-constant modification.27 Regardless of this contrast, however, 
                                                          
26 This aspect of the text might bring to mind Beckett’s famous observation about Joyce’s Finnegans 
Wake (1939): ‘Here from is content, content is form. You complain that this stuff is not written in 
English. It is not written at all. It is not to be read – or rather not only to be read. It is to be looked at and 
listened to’ (Beckett 1983, 27, emphasis in original). In this early aesthetic discussion, Beckett seems 
interested in the different ways in which we can attend to the written word. I would argue that this 
interest is developed with regards to speech in Not I. 
27 A good example of this modification can be found when the narrator attempts to describe the buzzing 
noise: ‘the buzzing...yes…all the time the buzzing…so-called… in the ears…though not in the ears at 
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the experience of speaking undoubtedly puts a strain on the attentional 
capacities of narrator and protagonist alike. As the narrator monitors the content 
of her speech continuously and struggles to find appropriate words, the 
protagonist that she describes can only attend to her speech on a sensory, 
phonological level – though she is ‘straining to hear…make something of it’ 
(Beckett 2006, 380). Beckett’s text presents two different ways of attending to 
speech but, in both, consciousness is struggling to keep up with the words that 
are being spoken.28 
In the text of Not I, then, Beckett seems heavily concerned with the 
strenuous processes by which protagonist and narrator attend to their own 
speech. But what of the actors playing the role of Mouth? How do they attend to 
their own words and to what extent do their experiences of speaking mirror 
those of narrator or protagonist? From the evidence surrounding productions of 
the play, it seems to have been Beckett’s opinion that the actors should not 
think about the meaning of what they say. For example, speaking of the advice 
Beckett gave her on playing Mouth in the play’s premiere, Jessica Tandy states: 
‘what it meant was, I found, you must not think what you are saying. It just has 
to come out’ (Knowlson 1997, 591). Tandy’s emphasis on not thinking about the 
content of the script seems to have carried through to contemporary 
performances. Lisa Dwan, who has performed the role numerous times in the 
last few years, states that as she performs: ‘the only way I’m conscious of the 
script is as a visual aid.. A road map.. All the rest is music, my family, my 
landscape..me’ [sic] (Dwan, e-mail message to author, 28 March 2015). 
Because she has rote learned the script, Dwan needs to apply little mental 
resource to what she is saying, meaning that she can mentally attend to other 
matters. Of course, just because the actors are not aware of thinking about 
what they say does not mean that they are not processing their words 
syntactically and semantically. Higher level analysis of speech could be going 
on without the actor’s awareness.29 Beckett, though, seems particularly 
                                                          
all…in the skull…dull roar in the skull…’ (Beckett 2006, 378). There is the sense that Mouth is constantly 
reflecting upon the content of the words she uses and modifying them accordingly. 
28 This relationship between the speeches of narrator and protagonist, of course, feeds into the text’s 
concern with the degree to which Mouth can be identified with the protagonist of whom she speaks. I 
will return to this question later in the chapter. 
29 Another option, here, may be to look at what is going on at the neural level. Laura Salisbury and Chris 
Code have taken this approach in reading Beckett’s work alongside the work of neurologist John 
Hughlings Jackson. In this view, the actor’s speech in Not I might be seen as a rote learnt activity that is 
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interested in creating a disconnect between the actor’s thoughts and their 
speech. In a 1972 letter to the play’s first director, Alan Schneider, Beckett 
speaks of the distinction between ‘mind & voice’ in the context of the play, 
suggesting that the speech should be delivered ‘without mental control or 
understanding’ (Harmon 1998, 283). Like the protagonist of the text, we are 
supposed to get the impression that the speaker on stage has no idea what she 
is saying. This feeling manifests in Douglas Watt’s observation that, in the 
premiere performance of the play, the voice seemed to have been ‘torn from its 
owner’ (Watt 1972). Beckett uses the theatrical environment to consider how 
one might speak without thinking about it and, in doing so, furthers the idea of a 
non-conscious subjectivity. 
But if the actor playing Mouth does not think about what the words of the 
play mean, what of how those words are spoken? This question was raised by 
Schneider who asked Beckett for advice on a ‘proper tone and, and also a 
proper tempo for the play’ (Harmon 1998, 280). Beckett’s response, here, 
emphasised a particular aspect of the speech over others, namely speed: 
I hear it breathless, urgent, feverish rhythmic, panting along without 
undue concern with intelligibility. Addressed less to the understanding 
than to the nerves of the audience which should, in a sense share her 
bewilderment’ (283, emphasis in original).  
This stipulation of breathless urgency in the monologue’s delivery seems to 
have been reiterated when Beckett directed the London production in 1973, 
working with Billie Whitelaw in the role of Mouth. In her biography, Whitelaw 
writes of herself and Beckett’s mutual feeling that the delivery should be very 
fast. This was in opposition to the producer Anthony Page who wanted the play 
to be performed at a speed that the audience could easily understand: ‘it seems 
that Tony wanted Not I to go slower. I had known from the start that I would 
have to go at the rate of knots, ideally at the speed of thought’ (Whitlelaw 1995, 
127). Speed, then, seems to have been a crucial component in Beckett’s 
conception of performances but what exactly is its function in Not I? 
                                                          
performed at a level of the brain below that which produces propositional language. Salisbury and Code 
observe Beckett’s ‘extraordinarily persistent desire to invoke forms of language that seem both 
phylogenically and ontogenically to precede the propositional language’ that we associate with ‘the 
functioning of an intentional consciousness (Salisbury and Code 2014, 113). 
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Now, the quickening of speech is something that the speaker might do 
with or without conscious awareness. Drawing on some 1984 experiments by 
James Deese, Levelt argues that a speaker might accelerate their speech in 
order to prevent an interlocutor from interrupting them, or to ‘express something 
in a modest, non-assertive way’ (Levelt 1989, 306). Also, in public speaking, it is 
frequently reported that the pressure of being watched prompts an (often 
unconscious) acceleration of speech. Of course, in the case of actors, the 
capacity to moderate one’s speech rate is highly prized and actors are 
frequently asked to vary the tempo of their speech based on character and 
situation.30 Attentional resources are frequently stretched here. Speech rate has 
to be monitored, along with other aspects of speech such as volume and 
prosody, in order for the actor to give a convincing impression of a particular 
person in a particular situation.31 In Not I, one might think that the actor’s 
attentional process is more straightforward. Unlike more naturalistic works, 
Beckett’s play emphasises the actor’s performance of a theatrical task above 
the attempt to play a character. As Beckett put it to Schneider, Mouth is ‘purely 
a stage entity, part of a stage image and purveyor of a stage text. The rest is 
[Henrik] Ibsen’ (Harmon 1998, 283). There is the sense that, in contrast to 
actors in naturalistic works such as Ibsen’s, the actors playing Mouth do not 
have to vary speech rate according to character and situation. They merely 
have to concentrate on getting the words out with the required urgency. Such 
an idea can lead to a view of Beckett’s play as a simple trial of human 
performance, and this perception might be re-enforced by the way in which 
performances continue to speed up. Jessica Tandy’s premiere performance 
clocked in at around twenty minutes, Whitelaw’s was around fifteen, and the 
contemporary performance by Lisa Dwan is performed in around eight. 
Reservations about this development can be seen in Jane Shilling’s 2013 
review of Dwan’s performance for the Daily Telegraph. For Shilling, Dwan’s is ‘a 
dazzling technical performance’ but, the emphasis on speed means that the 
play lacks the ‘eloquence and emotional range’ of earlier versions. ‘If she 
                                                          
30 For example, in To the Actor (1953), theatre practitioner Michael Chekhov draws a distinction 
between inner tempo and outer tempo and suggests that the actor should be able to manage both 
(Chekhov 2002, 75-6). The actor, here, should be able to play a character who seems to think fast but 
speak, or gesture, slowly (and vice versa). 
31 Of course actors may rehearse a role to the point that they no longer have to consciously attend to 
these aspects. 
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[Dwan] were a racehorse or a sprinter’, Shilling continues, the performance 
could be met ‘with unqualified admiration’. For Shilling though, ‘there is more to 
art’ than pure ‘virtuosity’, so the play feels ‘brilliantly empty’ (Shilling 2013).  
Whether or not one agrees with Shilling’s impression of Dwan’s 
performance, her critique hints at a tension that, I would argue, is crucial to Not 
I’s dramatic power, as well as its investigation of speech. The play does not 
merely require the actor to concentrate on speaking as fast as possible. Rather, 
the aspect of speech rate has to compete with a pressure for the speech to 
exude a certain musicality. The actor’s speech does not have to be in character 
but this does not mean that the actor can ignore what their speech sounds 
like.32 Whitelaw famously recalls that in Not I she felt like an ‘athlete crashing 
through barriers, but also like a musical instrument playing notes’ (Knowlson 
1978, 89). She also speaks of how each ’each gradation of the voice’ was 
meticulously choreographed by Beckett and the degree of concentration that is 
required of the actor when working within this framework (89-90). There is, then, 
a sense of multi-tasking embedded in performances of the play. The speech of 
Not I has to sprint and dance simultaneously, and I would argue that the play 
finds an aesthetic power in the sense of strain that derives from this. For 
Shilling, Dwan seems to attend to speed at the expense of prosody, and in 
doing so strips the play of some of its dramatic power. I would argue, however, 
that one can find dramatic power in the very tension that Shilling identifies. 
What we see in Not I is an actor straining to deliver both fast speech and music, 
and this can be very effective. Even if one cannot follow what is being said, the 
speech communicates an attentional strain that is able (in Beckett’s words) to 
work on the nerves of the audience. As Lyn Gardner puts it in a review of 
Dwan’s performance, ‘sense and storytelling’ may be absent but ‘the torrent is 
somehow completely and appallingly understandable’ (Gardner 2013). In this 
way, the play might be looked upon as both a study of the human subject’s 
capacity to attend to different aspects of their own speech, and an aesthetic 
exploration of the strains that derive from these attentional processes. 
 
                                                          
32 One might also suggest that the actor has to think about how their mouth looks when enunciating 
words, though Whitelaw notes that she felt detached from the visuals of the scene when performing the 
play: ‘Because I couldn’t see, I have no idea what Not I looked like […] once the blindfold had gone 
around my eyes and the hood over the top, I could be in the middle of Ilkley Moor’ (Knowlson 1978, 87). 
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The Performing Audience 
 
Thus far in our consideration of Not I we have focused on the ways in which the 
protagonist, narrator and actors perform and experience their own speech. We 
have only considered the audience insofar as they observe Mouth and reflect 
on their own responses to her verbal expulsions. It is clear, though, that the 
audience has a more active role. Put simply, there is a question over the extent 
to which the audience comprehends the words of the play. Beckett may have 
stated that Mouth’s speech should be ‘addressed less to the understanding than 
to the nerves of the audience’ but this is unlikely to prevent an audience from 
attempting to grasp what she is talking about. Evidently Beckett felt that the 
rapid tempo of the play would make this process difficult, but what is the nature 
of this difficulty?33 Is there a sense in which the play uses fast speech to 
investigate the audience’s capacity to make sense of words? There is no doubt 
that it goes fast. Psychologists calculate that, on average, conversational 
speech’ proceeds at around 160 words per minute. The television production of 
Not I performed by Billie Whitelaw goes at around 200wpm and Lisa Dwan’s 
performance even quicker. Thus, Not I does, on some level, test how quickly 
the human can comprehend speech that is delivered at a rate that is higher than 
usual. But we might better define the nature of this test by comparing Beckett’s 
work with some psychological experiments on the topic.  
Experimental psychology has certainly devoted a lot of time to the study 
of rapid speech comprehension. The discipline, however, has had problems 
finding a method with which to tackle the question of how well we comprehend 
rapid speech. In a discussion of an experiment on these matters, Wingfield, 
Peelle and Grossman observe that ‘even trained speakers attempting to speak 
rapidly introduce subtle and uncontrollable changes in articulatory clarity and in 
the pattern of linguistically based pauses and intonation contour’ (Wingfield, 
Peelle and Grossman 2003, 311). Thus, it is methodologically problematic to 
present increasingly hurried human speech and measure levels of 
comprehension because one cannot say whether comprehension is being 
                                                          
33 Beckett had evidently experimented with high speech rate in earlier dramatic works such as Play. This 
can be seen in a letter to Siegfried Unseld in which Beckett reasons that a ‘broken and rushed speech’ 
would produce a ‘necessarily imperfect understanding’ on the part of the audience (Craig et al. 2014, 
598). In light of this he suggests that the action of the play might be repeated twice in one performance. 
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affected by the speed of delivery, or merely the distortions that come with the 
hurry.34 In light of this problem, experimental psychology has recently made use 
of computer algorithms that remove pitch periods from vowel sounds and 
produce high speech rate without a great deal of distortion (312-13). Here it has 
been found that humans show capacity for some comprehension when speech 
is delivered at well over 400 words per minute (318-19).35 If Not I was merely an 
experiment on the human’s capacity to comprehend rapid speech, it would be 
slightly redundant. We know that humans can comprehend speech that is 
delivered at a much higher speech rate than Not I’s. 
 Something quite different, however, is going on in Beckett’s play. 
Beckett does not aim to remove the distortions and interferences that come with 
fast speech. In fact, the distortions are central to Beckett’s project. He hears the 
speech of Not I ‘panting along’, ‘feverish’ and ‘rhythmic’. Beckett, then, was not 
after pure speed but also desired the interferences that inevitably come with the 
strains of speaking rapidly. Beckett wanted a speech that was fast, but also 
hurried. This method has two main effects. First, the high speech rate means 
that it is very difficult to consciously follow the words. As the above-discussed 
experiments show, humans are capable of processing speech that is presented 
much faster than Not I’s. However, the faster the speech arrives, the less the 
individual is able to consciously keep up with it – the speed of thought struggles 
to keep up with the speed of processing. We might be able to answer questions 
on the content of the speech later but that does not necessarily mean that we 
feel ourselves to be comprehending the speech in real time. Of course, different 
individuals are more or less capable of consciously keeping up with a high 
speech rate and there is an extent to which one gets accustomed to faster 
speech. Nevertheless, the speed of the speech undoubtedly makes conscious 
understanding more strenuous and one feels as though large parts of the story 
are being missed. In the words of Ella Walker in her review of the play for The 
Cambridge News: ‘by the time I’d adjusted and was capable of deciphering 
words and the tale, it was over’ (Walker 2014). Second, the interferences that 
come with the fast speech (the actor’s ‘panting along’, for example) create a 
                                                          
34 One can just play recorded speech at a higher rate, but this creates distortions insofar as it raises the 
pitch as well. 
35 Additionally, in studies of reading, there has been the development of Rapid Serial Visual Presentation 
(RSVP). Here experimenters have presented words visually to subjects one at a time, finding that 
subjects show the ability for some comprehension at 10 words per second (Potter 1984, 91). 
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feeling of hurry, panic and fear. As the same reviewer puts it, ‘it was so brutal 
and so fast that I felt sick. It was like being chased down with no escape’ 
(Walker 2014). Instead of attempting to measure the speed at which speech 
can be processed, Beckett’s play allows one to experience the strains that 
come with attempting to comprehend rapid speech. Again Beckett is 
emphasising the physiological conditions of aesthetic experience. The narrative 
– what Walker calls the ‘tale’ – is obscured by the difficulties of comprehending 
words that are delivered with hurry. 
When considering Not I as a production that investigates the nature of 
speech perception and comprehension, it is also important to remember that the 
speech is not purely an auditory stimulus. An elevated mouth is presented in the 
darkness producing the speech. The early reviews certainly take cognizance of 
the visual power of this presentation. In his review of the 1973 staging at the 
Royal Court, this visual stimulus jumped out at Michael Billington and led him to 
rank the performance of Not I ahead of the performance of Krapp’s Last Tape 
(1958) on the same bill: 
“Not I” (Beckett’s latest work) is the more compelling because it leaves 
behind an ineradicable image: an endlessly mobile mouth, rimmed by 
white clown-like makeup pouring out words of agony (Billington 1973). 
What Billington perhaps undersells here, is the degree to which the visuals of 
an ‘endlessly mobile mouth’ can influence one’s perception of the words 
themselves. The degree to which the visuals of the mouth – and the speaker’s 
face – influence the reception of speech was a question being investigated in 
the experimental psychology of the period. Research in this area can be seen to 
take off in the latter half of the twentieth century. As early as 1954, Sumby and 
Pollack were testing the extent to which seeing ‘the speaker’s lips and facial 
movements’ helped one to understand their words in a noisy environment’ 
(Sumby and Pollack 1954, 212). In his survey of the subject, Quentin 
Summerfield argues that these experiments showed that ‘seeing the face of the 
talker can be equivalent to an effective improvement in the signal-to-noise ratio 
of about 15 decibels (Summerfield 1987, 6). From this he argues that in noisy 
situations visual hearing can ‘transform failure to understand into near-perfect 
comprehension’ (6). However, the impact of visual stimuli on speech perception 
was not fully appreciated in psychological circles until later. Writing in 1976, 
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McGurk and MacDonald suggest that ‘speech perception is normally regarded 
as a purely auditory process’, and describe some experimental results that 
challenge this assumption (McGurk and MacDonald 1976, 746). Subjects were 
shown ‘a film of a young woman’s talking head, in which repeated utterances of 
the syllable [ba] had been dubbed on to lip movements for [ga]’ (746). On 
seeing this video, most people ‘reported hearing [da]’ (746). Information ‘from 
the two modalities’ – aural and visual – was ‘transformed into something new 
with an element not presented in either modality’ (747). This is what McGurk 
and MacDonald call a ‘fused response’ and has come to be known as ‘the 
McGurk effect’ (747). The effect, McGurk and MacDonald continue, is very 
powerful and does not ‘habituate over time despite objective knowledge of the 
illusion involved’ (747). The experiment, then, suggests that visual information 
from the speaking mouth combines (unconsciously and automatically) with the 
auditory information to specify the speech sounds that are heard. 
Ordinarily, the fact that vision and hearing are working together during 
speech perception should not be a problem. It is not very often that a mouth’s 
movement contradicts the sound it makes, so most of the time eye and ear 
should really just be helping each other out. Indeed, as my grandmother might 
testify, the eyes’ ability to help out with speech perception can be very useful. 
Summerfield writes:  
As people get older and their hearing deteriorates, they rely on lip 
reading to an increasing degree. For those with profound or total losses 
of hearing, vision may be the major route by which speech is perceived 
(Summerfield 1987, 3-4). 
Similarly, Sumby and Pollack’s experiment showed how useful visual hearing 
can be in noisy environments. Thus, there are many cases in which visual 
hearing can act to compensate for difficulties in perceiving speech aurally. In 
this way, experimental psychology is drawing attention to a capacity that might 
help the human adapt to the new noises of modernity. In situations where it is 
difficult to comprehend speech, the experiments suggest, we can use the 
capacity to read lips as a supplement to auditory speech perception. It may be 
expected that Beckett’s play would be one such situation. The words pour out 
so quickly, it might be suggested, that the audience needs to make use of both 
the aural and visual modalities of speech perception. However, this does not 
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always play out in the accounts of the audience. When I first watched Not I at 
the theatre, I recall a member of the audience reflecting on the urge to shut his 
eyes in order better comprehend what was being said. The visuals were 
perceived as a barrier to comprehension, not an aid. Why might this be? It 
should be noted here that there are a number of different versions of Not I and 
each one holds different implications for visual speech perception. As 
mentioned, the original performance had the Auditor but this element was 
removed in later stage productions. The Auditor was also omitted when the play 
was translated to television. Thus, as performances of the play have 
proliferated, more and more focus has been put on the mouth. Also, the visibility 
of the mouth depends on which version of the play is being viewed. In stage 
productions the mouth can be quite small, particularly if you are seated at the 
back of a large theatre. In this case, one might question whether the mouth 
would be close enough to the audience for the lips to be read. In television 
productions, by contrast, the mouth is up close on the screen, so dominates the 
production. It is difficult, then, to make any definite statement about the role of 
lip reading in Not I. That said, there are couple of statements that can apply to 
the majority of versions.  
 One obvious difference between the speech presented in Beckett’s play 
and the speech presented in many of the scientific experiments is in what is 
taken away. Recall that, in their discussion of visual speech perception, Sumby 
and Pollack state that seeing ‘the speaker’s lips and facial movements’ can help 
us comprehend speech. In Not I we only get access to the former. In no version 
of Not I, do we get access to the speaker’s face. In this respect Beckett’s play 
asks a question as to whether, in perceiving speech visually, one makes use of 
the entire face, or just the lips. Experimental psychology has, to some extent, 
investigated this question. Experiments following on from McGurk and 
MacDonald’s have shown that ‘seeing only the mouth area [of the speaker] is 
sufficient for speech reading and for eliciting the McGurk illusion’ (Eskelund, 
MacDonald and Anderson 2015, 49). An example of this research that is 
particularly striking for its resemblance with Not I is Summerfield’s 1979 
experiment in which a speaker was presented in darkness and the lips were 
painted with decreasing amounts of ‘luminous make-up’ (Summerfield 1979, 
317). In this scenario, speech recognition was better when a mouth was 
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presented in darkness than when the viewer was given no visual information 
(318). However, the removal of other facial features did impair speech 
perception substantially (318-19). Thus the research has tended to indicate that 
facial expressions, as well as lip movements, can aid the recognition of words. 
The visuals of Beckett’s play may well make speech recognition measurably 
more difficult than in face-to-face contact. 
Additionally, the specific mouth movements that occur in Not I pose their 
own difficulties for the audience member that is attempting to make out what 
Mouth is saying. For example, the speed of delivery means that the speaker’s 
drawing of breath comes to the fore. Lisa Dwan, in particular, produces very 
distinct gasps in her version. Here, the double function of the mouth as an 
organ of speech and breath is emphasised. The words that the mouth shapes 
are frequently interrupted by the shapes of gasps. Beckett’s play, then, 
foregrounds the way in which the mouth takes in air and gives an output of 
words. However, the need for input continually interferes with the output. We 
might compare this phenomenon to the way in which the noisy buzz of 
electricity sometimes interferes with the music that is played through speakers. 
One is no longer able to focus purely on the content but becomes conscious of 
the means by which it is produced. The mouth is no longer merely a means of 
communication but also a distracting object. Recent psychological research (for 
example, Tiippana, Andersen and Sams 2004) has indicated that the presence 
of salient objects in the subject’s line of vision tends to weaken the capacity for 
visual speech perception. In Not I the mouth itself may be seen as such an 
object. When the audience member at Dwan’s production spoke of his desire to 
shut his eyes during the performance, it is my contention that his urge was 
rooted in the distracting power of – in Billington’s words – an ‘endlessly mobile 
mouth, rimmed by white clown-like makeup’. The visual element of the mouth 
may have been a potential line of communication – it might have helped him 
comprehend the words – but it was also a flickering, gasping, distracting object. 
In Not I, then, Beckett makes processes such as selective attention and 
speech perception noisy and, in doing so, draws attention to the physiological 
conditions of dramatic experience. At the theatre, we are, more often than not, 
able to attend selectively to events on stage without thinking about it. In Not I, 
though, by presenting only the single figure of a mouth and intensifying the 
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surrounding darkness, Beckett makes our attempts to focus on the action of his 
play strenuous. Similarly, naturalistic theatrical productions are ordinarily 
delivered in such a way that we can perceive and comprehend the words of the 
speakers without thinking about it. This allows us to focus on more traditionally 
dramatic aspects of the production (for example, the intricacies of personal 
narratives). Beckett’s play by contrast, to quote Laura Salisbury, produces 
interferences that disarticulate ‘the idea of language as a clear reflection of a 
pristine world of ideas where meaning noiselessly resides’ (Salisbury 2010, 
368). The pace of the speech makes one strain to follow the words, and the 
mouth becomes a distracting object. Through making us strain, then, Beckett 
raises our performances of selective attention and speech perception to the 
level of experience and explores the aesthetic power of these processes. 
        
Strains of Interpretation 
 
In the context of theatrical performances of Not I, then, I have suggested that 
the physiological and temporal conditions of aesthetic experience are 
emphasised at the expense of other aspects which might be expected to draw 
our attention in a theatrical setting. The strains of focusing on the mouth or 
comprehending rapid speech draw attention away from things like plot and 
character. There is, however, no doubt that Not I contains these elements; it is 
concerned with the telling of a personal story. The way in which the play is 
delivered might lead us to think that the text is a disordered, chaotic, randomly-
generated stream from which no order and sequence can be gleamed. But 
when one spends time with the printed text it is not nearly so disordered and 
chaotic as it may appear on stage or screen. Particularly in the opening section, 
there is the sense that a life story is being fashioned – that we are tracking the 
development of a particular protagonist. In the remainder of this chapter, I want 
to focus on the process by which we attend to, and interpret, this personal 
information. In doing this I will, to some extent, move away from experimental 
psychology and towards more clinical and psychotherapeutic approaches. This 
is because of a particular aspect of clinical, therapeutic and analytic practice: 
the assembling of a case history. In everyday practice, the clinician must 
efficiently register a large amount of information about a patient and structure 
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that information according to a particular set of principles. It will be my argument 
that Beckett is concerned with the attentional process by which this is carried 
out and how it translates into an aesthetic or dramatic context. 
Perhaps more than anything else the story of Not I’s protagonist is 
characterised by hurry and unevenness. This begins at birth. At the beginning of 
the text, we are told that the protagonist is cast out into a world that is jealous of 
its time: ‘out…into this world…this world…tiny little thing…before its time’ 
(Beckett 2006, 376). In the description that ‘it’ comes out ‘before its time’ there 
is the implication that the time at which the protagonist was born was not 
legitimately hers. Not only this, but the elliptical style gives the sense that there 
is no time to spare in the telling. There is also the sense that the protagonist 
was produced at the expense of as little time as possible: ‘parents 
unknown…unheard of…he having vanished…thin air…no sooner buttoned up 
his breeches…she similarly…eight months later…almost to the tick’ (376). The 
parents are marked by their punctuality. They are present until they have 
performed their reproductive duties, then vanish. The world that is narrated is 
characterised by time pressure and so is the narration. This is highlighted as the 
story of the protagonist’s life continues. The story starts at the very beginning of 
the protagonist’s life and gives some account of the early years, but then sixty 
or seventy years are passed over on the grounds that they were ‘a typical 
affair’, which produced ‘nothing of any note’ (376). The life story goes from birth 
to old age in twelve lines. The story does not lack order – it goes in a familiarly 
linear sequence from birth to old age – it just goes through this order in a very 
hurried fashion. 
Working with this hurried atmosphere is a sense of unevenness. This can 
be seen in the attitude held towards parenting. The protagonist’s parents are 
not present for long enough to show any love or affection but, even for those 
infants whose parents stay around longer, parental affection is seen as an 
uneven matter: ‘so no love…spared that…no love such as normally vented on 
the…speechless infant…in the home…no…nor indeed…for that matter…any of 
any kind…no love of any kind…at any subsequent stage’ (376). The notion, 
here, that the protagonist has been spared having love ‘vented’ on her gives the 
sense that love is a kind of by-product: a matter that builds up gradually and is 
then released in one big rush. There is the implication that, in the normal way, 
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love is a kind of waste that emerges out of the reproductive process and is then 
unevenly – almost violently – discharged on the infant. This unevenness is, 
again, reflected in the narration. The first seventy (or sixty) years of the 
protagonist’s life go through in a hurry but then a particular morning is focused 
on in heavy detail. The protagonist’s inner experience on this morning is the 
subject of the remainder of the text. Thus the story begins by surveying the life 
from a distance but then puts an ever increasing focus on the experience of a 
protagonist at one particular moment in time. The life story fixates on one event 
that has been deemed noteworthy. The text, then, presents a double drama of 
attention. On one hand, we are presented directly with the protagonist’s pattern 
of attention. For example, we get an account of what material the protagonist is 
focusing on: ‘she fixing with her eye… a distant bell… as she hastened towards 
it… fixing it with her eye… lest it elude her’ (378). On the other, there is the 
question of why this particular moment is the object of attention, as opposed to 
the rest of the protagonist’s life. A phenomenological concern with how one 
attends to a plethora of stimuli runs alongside a question of how one attends to 
a body of personal information and makes something of it. In each case, there 
is a hurried move to focus in on one particular aspect at the expense of others.  
 This approach is not uncommon in Beckett’s writing. In Beckett’s work, 
the personal story frequently loses its status as an aesthetic object that is 
produced to absorb or intrigue and becomes a mass of material to be moved 
through quickly and selectively. A particularly apposite example of this can be 
found in Rough for Theatre 2 (1956). In the play, two men, A and B, examine a 
case of documents relating to the life of a motionless third man, C, in order (it 
seems) to establish whether C’s life is worth carrying on with, or whether he 
should be allowed to jump from a building. In a way, this operation seems 
professional. C is defined by A and B as a ‘client’ who needs their ‘services’ – 
though it is also noted that they give out these services for free’ (Beckett 2006, 
237-46). What is clear, though, is the sense that attending to C’s personal 
information is a laborious process – not something that engrosses A or B but 
something they must work through. This is clear from the outset when A 
announces that they are beginning to pay attention: ‘We attend’ (238). There is 
the sense that the two men are on the clock as they work through the details of 
C’s life and decide whether it should continue. This sense becomes stronger 
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when B fastens onto the ‘vital’ detail that C has described himself as ‘morbidly 
sensitive to the opinion of others’ (242). Exactly why this detail is deemed so 
important never becomes clear but it prompts B to ‘read the whole passage’ in 
which the detail is embedded. However, the way in which B carries out this act 
of reading is very revealing. He begins reading the entire passage but soon 
loses patience with its wordy style (‘What kind of Chinese is that?’) and decides 
to skip the parts that follow the vital phrase until he gets to the ‘main verb’: 
‘“…Morbidly sensitive to the opinion of others at the time….” – drivel drivel drivel 
–“…I was unfortunately incapable – ”’ (243). As in Not I, there is a sense of 
hurry and unevenness in the way in which personal information is approached. 
A and B’s, attention to the life of C is a laborious process that is moved through 
with haste and involves fishing out ‘vital’ details from a glut of material. In Rough 
for Theatre 2, as in Not I, it is clear that the interpretation of personal 
information is conditioned by limitations of time and mental resource. 
 The production of the personal story in Beckett’s work, then, often seems 
less of an aesthetic exercise and more of a professional one – less about 
producing something gripping or beautiful than moving through material 
efficiently and organising it in a way that fulfils an often mysterious set of 
obligations. This sense of a professional approach to the personal, I think, is 
part of the reason that Beckett has so frequently been linked with professions 
such as psychiatry, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Of course, there is an 
extent to which this link simply derives from Beckett’s pre-occupation with 
unhappiness and mental pathology, but works like, Rough for Theatre 2 and Not 
I evidence a further interest in clinical practice. In the case of Not I, Angela 
Moorjani writes: ‘for many, Not I’s disembodied mouth spewing words at a 
silent, shadowy auditor came to evoke an analytic session’ (Moorjani 2004, 
176). And, more recently, Jonathan Heron and psychiatrist Matthew Broome 
have drawn a link between Rough for Theatre 2 and the psychiatric encounter. 
The point of connection, here, lies in the psychiatrist or analyst’s task of taking 
in a large body of personal information and organising it according to certain 
principles. In psychoanalysis, the mental strains involved in this procedure were 
recognised by Freud. In ’Recommendations for Physicians on the Psycho-
analytic Method of Treatment’ (1912), for example, Freud recognises the 
difficulties of ‘keeping in mind all the innumerable, names, dates, detailed 
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reminiscences, associations’ of each patient when one is treating ‘six, eight, or 
even more patients daily’ (Freud 1933, 323). In this way, as Jonathan Crary 
notes, Freud is ‘concerned with the physiological and mental limits of a 
sustained attentiveness’ (Crary 1999, 367). But in psychoanalytic theory, Crary 
continues, Freud is also producing ‘a technique for dealing with a stream of 
information that has no evident structure or coherence’ (368). Freud, Crary 
concludes, ‘sought to fashion himself (the analyst) into an apparatus capable of 
engaging a seemingly random sequence of signs (whether language, gestures, 
intonations, silences) and yet extracting from that disjunct texture some 
interpretive clarity’ (368). This is a concern that extends beyond psychoanalysis. 
Speaking of his experience in contemporary psychiatry, Broome writes: 
One of the problems we have in teaching medical students is that they 
find taking a full psychiatric history a huge leap from the briefer history-
taking that they learn for medicine and surgery. They feel that the 
amount of information they are requested to take is almost endless, and 
further how they order it, divide it up and present it back to a consultant 
or an examiner as difficult not only due to time constraints in the relaying 
of information but also in the genuine heterogeneity in clinicians’ models 
of mental illness, which in turn structures the clinical data (Heron and 
Broome 2016, 175). 
Models of mental illness might offer a structuring principle with which to 
organise large amounts of personal information but this leads to the further 
question of what theory to use. Broome suggests that the action of Rough for 
Theatre 2 resonates with psychiatric practice in the sense that A and B ‘order 
and marshal’ information in a particular but slightly enigmatic way (175). There 
may be a guiding principle in A and B’s practice but it is never imparted. I would 
argue that this analysis extends to the case of Not I. The play presents a life 
story but focuses on a particular set of events. What, we are left to wonder, is 
the structuring principle that has led to this set of events being deemed 
noteworthy? 
 
 
Even Attention and the Clinical Encounter 
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We might trace Beckett’s interest in clinical practice back to events in his own 
life. As we have seen, Beckett engaged with psychoanalysis and psychotherapy 
extensively in the 1930s, and it is here that the concerns of Rough for Theatre 2 
and Not I may be seen to develop. During his reading around psychotherapy 
and psychoanalysis, Beckett himself seems to have become a little frustrated 
with the clinician’s tendency to focus on a single detail. In a 1935 letter to 
Thomas MacGreevy, for example, he describes psychotherapist Alfred Adler as 
‘another one trackmind’ (Feldman 2006, 101). As Matthew Feldman observes, 
Adler was the fifth academic psychoanalyst Beckett encountered during his 
engagement with the subject and one can sense Beckett becoming fatigued at 
a proliferation of explanatory theories (Feldman 2006, 79). But Beckett’s 
engagement with psychotherapy and psychoanalysis was not purely one of 
resistance to theory. He undoubtedly wanted to get certain things out of it. As 
Laura Salisbury has highlighted, Beckett’s interaction with therapy was not 
detached from practical pressures. Certain psycho-somatic symptoms drove 
him to therapy with Bion and he undoubtedly wanted a return from his input of 
time and – his mother’s input of – money (Salisbury 2011. 64). Feldman points 
out that Beckett’s psychology notes ‘constitute a significant outlay of effort in 
their own right’ and he is right to suggest that this effort can be viewed as part of 
Beckett’s ‘larger self-education process’ (Feldman 2006, 115). At the same 
time, though, Feldman recognises that Beckett was evidently looking to 
psychotherapeutic theory for further insight into his own maladies. Beckett 
seems to have felt a desire for the illuminating light of theory. Feldman observes 
that in Beckett’s notes on psychoanalysis ‘the overriding impulse is one of 
attempted self-diagnosis’ (100). There is a sense that Beckett read the 
templates of psychoanalytic theory against his own symptoms in order to see 
what fit.  
Beckett, then, may have experienced a frustration with the one-track 
nature of the theoretical approach but he had also looked to psychoanalytic 
theory for explanations of his own experience. This tension can be seen in 
Beckett’s transcription of this line from Karin Stephen’s The Wish to Fall Ill 
(1933): 
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If he [the patient] is dominated by unconscious starvation, so that he 
needs in all relationships to get as much as possible, he will try & get the 
most out of his hour, irritably demanding explanations (TCD MS 
10971/7/5). 
Here the desire to ‘get the most’ from time in therapy is seen as symptomatic of 
‘unconscious starvation’, an observation that can be looked at in two ways. In 
one sense, the patient is demanding that the theoretical searchlight works upon 
him in order to give the best possible view of his problems. But, in another, this 
observation can be seen as a product of the therapist’s one-track mind, in which 
all behaviour is seen in the light of a theoretical insight: if the patient demands 
explanations, the therapist thinks, it must be because of ‘unconscious 
starvation’. From his engagement with psychotherapy, then, Beckett had some 
understanding of the desire for efficient insights but also of the unbalanced 
attentiveness of the clinician. 
 Many clinicians, of course, have themselves warned against uneven 
attentiveness, or the one-track mind. In psychoanalysis, in particular, a tradition 
can be traced back to Freud’s privileging of suspended or diffuse attention – as 
opposed to critical or deliberate attention – in therapeutic practice. In 
‘Recommendations for Physicians’, Freud argues that the therapist should not 
make effort ‘to concentrate attention on anything in particular’ (Freud 1933, 
324). Rather, the same ‘evenly distributed attention’ should be maintained in 
regard to ‘all that one hears’ (324). For Freud, the need for the adoption of an 
‘evenly distributed attention’ is partly a method by which to reserve mental 
resources when dealing with large amounts of personal information. However, 
he also argues that overly concentrated attention works against the acquisition 
of psychoanalytic knowledge. For Freud, when ‘attention is deliberately 
concentrated’, one aspect of the material ‘will be fixed in the mind with particular 
clearness and some other consequently disregarded’ (Freud 1933, 324). This is 
unlikely to be productive because ‘one’s expectations or one’s inclinations will 
be followed’ and, if this is the case, ‘there is the danger of never finding 
anything but what is already known’ (324).  
Freud’s approach to attention became influential in twentieth-century 
British psychoanalysis, and particularly the work of D.W. Winnicott and Wilfred 
Bion. Winnicott’s approach to this topic manifests in the essay ‘Child 
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Department Consultations’ (1942). The paper is a report ‘on the cases that 
came through the Child Department of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis in 
London over a period of one year’ (Winnicott 1958, 70). Not all of the cases 
documented go into formal analysis. Winnicott is describing the initial procedure 
in which he decides on the best course of treatment for a new case: assembling 
a history of the patient and assessing whether sustained analysis will be 
appropriate and practical. To some extent this is a process in which information 
must be efficiently processed. The paper covers each case very briefly 
(fourteen cases in around ten pages) and there is a consistent emphasis on 
time considerations. Winnicott specifies, for example, how long it took to ‘get a 
good history’ of each case (71). But within this scenario, where efficiency is 
undoubtedly important, Winnicott emphasises a form of attentiveness that goes 
beyond the efficient extracting of information. For example, Winnicott describes 
one satisfactory case. In the case of three-year-old Queenie, there was no time 
for formal daily analysis. However, with some difficulty, the mother was able to 
bring the girl to Winnicott personally for treatment ‘two or three times a week 
over a period of six months’ (75). For Winnicott, it was always clear that time 
constraints would make daily visits impossible and cut the analysis short. 
Nevertheless, ‘not wanting to send the child away with nothing but a useless 
consultation’, he went ahead treating Queenie as if doing formal analysis (75). 
This brings results: ‘quite important work was done, for the material brought by 
the child enabled me to show sequence and order in it, and I obtained specific 
results from interpretations, just as in real analysis’ (75). This success, for 
Winnicott, could only have been achieved ‘by an analyst, experienced in long, 
unhurried analysis in which material can be allowed to force itself on the 
analyst’s attention while he gradually learns to understand it’ (76). For 
Winnicott, the analyst’s attention should not be easily acted on. The 
presentation of the material alone does not mean that the analyst can attend to 
it and instil it with ‘sequence and order’. Rather material has to ‘force itself’ on 
attention. This is where the experience of the analyst comes in. The 
‘experienced’ analyst is able to recognise that material does not work on 
attention instantaneously or easily and so, in spite of time pressures, is in no 
hurry to ‘understand’ it. There is recognition that the analyst’s role is to make 
something of the material but the skilled analyst is distinguished by a lack of 
hurry in going through the process.  
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Now, one might argue that in finding ‘sequence and order’ Winnicott is 
attempting to instil the material with a familiar shape. This is always a danger in 
the interpretive process. This danger, though, has to be weighed against the 
dangers of another form of practice in which time and material simply pass 
through with nothing coming of it. This is invoked in Winnicott’s desire not to 
reduce therapy to the ‘useless consultation’ in which the patient simply comes 
and goes. Also important in Winnicott’s account is the idea that this treatment 
was ‘enabled’ by the particular ‘material brought by the child’. There is the 
implication, here, that, if different material had been brought by a different child, 
this method of treatment may not have produced satisfactory results. Indeed, 
the other cases covered in Winnicott’s paper require very different courses of 
treatment. The sequence and order Winnicott finds is dependent on the 
particular material that the patient brings. There is no assumption that the 
therapist can simply find this shape in any material just by attending to it in a 
certain way. 
 In his Brazilian Lectures (1973-4),36 Bion also advocates a patient 
attentiveness in which one does not look for a ‘vital’ detail but waits for material 
to work on the analyst’s attention: 
Instead of trying to bring a brilliant, intelligent, knowledgeable light to 
bear on obscure problems, I suggest we bring to bear a diminution of the 
“light” – a penetrating beam of darkness; a reciprocal of the searchlight 
[…]. The darkness would be so absolute that it would achieve a luminous 
absolute vacuum. So that, if any object existed, however faint, it would 
show up very clearly. Thus a very faint light would become visible in 
maximum conditions of darkness (Bion 1990, 20-1). 
In a literal sense, of course, this extract speaks to the staging of Not I. The 
observer of Not I, and many of Beckett’s late plays, might feel as though the 
auditorium has been thrown under Bion’s beam of darkness, in which any faint 
light becomes visible. But Bion is obviously speaking in a more metaphorical 
                                                          
36 As Matthew Feldman has suggested, this late Bion is likely very different to the one Beckett 
encountered in the 1930s (Feldman 2006, 93). At the time of his sessions with Beckett, Bion had yet to 
undergo formal psychoanalytic training and, Feldman notes, his early outlook was likely ‘too positivistic’ 
to show ‘any great harmony with Beckett’s concerns in the 1930s’ (93). Here I am not concerned with 
showing influence either way. I would suggest, however, that the accounts of therapeutic attentiveness 
that Bion developed in his later life are useful in outlining the problems of attention that Beckett’s plays 
present. 
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sense about the therapist’s manner of attending to the ‘obscure problems’ of a 
patient – how one registers the material presented by the patient and makes 
something of it. The crucial difference between the beam of darkness invoked 
by Bion and the searchlight is one of activity and passivity. In the latter, one 
knows what one is looking for and attention is shifted around until it is found. In 
the former, by contrast, one attends to the general area and it is the object that 
makes itself visible. Bion is advocating the latter: a mode in which the analyst 
does not illuminate the patient’s problems but merely attends to a dark space in 
which the problems can illuminate themselves. The analyst’s skill, then, is in 
shutting out his own insights so that they do not interfere with the insights 
coming from the patient. The metaphor invokes two related points of difficulty 
within psychotherapy. The first is the extent to which theoretical knowledge 
should guide the therapist and outline the objects that are to be looked for. The 
second is the temporal pressure for something to be found over the course of 
therapy. The searchlight mode is informed by theory and temporally more 
efficient. Theory endows the operator of the searchlight with a template of what 
is to be looked for and objects can be found that resemble this template more or 
less. Thus something is likely to be found even if it does not exactly resemble 
what one is looking for. When using the beam of darkness, on the other hand, 
one has to play a waiting game and there is no guarantee that any object will 
show up. The approach is not necessarily productive and the therapist becomes 
less ‘brilliant’. Rather than producing insights, the therapist’s role is to create 
conditions in which insights can (but may not) emerge. 
 Bion’s ideas on clinical practice were, to some extent, drawn from 
aesthetics and literature. He repeatedly referenced John Keats’s idea of 
negative capability – the capacity, exhibited by writers such as Shakespeare, to 
tolerate uncertainties and doubts without reaching for fact and reason (Rollins 
1958, 193-4). Bion notes: 
If psycho-analysts are to be able to interpret what the analysand says, 
they must have a great capacity for tolerating their analysand’s 
statements without rushing to the conclusion that they know the 
interpretations. This is what I think Keats meant when he said that 
Shakespeare must have been able to tolerate “negative capability” (Bion 
1990, 45). 
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Bion seems to suggest that in everyday life we find it difficult to tolerate the 
statements of others without attempting to interpret whether those statements 
are factually true, or why that particular person is making that particular 
statement. The skill of the analyst, or a literary writer such as Shakespeare, 
however, lies in being able to tolerate ‘mysteries’, ‘half-truths’ and ‘evasions’; 
allowing a statement to stand rather than seeking to explain it away (46). In 
effect, Bion is suggesting that a particular aesthetic mode of attending to 
personal information can inform clinical practice. This view relates interestingly 
with Beckett’s aesthetic. As we have seen, Beckett’s writing is frequently 
concerned with the imperfect conditions in which limits of time and attentional 
capacity pressure us into making hurried interpretations. In Rough for Theatre 2 
we are presented with a professional environment in which A and B attempt to 
structure information efficiently and fish out ‘vital’ details. In Not I, this is taken 
further. The personal story of Not I is presented to the audience in such a way 
that one feels the physiological and temporal pressures that force uneven 
attentiveness. The process of following the words of Mouth is so strenuous that 
it becomes tempting to adopt a one-track mind – to structure one’s conception 
of what is going on around a particular accessible detail. Here, we might look to 
an approach that has been taken to language comprehension within 
experimental psychology. There is a body of psychological thought which 
emphasises the extent to which one’s understanding of a statement is 
structured, not only by the statement itself, but also the knowledge that the 
listener/reader already possesses (Anderson 1978; Ferreira, Bailey and Ferraro 
2002). Thus, in situations where the information that we receive is degraded, it 
is argued, the listener is likely to draw on theoretical knowledge and long-term 
memory (what the psychologists call a ‘schema’), in order to produce an 
understanding that is ‘good enough’ to serve a particular purpose (Ferreira, 
Bailey and Ferraro 2002, 13-14). Following Freud, and drawing on literary 
ideas, Bion seems to advocate a mode of attention that eschews this schematic 
approach to interpretation. Beckett, though, produces an environment in which 
we are under pressure to take shortcuts. Where Bion is interested in bringing an 
aesthetic mode of attention into a professional environment, Beckett seems to 
do the opposite: in Not I an aesthetic environment is perforated by the 
psychophysiological pressures that make us rush to interpretation.   
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The difficulties of attending to Not I’s personal story, however, go beyond 
physiological and temporal pressures. We are also faced with the absence (or 
incomplete presence) of the person. This contrasts with the approaches of 
Winnicott and Bion in which the patient’s presence and state of emotion, is 
paramount to the construction of the personal story. In Winnicott’s paper, for 
example, we are told of how the patient interacted with the therapist through 
play: 
The play with toys and by drawing and cutting enabled me to interpret 
and to show that I could tolerate penis envy and ideas of violent attacks 
on the mother’s body and on the father’s penis and on babies unborn 
(75). 
Winnicott is evidently working with a particular psychoanalytic theory here, but 
for our purposes it is merely important to note that he is looking to the 
immediate presence of the child (her activity and emotional state) when making 
interpretations. Broome suggests that this is also crucial in psychiatric 
examination: ‘in psychiatry it is good practice to review written records 
alongside the clinical encounter with an individual’ (Heron and Broome 2016, 
177). It is desirable that verbal histories are encountered in conjunction with a 
face-to-face examination in which the psychiatrist can register ‘things like the 
person remaining in one place over a period time, levels of motor activity, as 
well as particular abnormal physical movements’ (174). The psychiatrist’s sense 
of a personal story, then, is structured by a theoretical approach but also 
interpersonal contact. In Rough for Theatre 2, Broome argues, C is almost 
completely absent and so the interpersonal way of understanding a life story is 
marginalised: ‘we see one mode of understanding as being prioritized at the 
total exclusion of another and a seeming bureaucratization of practice’ (177). 
 In Rough for Theatre 2, then, we see personal information being 
interpreted purely through the analysis of documents. In Not I, though, Beckett 
complicates this idea slightly. We are constantly teased with the notion that the 
protagonist is telling her own story. Mouth, we are told, is recovering ‘from a 
vehement refusal to relinquish third person’ (Beckett 2006, 375). There is the 
suggestion that we are not being told about the protagonist’s life by an 
anonymous narrator, but rather the protagonist is telling us about her own life. If 
this was the case, the audience might feel as though they are encountering the 
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person as well as the report. Beckett, though, never quite allows this to happen: 
we are confronted with nothing but a mouth and that mouth never says I. Thus 
we are not confronted with a case history but neither are we allowed to 
appreciate a personal encounter. Part of the play’s aesthetic power, I would 
suggest, lies in its refusal to fit neatly into either of these categories. In this way, 
Beckett’s play might be seen as an experiment on the audience’s capacity to 
tolerate uncertainties and doubts. Do the psychophysiological conditions of 
Beckett’s theatre pressure us into a schematic interpretation of what is going 
on? Or, do we exhibit the ‘negative capability’ of Keats and Bion, and allow the 
enigmas of the play to stand unresolved? 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are three main concerns that I want to draw from this discussion of Not I. 
First, I have suggested that Beckett’s play fleshes out Schopenhauerian 
conceptions of human experience. Beckett’s work can be placed in a tradition 
that explores, through practical investigation, Schopenhauer’s ideas about the 
limitations of human experience and performance. In particular, here, I noted 
that Beckett’s writing is interested in attending to the limitations of 
consciousness. Beckett’s aesthetic experiments investigate the fragility and 
partiality of conscious attention.  
Second, I have argued that in Not I Beckett manipulates theatrical 
conditions in order to raise questions about the human capacity for attention 
and speech perception. He produces conditions in which aesthetic experience 
depends on one’s capacity to adapt to darkness, and gaze at one thing for an 
extended period of time. He also explores the different ways in which speakers 
attend to their own speech, emphasising the strains that come with the attempt 
to monitor multiple aspects of speech. And, with regards to how we perceive the 
speech of others, he makes it strenuous for the audience to comprehend 
speech by (1) insisting on a high speech rate; (2) removing most of the 
speaker’s facial features; and (3) emphasising the mouth’s potential to distract 
from visual speech perception. In all these ways, Beckett draws attention away 
from more traditionally dramatic aspects of theatrical experience, such as plot 
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and character, and shifts focus to the means by which we make sense of the 
word and the world.  
Third, I have argued that the play experiments on our capacity to 
interpret a body of personal information: pitting a mode of attention in which one 
attempts to shut out theoretical insight and tolerate enigmas, against a more 
professional, time-pressured mode in which we use the knowledge that we 
already possess in order to make efficient interpretations about what is going 
on. Not I, then, might be seen as an aesthetic experiment in a sense that goes 
beyond its formal innovations or opposition to the ‘mainstream’; it works towards 
an understanding of how the human attends to, comprehends, and interprets 
the spoken word. 
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Chapter 2 
Face Reading and Attentional Management in That Time37 
 
During his reading of psychology in the 1930s, Beckett’s interest was captured 
by a debate between the associationist and Gestaltist schools. The question, 
here, was one of whether the individual learns to recognise distinct objects, or 
does so intuitively. Beckett took down these details: 
Associationists rejected innate ideas & all native knowledge of objects. 
Only by experience can we interpret raw material of sense data (e.g. 
elicit an organised scene from a manifold of coloured spots). Gestaltists 
admit that we know the properties of objects by experience but deny that 
we ever had to learn their shapes (TCD MS 10971/7/7). 
The debate, then, centres on the process by which ‘raw’ sensory material is 
interpreted. The associationists saw this process as an acquired skill and, as 
Beckett continued to note, the Gestaltists saw it as a matter of the brain’s 
‘primary response’ to stimulation (10971/7/7). Beckett’s transcription goes on to 
sketch out the Gestaltist view in terms of face recognition: ‘a baby does not 
open its eyes on [William] James’s “big blooming buzzing confusion”, but 
singles out a face or other compact visual unit’ (10971/7/7). The face is taken by 
the Gestaltists to be a pattern which the baby is pre-disposed to single out – a 
‘compact visual unit’ to which humans are intuitively drawn. Beckett also notes 
the Gestalt school’s experiments with the face. He copies down the Gestalt 
observation that the subject’s interpretation of the same facial movement 
changes depending on how much of the face is made visible: ‘Apparent change 
in a feature does not mean objective change in that feature. The eyes, when 
only the upper part of the face is exposed, have a different expression then [sic] 
when the whole face is exposed’ (10971/7/7). Beckett’s interest is piqued by an 
experiment in which the observer’s reading of a particular part of the face can 
be seen to change depending on the way in which the whole face is presented. 
Here, it should be remembered that Beckett is merely taking notes from 
Woodworth’s summary. He is not necessarily endorsing Gestalt notions of 
                                                          
37 Parts of this chapter have previously appeared in Critical Survey (Volume 27 [1], Spring 2015). 
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perception. Indeed, as Jean-Michel Rabaté (1984) and Matthew Feldman 
(2006) have suggested, these notes were incorporated into Beckett’s next novel 
Murphy (1938), in which the Gestalt approach comes under severe scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, the transcription certainly shows Beckett’s awareness of 
psychological debates around face perception in the early part of the twentieth 
century. This chapter will argue that, later in his career, Beckett would develop 
these ideas in his own theatrical experiments with the face. 
 
Attending to the Face 
 
Beckett’s facial experiments occur at a time when the human face was the 
subject of a large amount of scientific investigation. The scientific study of facial 
expression goes back at least as far as Charles Darwin’s The Expression of 
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872).38 But in their summary of the subject, 
Dacher Keltner and Paul Ekman suggest that ‘two developments in the late 
1960s and 1970s galvanized the study of facial expression’ (Keltner and Ekman 
2000, 236-7). First, experimental psychology produced ‘objective measures of 
facial expression’, in the form of the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) 
developed by Ekman and Wallace Friesen in the late seventies (237). Second, 
experimenters began to suggest ‘universality in interpreting facial expressions’ 
(237). Until the late 1960s, Keltner and Ekman argue, interpretation of facial 
expression was thought to be ‘a noisy, unreliable system with little reliable 
communicative value’ (240). Since then, however, Ekman and others have 
continually built the case that humans are intuitively very skilled and efficient 
readers of facial expression. Debates around the universality of facial 
expressions are ongoing and I am not looking for a resolution to the overall 
debate here. Instead, I will look specifically at the effort and concentration 
required in the processes of making and reading facial expressions. There is a 
body of experimental evidence suggesting that facial expressions can be 
produced and interpreted without a great deal of concentrated effort. However, 
through a reading of That Time, I want to investigate how this effortless mode 
                                                          
38 Nineteenth-century culture’s interest in physiognomy (the idea that facial features or expressions 
were representative of character or ethnic origin) should also be pointed out. For discussions of this, see 
Hartley (2001) and Pearl (2010). 
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might interact with a more effortful way of reading faces, as well as how the two 
modes combine in an aesthetic or dramatic context. 
From the nineteenth century onwards, experimental psychology has 
continually investigated face perception in babies and young children, as well as 
adults. Contemporary psychology has, by and large, upheld the Gestalt notion 
that, ‘immediately after their birth, infants attend preferentially to faces and face-
like configurations’ (Frank, Amso and Johnson 2014, 13).39 This preference for 
the face in childhood is seen to translate into an adult’s ability to navigate facial 
expressions without a great deal of concentrated attention. In their survey of 
experimental findings on the subject, Vuilleumier and Righart argue that much 
psychological research has suggested that ‘facial displays of emotions are 
produced involuntarily and perceived effortlessly’ (Vuilleumier and Righart 2011, 
449). They point to a number of experiments in which subliminally presented 
faces have been seen to affect behaviour. For example, Winkielman, Berridge 
and Wibarger (2005) tested ‘the impact of subliminal presentations of happy 
and sad faces on the actions of pouring and consuming a [unfamiliar] beverage’ 
(Winkielman, Berridge and Wibarger 2005, 122). The study found that subjects 
who had rated themselves ‘thirsty’ before the experiment ‘poured more and 
drank more of a beverage after exposure to happy faces’ than after exposure to 
neutral faces (128). They also poured and drank less after exposure to angry 
faces. The other notable finding, here, was that participants did not report any 
change ‘in their subjective state, even when their mood was assessed 
immediately after the subliminal primes’ (128). This suggests that face reading 
can be carried out and acted upon, even when the individual has no awareness 
of being affected. So it would follow that the individual can process a face 
emotionally without making any effort to attend to it. Experimenters have also 
suggested that some facial expressions may be ‘detected better, or faster’ than 
others (Viulleumier and Righart 2011, 453). This has particularly been the case 
when the face presented can be interpreted as angry or hostile. For example, a 
                                                          
39 There is, though, evidence to suggest that the ‘the amount that infants look at faces increases 
considerably during the first year’ (Frank, Amso and Johnson 2014, 13). This was seen when Frank, Amso 
and Johnson showed a video of Sesame Street and monitored the degree to which infants aged 3, 6, and 
9 months attended to the face. They found no difference between ages when the video showed large 
‘static faces talking to one another’ (19). However, there was a ‘developmental increase’ in attention to 
the face when the video ‘featured small faces and considerable motion of both the camera and the 
people in the film’ (19). For the experimenters, neo-natal infants may be drawn to the face, but the 
tendency and capacity for attention to the face does become stronger with age.  
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common experimental task presents subjects with a series of stimuli: first an 
expressive face, then – on another part of the screen – a dot. Measured here is 
the time it takes for the subject to disengage from the face and move onto the 
dot; the common finding being that it takes longer for subjects to ‘disengage 
attention from threat-related faces, as compared with positive or neutral faces’ 
(454). This has been taken to suggest that ‘the processing of facial expression 
[…] may be unintentional and arise before the face has received full attention’ 
(455). In other words, one has scanned a face for signs of emotion, before 
making a concentrated effort to do so. Vuilleumier and Righart conclude that 
these experiments exemplify a body of behavioural research which indicates 
‘that facial expressions can be processed in a range of situations that imply 
automatic abilities, in the sense that these involve a lack of intention, focused 
attention, or even awareness’ (456).  
This focus on the effortlessness of face reading in experimental 
psychology might lead one to overlook a more deliberate mode of interpreting 
the face. When inspecting a painted face in a portrait gallery, for example, is the 
attention one pays limited to the effortless kind described in these experiments? 
It seems to me that this situation would also call for a more concentrated 
attentiveness. Here, the face can become an enigma and one might spend 
hours puzzling over it. This is particularly the case when looking at the 
unresponsive face; the face that stares blankly into the distance and eludes its 
context. Jonathan Crary finds an example of this kind of expression in Edouard 
Manet’s In the Conservatory (1879). In this painting, Crary sees Manet’s 
portrayal of the woman’s face in terms of the questions it provokes:  
We are allowed by Manet, who painted this face with uncharacteristic 
definition, to ask such specific questions. Is she engaged in thought, or 
vacuous absorption, or that form of arrested (or diverted) attentiveness 
that borders on a trance (Crary 1999, 99-100). 
The artist’s technique, here, is perceived to prompt a sustained reading of the 
face. Rather than involuntarily, scanning the face, the observer is asking 
questions: what could this woman possibly be experiencing that would give her 
this face? In the field of experimental psychology there is a concern with proving 
the existence of a mode of face reading that is not necessarily available to 
introspective experience or conscious recall. Thus, much less emphasis is 
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placed on this slower, more effortful mode of face reading. The existence of a 
conscious, effortful mode may be seen as self-evident and therefore not 
something that needs to be proved through experiment. However, when 
discussing the face in wider culture it is important to ask the question of how the 
two modes might interact. A theory supporting this deriving from the psychology 
of perception would be Daniel Kahneman’s two-system thesis. Kahneman 
characterises the decision-making process as an ‘uneasy interaction’ between 
two systems: the ‘automatic’ system 1 and the ‘effortful’ system 2 (Kahneman 
2011, 415). For Kahneman, system 2 ‘articulates judgements and makes 
choices, but it often endorses or rationalizes ideas that were generated by 
system 1’ (415). Applied to face reading, this idea would suggest that certain 
interpretations could be generated rapidly and effortlessly by system 1. But this 
would still leave room for system 2 to make slower more effortful judgments 
about the face. System 1 might scan the whole face and pick up an overall 
affect, where system 2 can study each feature sequentially and contextualise 
the face to a greater degree. However, for Kahneman, it is likely that the 
effortful judgements deriving from system 2 will be heavily influenced by the 
initial impression taken from system 1.  
Beckett’s reading of the Gestalt-associationist debate would have given 
him some grounding on these questions of the temporality of face reading. The 
debate seems to mark a distinction between two modes of encountering the 
face. On the one hand there is a skilled, effortful ‘associationist’ process in 
which one interprets the face in a deliberate, almost systematic way. But on the 
other there is the Gestalt encounter in which the face simply appears and 
provokes a response. In the text of That Time Beckett seems to play these two 
encounters off against each other. This can be seen in the recollection of ‘that 
time in the portrait gallery’ (Beckett 2006, 388). The protagonist goes to the 
gallery ‘to rest and dry off’ before getting ‘on to hell out of there’ (388). The 
gallery is almost empty: ‘not a living soul in the place only yourself and the odd 
attendant drowsing around in his felt shufflers’ (389). It is seemingly an ideal 
place for a rest. But, as the protagonist dozes amongst the paintings, he 
undergoes a peculiar experience: 
You hoisted your head and there before you when they opened a vast oil 
black with age and dirt someone famous in his time some famous man or 
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woman or even child such as a young prince or princess of the blood 
black with age behind the glass where gradually as you peered trying to 
make it out gradually of all things a face appeared had you swivel on the 
slab to see who it was there at your elbow (388). 
The passage describes two modes of face reading. The first is the steady 
deliberate attentiveness exhibited by Crary’s reading of Manet’s painting. The 
protagonist appreciates the painting’s materiality (the size, the materials used, 
and its condition) and gradually starts to investigate the features of the 
individual represented (status, age, gender). However, this process is 
interrupted by the appearance of a face. So begins the second mode of face 
reading. The text’s presentation of this second face leaves a lot of room for 
interpretation. It could be the protagonist’s own face reflected in the glass of the 
painting, or it could be a ghostly apparition. It could be that a face represented 
within the painting gradually becomes apparent to the protagonist – having 
been initially overlooked. Or, it could be that someone has snuck up from 
behind and the protagonist sees this person’s face reflected in the glass.40 What 
is clear, though, is that the protagonist interprets the face as a presence at his 
elbow. This mode of face reading is dramatically different from the first. In the 
first mode, the protagonist’s relationship with the figure remains visual. He 
peers at it and the figure’s face is only implicit as he consciously tries to ‘make it 
out’. In the second mode, by contrast, a face simply appears. There is no effort 
to make it out. Also, the protagonist has more than a visual relationship with the 
face. It triggers action, making him ‘swivel’. The text of Beckett’s play, then, 
engages with the idea that face reading is a process that can be either effortful 
or involuntary. One might go through the attentive process of making the face 
out, or it could simply appear and trigger a response. However, there seems to 
be the suggestion that the latter process can interrupt the former. The affective 
perception of the whole face seems to interfere with the slower, more deliberate 
process of making a face out. 
                                                          
40 This would link to the passage in Molloy (1951) where Moran washes his face in the stream and sees 
in the water ‘little by little a face with holes for the eyes and mouth and other wounds, and nothing to 
show that it was a man’s face or a woman’s face, a young face or an old face’ (Beckett 2009d, 143). John 
Bolin has recognised ‘the conjoining of a radical self-estrangement with a hovering sense of revelation’ 
in this passage, and argued that this invokes the work of Jean Paul Sartre (Bolin 2013, 149). In That Time, 
though, there is more ambiguity. The protagonist may be seeing himself as another or, in fact, seeing 
the face of another. 
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Staging Faces 
 
On a textual level, then, Beckett’s play certainly speaks to the attitudes towards 
face reading that were developing in twentieth-century experimental 
psychology. It is particularly interested in how a steady, aesthetic mode of face 
reading can be interrupted by a more automatic encounter with the face. In That 
Time, though, Beckett moves beyond textual representation and attempts to 
stage a live face alone in the dark. Beckett undoubtedly took a great deal of 
trouble over this staging and, as is the case with the text, he seems to have 
been concerned with the interaction between deliberate and automatic face 
reading. We have seen that the painted face features heavily in Beckett’s text, 
and painting also seems to have been a major influence on the staging of his 
plays. Billie Whitelaw famously compared Beckett’s plays of this period to 
‘moving, musical’ Edvard Munch paintings and the link between Beckett’s 
theatrical scenes and particular paintings (or styles of painting) is commonly 
drawn (Knowlson 1978, 89). Conor Carville, for example, suggests that the use 
of lightness and darkness that characterises much of Beckett’s theatrical 
practice derives from seventeenth-century Dutch painting (Carville 2015, 76). 
What I want to emphasise here, though, is the degree to which Beckett 
recognised that his appreciation of painting was conditioned by temporality and 
attentional capacity. 
Beckett was a well-known lover of the visual arts. James Knowlson 
states that Beckett began visiting the National Gallery in Dublin regularly as a 
student and the ‘deep love of painting’ acquired there ‘remained with him for the 
rest of his life’ (Knowlson 1996, 57-8). This appreciation of painting flourished 
on his trip to Germany in the 1930s. Mark Nixon notes that a reader glancing at 
the diaries Beckett kept there ‘could be forgiven for thinking that they were 
written by an art critic’ (Nixon 2011, 132). The ‘German Diaries’ are particularly 
interesting for the insights they give into Beckett’s process of attending to 
paintings. For example, Nixon discusses Beckett’s appreciation of Antonello da 
Messina’s depiction of St. Sebastian (1475-6): ‘the painting inspired Beckett to 
such a degree that while looking at it he “felt a poem beginning” but was 
disturbed by “a noisy guide with a party screaming about Raphael”’ (146). The 
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poem, here, is recognised as the product of a steady, effortful attentiveness. 
However, like the protagonist in That Time, Beckett’s patient, aesthetic 
attentiveness is disturbed by a reflex response to the guide’s ‘screaming’. 
Beckett clearly recognises that his appreciation of painting is grounded by 
attentional limits. Another painting Beckett inspected in Germany was Mathias 
Grünewald’s Sts. Erasmus and Mauritius (1520-4). Beckett suggests that the 
painting ‘immediately says very little’ but it is ‘gradually full of psychologies & 
derisions. Remoteness, contempt, suspicion of Erasmus, social & devout 
prepossessions in conflict’ (148). Here, Beckett very clearly identifies the extent 
to which his interpretations of the painted scene are temporally-grounded. 
Beckett is not aware of getting anything from the painting instantaneously – 
though it is of course possible that he is sensing more than he knows. As time 
passes, however, the painting gets filled with ‘psychologies & derisions’. Beckett 
not only reads the face of Erasmus and finds certain emotions, but also 
interprets hesitancies within Erasmus. Erasmus becomes the object of empathy 
as Beckett ponders the situation and what it would mean for someone of 
Erasmus’s background.  
Beckett’s concern with the temporality of face reading and the possibility 
of distraction can also be observed in the live face that is staged in That Time. 
In one sense, it is a painterly construction that is designed to provoke a patient 
aesthetic attentiveness. Like the protagonist in the portrait gallery, the audience 
are invited to go through the slow, effortful process of trying to ‘make out’ the 
face and appreciate its particular qualities. But at the same time it is a noisy 
stimulus that is likely to trigger automatic reactions. For evidence of the extent 
to which Beckett thought about the psychophysiological impact of the face we 
might turn to the genesis of the play. Beckett’s primary concern during this 
process seems to have been a question of whether the listening face alone was 
enough of a visual element. He states in a manuscript note: ‘to the objection 
visual component too small, out of all proportion with aural, answer: make it 
smaller on the principle that less is more’ (Knowlson 1996, 602). The extent of 
Beckett’s deliberation over this aspect of the play becomes apparent in his 
letters to director Alan Schneider. He stated that there was ‘not much’ to be 
done to the play in September 1974, but was deliberating on the problems of 
imbalance between aural and visual components up until August 1975:  
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The delay in parting with it [That Time’s manuscript] is due to misgivings 
over disproportion between image (listening face) and speech and much 
time lost in trying to devise ways of amplifying former. I have now come 
to accept its remoteness and stillness (Harmon 1998, 320-28).  
Beckett’s deliberation over whether or not the face needed to be amplified, and 
how this might be done, implies a question of the extent to which face reading 
occupies attention. Beckett’s conclusion in the manuscripts that ‘less is more’, 
suggests he came to think that the less the face does, the more it will occupy 
the audience. But he was obviously not always entirely sure about this. He 
spent some time thinking about how a face might be made to arouse attention. 
S. E. Gontarski gives one example of this. In the opening holograph, Beckett 
mooted two potential movements for Listener: 
The first, which no doubt would have caused an unbearable burden for 
the actor was: “No blinking. Eyes staring wide open as long as possible. 
Then closed as or longer.” In revision, Beckett noted an alternative “eyes 
open only in silence.” And it is the alternative that Beckett retained in the 
second holograph version and essentially maintained throughout 
composition (Gontarski 1985, 155). 
Note that Beckett did not set a maximum duration for the stare. Instead, the 
eyes were to ‘stay wide open’ for ‘as long as possible’. Beckett had used this 
kind of instruction before. In the 1971 Berlin production of Happy Days (1961), 
he had asked the actress playing Winnie, Eva-Katharina Schultz, to stare out to 
the audience ‘unblinkingly for as long as possible’ (Knowlson 1996, 584). She 
was, Knowlson states, ‘almost blinded’ and needed eye-drops (584). This 
method evidently puts certain somatic strains on the actor and one can see how 
these strains might produce a noisy affective stimulus. However, the alternative 
that Beckett settled on in the case of That Time brings up a different set of 
concerns. Rather than amplifying the visual stimulus and arousing the audience 
with a bodily spectacle, Beckett produced a play that tests the capacity of the 
face to command attention. In the final version, the audience is presented with a 
face that does almost nothing. The eyes are closed and Listener is inactive for 
nearly all of the play. His activity amounts to a few ten second blocks of silence 
in which the breath becomes ‘audible’ and the eyes open for three seconds 
(Beckett 2006, 388-95). Then a final flourish in which there is a five second 
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‘smile, toothless for preference’ (395). The face is live but it is not particularly 
lively. What demands does this live but almost inactive face make on audience 
and actor? 
In terms of the requirements put on the actor, the facial movements of 
That Time give the actor temporal, as opposed to interpretive tasks. Beckett is 
not asking the actor playing Listener to be consciously expressive with his face. 
In fact, he is distracting the actor from expressiveness. First, there is the 
deceptively arduous task of keeping the eyes closed for long periods. Ruby 
Cohn observed the ‘strain within repose’ in Patrick Magee’s face when he 
performed the role at the Royal Court (Cohn 1980, 268). But there is also the 
task of opening the eyes at precisely the right moment and for precisely the 
right duration. There is no necessity for the actor to react to the meaning of the 
text. Instead the demands of the role are largely temporal and somatic – doing 
the right thing at the right moment. Cohn’s recollection of Magee’s statements 
around the time of the Royal Court performance is telling in this respect. She 
remembers Magee mocking ‘earnest academics who dig through Beckett’s texts 
for buried gold’, and maintaining that Beckett’s directions were ‘so simple and 
specific that any idiot could follow them’ (267-8). As Magee saw it, his role was 
not to engage with the text and make emotional interpretation through his face, 
but to simply follow specific instructions. In a sense, then, Beckett is 
discouraging a naturalistic mode of face reading in which the actor deliberately 
produces facial expressions for the audience to interpret. Instead, he is asking 
the actor’s face to work in an almost mechanical way. However, regardless of 
intention or attention, the actor simply cannot present a blank face. As Bernard 
Waldenfals states in relation to Emmanuelle Levinas (of whom we will hear 
more momentarily), ‘we cannot close our face as we close our eyes’ 
(Waldenfals 2002, 64). Each performance will bring with it a particular set of 
unscripted facial movements: the lips might quiver; the eyebrows might raise or 
lower and there may be tensions and relaxations of the jaw. From his 
experience directing Not I, Beckett would have been very aware that the human 
face finds it difficult to stay still. That Time experiments with this difficulty by 
leaving room for unscripted expressions. The actor’s face is bound to present 
some involuntary movement and, by presenting the face as the sole visual 
stimulus, Beckett emphasises these flickers. The live stimulus of the actor’s 
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face always threatens to disturb the scripted face. Beckett’s play can be seen 
as an experiment that draws attention to the face’s status as both a site of 
aesthetic interpretation and an affective psychophysiological stimulus. 
 
Face Culture 
 
If Beckett’s play can be thought of as an experiment on face reading, it might be 
useful to place this experiment in a broader historical context. In the modern 
period the face has increasingly become a point of contention. This is noted by 
Crary in his discussion of Manet’s painting. Crary suggests that Manet’s 
portrayal of the woman’s face in the conservatory can be placed within the 
context of cultural developments in the later part of the nineteenth century. The 
period, for Crary, saw ‘a new regime of faciality’ take shape after a long 
historical period in which ‘the meanings of the human face were explained in 
terms of rhetoric and language’ (Crary 1999, 99). In this ‘new regime’, the face 
could belong to a human being that was both a ‘physiological organism’ and ‘a 
privatized, socialized individual subject’ (99). Crary suggests that Darwin’s work 
on the expression of emotions can be seen as a manifestation of this change. In 
this context, the ability to control one’s own facial expression becomes a key 
marker of social normativity. Conversely, the uncontrolled face begins to be 
seen as a window to pathology. Crary suggests that it is in the field of mental 
pathology, ‘with its analyses of hysterias, obsessions, manias and anxieties, 
that the face with all its intrinsic motility becomes a sign of a disquieting 
continuum between the somatic and the social’ (99). The woman’s expression 
in Manet’s painting is significant because it simultaneously evokes ‘public 
presentation’ and involuntary behaviour. Crary argues that the woman could be 
recomposing herself in response to a suggestion from the man next to her in the 
picture, but she could also be in a trance. The expression is concurrently 
somatic and social, involuntary and effortful (99-100). Thus, for Crary, Manet’s 
painting embodies the novel and ‘precarious’ position of the nineteenth-century 
face (99).  
The central question in Crary’s discussion seems to be one of whether 
the face can be managed. Crary suggests that, within nineteenth-century 
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culture, there was an assumption that the inability to manage one’s face was a 
sign of insanity or inhumanity. This assumption, though, came into conflict with 
developing evolutionary and physiological conceptions of facial expression. The 
face, I would argue, has continued to occupy this precarious position through 
the twentieth century and beyond. This is evidenced in the work carried out by 
Ekman and others into ‘micro-expressions’ – ‘very brief facial expressions’ that 
‘occur when a person either deliberately or unconsciously conceals a feeling’ 
(Ekman 2015). There is the idea that, as socialised beings, humans will 
inevitably try to mask certain spontaneous expressions of emotion (the teacher, 
for example, might try to hide anger from students). But these spontaneous 
expressions will still manifest as flickers on the face. The face, Ekman’s 
psychology suggests, will betray even the most socialised of individuals – it can 
never quite be controlled. Western culture is still seduced and disquieted by the 
idea that facial expressions can mark us out as both physiological organisms 
and socialized individual subjects. Ekman’s research is interested in showing 
that faces cannot be completely mastered, but the dissemination of his work 
plays on a need for mastery. For between $40.00 and $200.00 (US), one can 
purchase Ekman’s training tools, which promise to teach you how to ‘read 
micro-expressions’, ‘spot concealed emotions’, and ‘manage the expression of 
your own emotions’ (Ekman 2015). There is ongoing tension between the 
recognition that facial expressions are frequently produced involuntarily and 
uncontrollably, and the individual’s desire to attain some level of control over 
them.  
This interest in face management can be found throughout twentieth-
century culture. Within twentieth-century psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, 
there was a continuous interest in the face, and particularly the potential 
dangers and benefits of face-to-face interaction. As Crary suggests, nineteenth-
century psychiatry commonly treated facial expressions as markers of mental 
pathology. The most prominent example of this can be found in the images of 
patients produced in case studies of hysteria. These images often highlight the 
facial expression as a key symptom of the condition. Sander Gilman notes that 
the case studies of the period make some effort to obscure the identity of their 
subjects through the ‘use of initials or masked names’ (Gilman 1993, 349). 
However, the face itself is still usually presented – often emphatically – because 
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it is deemed to give crucial insight into the condition: ‘there is the assumption 
that the face (its structure or its expression) is so important that it does not need 
to be masked’ (349). In The Invention of Hysteria (1983) Georges Didi-
Huberman notes that photography was used for its potential to capture aspects 
of the face that the naked eye might miss. Speaking particularly of the 
neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot, he argues that it is ‘on the basis of 
photography’s capacity for (diagnostic, pedagogical) certification and 
(prognostic scientific) “foresight” that Charcot’s iconographic impulse, as it has 
been called, must be understood’ (Didi-Huberman 2003, 33, emphasis in 
original). Representations of the face, then, were an integral part of nineteenth-
century psychiatry’s diagnostic procedure. In twentieth-century psychotherapy 
and psychoanalysis, however, the face is not only looked to for diagnostic 
purposes. There is also a growing sense that facial interaction between patient 
and therapist/analyst might function as a more or less useful part of treatment. 
Discourse on this topic might be seen to begin with Freud who evidently 
recognised the potential significance of face-to-face interaction to 
psychoanalysis, but wanted to manage interaction in a particular way. In 1913, 
Freud recommended that face-to-face contact between analyst and patient be 
avoided. He stipulated a therapeutic environment in which the patient reclines 
‘on the sofa while one sits behind him out of his sight’ (Freud 1933, 354). This 
situation is preferable, he reasons, because, when listening to the patient, the 
analyst resigns their self to the control of ‘unconscious thought’ (354). Freud 
thinks that this unconscious thought will be expressed on the therapist’s face, 
and that these unconscious expressions might affect the patient. This state of 
affairs is undesirable: ‘I do not wish my expression to give the patient 
indications which he may interpret or which may influence him in his 
communications’ (354). Freud undoubtedly recognises that much can be 
gleamed from the face (and stipulates an environment in which analyst might 
look to the face of the analysand) but he is not interested in making use of facial 
interactions within the therapeutic environment.41  
                                                          
41 In Discourse Networks (1985), Friedrich Kittler sees this as symptomatic of Freud’s tendency towards 
‘exclusion of the optical realm’ (Kittler 1990, 284). For Kittler, this tendency sits uncomfortably with the 
concept of ‘free floating’ (or evenly divided) attention. Like the phonograph, Kittler continues, Freud’s 
method fishes ‘in the wide stream of perception, but only among acoustical data’ (284). 
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However, as the century goes on – and non-Freudian methods of 
psychotherapy become more prominent – there is a growing interest in the way 
in which facial interaction might affect therapeutic relations. Micro-expressions 
were, in fact, first observed in a study by Haggard and Isaacs (1966), which 
focused on facial expressions within psychotherapeutic sessions (Haggard and 
Isaacs 1966, 154-65). Also, psychoanalytic therapists such as H. F. Searles 
began to incorporate face-to-face interaction and suggest that the ‘analyst's 
facial expressions are a highly, and often centrally, significant dimension of both 
psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic therapy’ (Searles 1984-5, 47). Describing 
the case of a forty-year-old female patient, Searles recognises that the patient’s 
‘attunement’ to his face proved to be a ‘far more significant emotional avenue 
for the unfolding of the transference, than did the realm of words’ (64). In other 
cases, Searles finds that when paraphrasing things that he had said in previous 
sessions, patients would ‘largely unconsciously’ iterate his facial expressions 
(52). Thus, ‘in the core phase of the work with any one patient, each of the two 
participants’ facial expressions “belong,” in a sense, as much to the other as 
oneself’ (60). The facial expression, here, is seen not only as a window to 
pathology, but as the primary medium through which patient and therapist 
communicate.42 Thus, whether in Freudian practice or face-to-face 
psychotherapy, the face was of high importance in twentieth-century therapy. 
Freud took the analyst’s face out of the equation (perhaps because of an 
awareness that his face would make expressions that he could not control). 
Later therapists, on the other hand, have tried to incorporate the spontaneity of 
facial interaction into their approach. As in the work of Ekman, there is the 
recognition that facial expressions will be produced and interpreted involuntarily 
but also a desire to filter out, identify, modify or make use of this 
unmanageability. 
This concern with the face in psychology spilled into twentieth-century 
philosophy. In A Thousand Plateaus (1980), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
discuss facial culture.43 They note that ‘the face has been a major concern of 
                                                          
42 A very important aspect of this interest lies in the analogy between the patient-therapist relationship 
and the parent-child. Patrick Casement invokes this in Learning from the Patient (1985): ‘like a child who 
watches the mother’s face for signs of pleasure or indications of mood, patients listen for similar signs 
from the therapist and there are many available’ (Casement 2002, 58). 
43 Deleuze and Guattari draw on Beckett’s work extensively. Indeed, Beckett’s novels are cited in their 
discussion of faciality in the novel in A Thousand Plateaus (191-3). For a critical discussion that relates 
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American psychology, in particular the relation between the mother and the 
child through eye-to-eye contact’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 188).44 However, 
their discussion opens out into a wider discussion of ‘faciality’. The face, they 
argue, comes into being when the head ‘ceases to be part of the body’ and 
becomes a ‘screen with holes’ – a ‘white wall’ punctuated by black holes (188-
9). Here, Deleuze and Guattari argue, an ‘abstract machine’ produces ‘faciality’ 
(189). This operation begins with the head being ‘decoded’ and ‘overcoded’ by 
the face and, eventually, ‘the entire body’ also ‘comes to be facialized as part of 
an inevitable process’: 
When the mouth and nose, but first the eyes, become a holey surface, all 
the other volumes and cavities of the body follow. An operation worthy of 
Doctor Moreau: horrible and magnificent. Hand, breast, stomach, penis 
and vagina, thigh, leg and foot, all come to be facialized (188-189). 
Deleuze and Guattari are keen to distinguish this process from one in which 
parts of the body are simply seen to resemble the face. They are interested, 
instead, in ‘a much more unconscious and machinic operation that draws the 
entire body across the holy surface’ (189). In this process, instead of 
experiencing the body as a proprioceptive, volume-cavity system, one begins to 
scan it in terms of the way in which holes are presented on a wall. Is this hole 
too big? Is that hole the wrong shape? Should the other hole even be there?  
Deleuze and Guattari, then, do not take the face as a given. It is not, they 
argue, related to ‘evolution or genetic stages’ and nor is it ‘universal’ (190-6). 
‘Certain social formations’ they suggest ‘need face’ and ‘there is a whole history 
behind it’ (200, emphasis in original). In ‘primitive societies’, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue, ‘there is very little that operates through the face’ but in 
modernity the face has become an entrenched, habitual, often violent way of 
perceiving otherness and endowing it with degrees of sameness (195).  
We might relate Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of an ‘unconscious and 
machinic’ operation of faciality to the study of face reading in experimental 
                                                          
the concept of faciality to Beckett’s drama, see Colin Gardner’s work on Beckett and Deleuze (2012, 90-
5). 
44 It should be noted that, in his own psychoanalytic (or post-psychoanalytic) practice, Guattari moved 
away from one-to-one, face-to-face contact and began using a form of group therapy. As Gary Genosko 
puts it, Guattari ‘called into question the analytic relationship of analyst-analysand, the so-called face-
to-face, dual relation, for the sake of the analysis of groups in a clinical setting’ (Genosko 2002, 68). 
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psychology, though there are obvious differences. Experimental psychology 
tends to discuss the face in terms of universals and evolution whereas Deleuze 
and Guattari conceive of the face as a culturally determined phenomenon. 
Experimental psychology studies the face in order to better define the human, 
where Deleuze and Guattari see the face as an essentially ‘inhuman’ symptom 
of modernity (189). Nevertheless, in both there is the idea that the reading of 
faces goes on outside of the individual’s control. Rather than consciously 
interpreting a face and drawing conclusions about it, both suggest that certain 
processes work on human beings and lead them to recognise, and respond to 
faces in a certain way. Deleuze and Guattari also speculate on how human 
beings might escape or ‘dismantle the face and facializations’ (188). They are 
searching for ways of working against or overcoming the unconscious 
operations of the abstract machine of faciality. In this way, their ideas might be 
related to those of Ekman, Freud and Searles. In each there is the recognition 
that faces are produced and read involuntarily, and – in very different ways – all 
make moves towards managing this process. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s account has been influential but perhaps the 
twentieth-century philosopher best known for his emphasis on the face is 
Emmanuel Levinas.45 As was the case with Deleuze and Guattari, the face to 
which Levinas refers is not merely the collection of features situated at the front 
of the head. Rather it seems to refer to a way of encountering the other’s 
presence more generally. For Levinas, ‘the face is a living presence; it is 
expression’ (66). The face, then, is not cut off at the neck. The facial encounter 
may be an encounter with any living, expressing presence. As Bernard 
Waldenfals notes, Levinas is not suggesting that there is some aspect of the 
other that is ‘condensed in the face’ (Waldenfals 2002, 65). Instead, ‘the whole 
body expresses, our hands and shoulders do it as well as our face taken in its 
narrow sense’ (65). Thus, both Deleuze and Guattari and Levinas describe the 
facial encounter as a general mode of experiencing the other. However, there is 
certainly a distinction to be made between the ways in which this encounter is 
described in the respective works. For Deleuze and Guattari, the facial 
encounter occurs through the medium of a ‘machinic’ system. In the view of 
                                                          
45 There is a significant body of criticism which considers Beckett’s relationship with Levinas. For 
example, see Fifield 2013. 
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Levinas, by contrast, the encounter is much more direct. For Levinas, one can 
decide to play a particular role when in contact with others, but this role-playing 
does not preclude a more direct facial encounter. An existent can lie ‘without 
being able to dissimulate his frankness as interlocutor’: 
The eye breaks through the mask – the language of the eyes impossible 
to dissemble. The eye does not shine; it speaks. The alternative of truth 
and lying, of sincerity and dissimulation, is the prerogative of him who 
abides in the relation of absolute frankness, in the absolute frankness 
which cannot hide itself (66). 
For Levinas, then, the eyes have a language but this language is not coded in 
the way that it is for Deleuze and Guattari. The features of the face are not 
holes to be processed by an abstract machine. Instead, they have their own 
language which communicates with frankness and cannot be overcoded. Thus, 
even as one puts on a mask and ‘disposes a theme’, the eyes are able to break 
through and express in a manner that is unquestionable (66). Again the face is 
seen as a site of unmanageability – it does not dutifully express what the 
individual consciously wants it to express. But, for Levinas, this unmanageability 
is not pathological and nor is it merely seen to interrupt a verbal encounter. 
Rather, it is the site at which meaning might emerge. Meaning, as Levinas 
describes it, is not ‘produced as an ideal essence; it is said and taught by 
presence’ (66). Thus, in the facial encounter with the other, one is changed: the 
other’s presence ‘dominates him who welcomes it, comes from the heights 
unforeseen and consequently teaches its very novelty’ (66). If the encounter 
with the other’s facial presence is welcomed, Levinas suggests, the self is de-
stabilised and becomes receptive to meaning. 
  Twentieth-century psychology, psychotherapy and philosophy, then, 
offer a wide range of approaches to the face. There are differences between 
disciplines. For instance, Ekman's Facial Action Coding System would likely be 
anathema to a philosopher such as Levinas, for whom giving meaning to one’s 
presence is ‘irreducible to evidence’ (66). But there are also differences within 
disciplines. Freud filtered facial interaction out of the analytic session where 
Searles made it the focal point of his psychoanalytic method. There are also 
disagreements on whether the face is a cultural construct or a matter that 
humans are innately drawn to. Wherever one looks, though, there is a growing 
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emphasis on the idea that the movements of the face (and our interpretations of 
these movements) frequently occur outside of the individual’s conscious control. 
For some, such as Levinas and Searles, this offered the hope of ethical, or 
therapeutic, insight. For others, the face was the product of cultural 
homogenization and one needed to escape it. Some, such as Ekman, 
attempted the rational study of the face, and others – like Freud – tried to put 
facial interaction to one side. All, however, posit a face that is beyond the 
conscious control of the human individual and question what might be done with 
it.  
 
Managed Spontaneity 
 
Whether in experimental psychology, psychotherapy or philosophy, then, 
twentieth-century culture was heavily concerned with questions of the face’s 
manageability. But how does this concern manifest in Beckett’s theatrical 
experimentation? I want to argue that Beckett’s writing can be seen to engage 
with one aspect of twentieth-century facial culture in particular. It registers and, I 
propose, resists an attitude that seeks to use the face’s perceived 
unmanageability in order to produce a choreographed sense of spontaneity. 
This technique of manufacturing spontaneity can be traced back to the 
theatrical practices of the nineteenth century, particularly the act of flinching. 
Tiffany Watt-Smith notes how, in this period, flinching ‘hardened into a “stage-
effect”, a piece of “business” in which jerking, twitching and staggering 
backwards, shielding the face, shrieking and gasping were carefully 
choreographed in order, paradoxically, to suggest a body involuntarily betraying 
itself’ (Watt-Smith 2014, 63). The twentieth century, though, would see the rise 
to ubiquity of another movement in which the body seems to betray itself, the 
smile. Colin Jones argues that the twentieth century saw a great increase in 
cultural esteem for the toothy smile, in contrast to the nineteenth century’s 
idealisation of ‘thoughtfulness, character and demureness’ (Jones 2014, 180). 
This, Jones suggests, was triggered by new photographic and dental 
technologies. Dentistry became accessible en masse and the photographic 
snapshot allowed one to capture the spontaneous, pearly-toothed smile in a 
way that was not possible with paint (180-1). But, with this cultural preference, 
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the smile also became a skill to be mastered. It became a way of making 
friends, getting jobs and selling products; not only a spontaneous expression of 
happiness, but a culturally ubiquitous expectation (182). Appreciation for the 
smile, here, extends beyond the aesthetic practices of theatre or painting. In a 
wider culture, and particularly in commercial situations, the smile acquired 
value. The mere act of smiling (curving the mouth upwards and showing the 
teeth), though, was not enough: what people were deemed likely to pay for, it 
seems, was the evocation of spontaneity. This development is recognised most 
extensively by Arlie Russell Hochschild in her study of the practices of air 
hostesses working for Delta Airlines. These workers carry out, what Hochschild 
calls, ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild 1983, 8-9). Smiling is part of their work but 
the required smiles are not merely professional; they must seem spontaneous. 
This attitude, Hochschild notes, is evidenced in a jingle used by Pacific 
Southwest Airlines: ‘[On PSA] our smiles are not just painted on’ (4).  
In order to produce this sense of spontaneity, Hochschild continues, 
hostesses adopt an ‘artificially created elation’ (4). Their labour does not lie in 
making themselves look happy but in working themselves into a happiness from 
which a smile can easily slip. Drawing on Constantin Stanislavski’s theatrical 
theory, she calls this emotional labour ‘deep acting’ (38). In order to evoke an 
emotion convincingly, Stanislavski argues, an actor must feel that emotion, 
perhaps by recalling or imagining an experience that has provoked/would 
provoke it (Stanislavski 1965, 57). For Hochschild, the air hostess (and many 
other participants in modern life) must work in a very similar way (37-43). The 
individual’s facial work, then, lies in looking as though they are not working to 
produce facial expression. When the work becomes perceptible, though, we 
begin to move into the realm of what Sianne Ngai terms, ‘the zany’. Drawing on 
Hochschild’s study, Ngai argues that in the later part of the twentieth century 
there was a move in the ‘capitalist organization of production’ from ‘scientific 
management’ to ‘performance management’ – from a mode of production in 
which one merely had to carry out particular tasks, to one in which one had to 
exude a particular personality or emotion (Ngai 2012, 201). An aesthetic of 
zaniness, for Ngai, registers this by emphasising the ways in which ‘affect, 
subjectivity, and sociability’ are being put to work (203). This aesthetic, for Ngai, 
is largely comedic. Ngai suggests that if the earlier capitalist system ‘made 
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people laugh at characters incapable of adjusting to new roles and social 
situations quickly’, the later system draws comedic potential from characters 
that ‘seem almost too good at doing so’ (174). To exemplify this, she points to a 
selection of figures that might seem far-removed from Beckett’s aesthetic, 
particularly Lucille Ball’s character (Lucy) in the mid twentieth-century situation 
comedy I Love Lucy, and Jim Carrey’s character in the 1996 comedy The Cable 
Guy (175-202). Unlike these characters, it is difficult to argue that Beckett’s 
protagonists are ‘too good’ at adjusting to new roles and social situations’. 
Rather, Beckett’s writing tends to focus on figures that fail (or refuse) to adapt. 
The paradigmatic Beckettian figure, it may be thought, is not one that 
continually moves between social roles. Rather Beckett’s characters prefer, 
paraphrasing Molloy, to stay where they happen to be (Beckett 2009d, 85). 
Nevertheless, Ngai’s conception of the zany aesthetic evidently encompasses 
Beckett’s writing (or certain aspects of it). Beckett, Ngai states in passing, works 
in the zany tradition by exploring ‘themes of laborious or compulsive doing’ (13-
14). How, then, can Beckett’s – seemingly rather rigid – figures fit into a 
comedic aesthetic that focuses on subjects that are, in Ngai’s words, ‘absolutely 
elastic’ (Ngai 2012, 174)? 
Ngai seems to perceive Beckettian zaniness in moments where 
characters perform ostensibly pointless tasks indefatigably, and with great relish 
– one thinks particularly of the sucking-stones episode in Molloy (Beckett 
2009d, 63-9). But these moments seem to differ from the instances of zaniness 
that Ngai recognises elsewhere insofar as characters such as Molloy are not, in 
any straightforward sense, adapting to new roles or social situations. Rather 
they are described to be fulfilling their own needs and desires. Molloy, for 
example, professes a ‘bodily need’ to ‘suck the stones in the way I have 
described, not haphazard, but with method’ (68). There is not the sense of 
social or professional obligation that characterises Ngai’s other examples of 
zaniness. However, I want to argue that, in his use of the smile, Beckett 
explores questions of social performance in a way that resonates strongly with 
Ngai’s idea of the zany.  
Now, Beckett’s writing frequently considers the smile, and different types 
of smile can be found across the oeuvre. In some instances, the smile is 
described as a private phenomenon that affects the mind but may not be 
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perceptible on the face. For example, in a review of Jack B. Yeats’s novel The 
Amaranthers (1936), Beckett writes of how, when confronted with Yeats’s irony, 
‘the face remains grave, but the mind has smiled’ (Beckett 1983, 89). Another 
instant in which the smile is portrayed as kind of mental affect can be found in 
The Capital of Ruins (1946), a short prose piece written for radio in the 
aftermath of the Second World War which reflects on Beckett’s time as a 
hospital volunteer in war-shattered Saint-Lô. Here Beckett points to a number of 
moments in which the ‘therapeutic relation’ between patients and staff faded 
and there was: 
the occasional glimpse obtained by us in them, and who knows them in 
us (for they are an imaginative people) of that smile at the human 
conditions as little to be extinguished by bombs as to be broadened by 
the elixirs of Burroughes and Welcome –  the smile deriding, among 
other things, the having and the not having, the giving and the taking, 
sickness and health (Beckett 1995, 277). 
Again, the smile seems to function primarily as the mind’s response to a social 
situation, it can only be glimpsed occasionally on the face. Crucial, here, is the 
point that no conscious emotional labour goes into the production of these 
smiles. They are, it seems, reflex, emotional responses to certain situations 
which occasionally leave external traces.  
 In other works, however, these seemingly effortless (often purely 
mental) smiles are superseded by smiles that show a large amount of facial 
(though not necessarily emotional) labour. An early example of this can be 
found in the smile of the character Watt. Watt, we are told, ‘had watched people 
smile and thought he understood how it was done’ (Beckett 2009e, 19). The 
protagonist’s smile is not an involuntary show of emotion, but the product of a 
deliberate process of studying others in order to master the smile. This process 
of study has worked to an extent: ‘Watt’s smile, when he smiled, resembled 
more a smile than a sneer’ (19). But, the narrator suggests, ‘there was 
something wanting to Watt’s smile, some little thing was lacking’ (19). This lack 
makes the smile something of an enigma: those seeing it for the first time ‘were 
sometimes in doubt as to what expression was exactly intended. To many it 
seemed a simple sucking of teeth’ (19). Also, Watt’s smiles have a tendency to 
linger: 
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Watt’s smile was further peculiar in this, that it seldom came singly but 
was followed after a short time by another, less pronounced it is true. In 
this it resembled the fart. And it even sometimes happened that a third, 
very weak and fleeting, was found necessary before the face could be at 
rest again (21).46 
This comparison is interesting as the smile gets caught between the somatic 
and the social. A fart is bodily and involuntary to an extent. It can, on occasion, 
break out from nowhere without one’s having the chance to think about it. But at 
the same time the individual usually has a modicum of control over the process 
– one can usually pick socially opportune moments. In Watt the sense of 
spontaneity is degraded as the smile is extended through time. The third 
movement, we are told, was ‘found necessary’, which gives the sense of a 
cognitive debate over how long to extend the process. There is the implication 
that, in the normal way, the smile slips out one time before the face rests. But in 
Watt’s ‘peculiar’ way, the face is seen to think about its smiling – cognition is 
seen to override affect. Importantly, here, Watt is not deep acting. He has not 
worked himself into a state of emotion from which a smile can easily slip. He is 
managing his facial features in order to produce a particular shape rather than 
doing the emotional labour that would enable a spontaneous smile. Watt’s facial 
effort is perceptible and so he produces a slightly enigmatic smile which exudes 
a peculiarly Beckettian zaniness. One sees a subject labouring to adjust to a 
social situation, but it is the wrong type of labour. In a world in which the subject 
is expected to manage their emotions in order to produce a spectacle of 
spontaneity, Watt is only able to manage the machinery of his face. 
 In That Time the audience is presented with a descendant of Watt’s 
smile. The play closes with a five-second smile ‘toothless for preference’, but 
what are we to make of it (Beckett 2006, 395)? It is important to recognise a 
difference in medium here. In contrast to that of Watt, there is an actor’s face 
behind Listener’s smile and we might question the nature of the relationship 
between actor and smile. Given that Listener’s smile is situated at the end of the 
performance, it may be seen as the moment at which the mask comes off and 
the actor relaxes, producing a spontaneous show of emotion. However, as was 
                                                          
46 For another reading that considers the relationship between affect and facial expression in Beckett’s 
work see David Houston Jones’s (forthcoming) work on trauma, face and figure in Beckett’s writing. 
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the case in Watt, the smile lingers. It is extended for five seconds ‘till fade out 
and curtain’, which signifies that the script is still playing out (Beckett 2006, 
395). This extension through time gives the sense that the smile is being forced 
and because of this, I do not see it as a show of happiness, relaxation or relief. 
As Shane Weller puts it, the smile provokes a ‘labour of interpretation’ (Weller 
2006, 131). There may be a hint of spontaneity in the actor’s smile. He may 
spontaneously show relief at the end of the play. But the extension of this smile 
over time lends doubt as to what it is expressing, and the primary sense evoked 
is that of a ‘zany’ effort. As suggested by the above comments of Patrick 
Magee, Beckett does not ask the actor playing Listener to perform emotional 
labour (Stanislavskian ‘deep acting’) during performances, but to follow simple 
and specific instructions. In That Time, though, he seems to script the moment 
at the end of a performance where the actor is supposed to stop acting and 
engage in face-to-face contact with his customers, the audience. In the late 
twentieth century, the individual was under increasing pressure to make 
moments of labour look spontaneous. In Beckett’s play, though, the moment in 
which the actor is supposed to look spontaneous begins to look like work. 
Beckett is writing against a Stanislavskian culture of deep acting47 and a 
broader culture of managed spontaneity.  
 
Selective Attention and the ‘Cocktail Party’ Problem 
 
In the presentation of a flickering and often inactive face, Beckett has so far 
been seen to experiment on the process of face reading and engage with 
contemporary attitudes towards the face. One should not forget, however, that 
the face is not the only element of the play. The low-level visual stimulus is 
accompanied by a stream of aural stimuli. Listener may not speak to the 
audience, but the audience does listen in on his being spoken to. The action of 
the play sees three recorded voices, ‘A’ ‘B’ and ‘C’, come to Listener ‘from both 
sides and above’ (Beckett 2006, 388). The three voices give out three different 
memories, which we might assume are from different periods of Listener’s life: 
                                                          
47 Numerous critics have pointed out the degree to which Beckett’s writing breaks with Stanislavskian 
method. See, for example, Uhlmann 2013, 173-5. 
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‘A’ of old age, ‘B’ of middle age and ‘C’ of youth. They give out a huge amount 
of detailed information about what Listener has experienced and how he has 
experienced it. For example, voice ‘C’ begins: 
when you went in out of the rain always winter then always raining that 
time in the Portrait Gallery in off the street out of the cold and rain slipped 
in when no one was looking through the rooms shivering and dripping till 
you found a seat at a marble slab (388). 
This is not just the gist of a memory but a detailed recollection of lived 
experience. Without pause, we are given a flurry of particulars; the weather 
(‘winter then always raining’); where the protagonist goes (‘the Portrait Gallery’); 
how his body feels (‘shivering and dripping’); what he sits on (‘a marble slab’). 
As in Not I, these words were intended to be delivered quickly. In an early note, 
Beckett states that the play should last ‘15 min’ and go at 200wds/min’ 
(Gontarski 1985, 156). Thus, as the visual stimulus gives out very little scripted 
information, the aural stimulus gives out an abundance of it. This wealth of aural 
information is also presented in a fragmented manner. The memories are not 
presented one-by-one in chronological order. Instead, ‘they modulate back and 
forth without any break in general flow’ (388). Thus the first part of a memory is 
given by A. Then, without break, C takes over and starts to give out a different 
memory. Next, C stops and B starts to give out a different memory, and so on. 
In addition to this fragmentation, there is a problem of chronology. The play 
does not start with the memory of youth and move through to old age, but starts 
with old age and moves back to youth, only to go back to old age again in a 
loop. Furthermore, the order shifts as the play goes on. If the face provokes ‘a 
labour of interpretation’ by giving out a dearth of information, the voices provoke 
equal labour by presenting a torrent of seemingly disordered detail. In what 
follows, I will be concerned with the way in which these two sensory channels 
work together. James Knowlson has observed that in Beckett’s drama of this 
period sight is played off against sound (Knowlson 1996, 624). In a sense, That 
Time is a perfect example of this conflict between ear and eye. As mentioned 
above, when studying da Messina’s depiction of St. Sebastian in Germany, 
Beckett complained of being disturbed by a ‘noisy guide’. It may be suggested 
that in That Time, voices A B and C take the role of this noisy guide and 
interfere with the audience’s study of the face. Conversely, one might argue that 
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the ‘labour of interpretation’ provoked by the face distracts from the content 
being voiced by A, B and C. However, the visual and aural stimuli may also be 
seen to supplement each other. Put crudely, the material presented by the three 
voices might be seen to represent what is going on in Listener’s mind. Thus the 
voices might help us interpret the face’s expression and the face’s movements 
might also help us to interpret the voices. Two sensory channels are, in one 
sense, competing for attention but, in another, combining to give the audience a 
sense of what is going on.  
The aural stimulus in That Time was not intended as one continuous 
stream. It is broken up into different channels and these channels also have the 
potential to come into conflict with each other. This potential for conflict is 
evident in the manuscripts. As with the presentation of the face, Beckett toyed 
with various ideas as to how he would present the aural stimulus. Gontarski 
recognises that, in early drafts, there was a large focus on processes of 
‘interruption’ and ‘conflict’ between the three channels (Gontarski 1985, 156). In 
the initial draft, Gontarski continues, Beckett considered a set-up in which there 
were moments where two of the voices would speak together: ‘A beginning 
stops B or C, but for a moment 2 together. A may persist. B or C yield’ (156). 
Beckett’s mooted method bears a striking resemblance to a series of 
experiments that took place in twentieth-century experimental psychology. In 
presenting two recorded voices simultaneously, Beckett would have produced 
his own experiment on a psychological effect known as the ‘cocktail party’ 
problem. This is the question of how, when presented with multiple voices, the 
human is able to attend to a certain voice and inhibit others. In his review of the 
field of selective attention Jon Driver outlines this problem as such: 
In many situations (e.g. a noisy room full of people), many sounds enter 
our ears at once. How are we able to pick out just those sounds that are 
relevant to us (e.g. the conversation we are taking part in)? Moreover, 
what is the difference in processing for such attended sounds vs. 
unattended sounds (e.g. the other conversations taking place in the 
room) (Driver 2001, 54)? 
There are two questions to tackle here. First there is a question of separating 
signal from noise in any situation: for example, how I manage to attend to the 
music coming from my speakers and ignore the sounds of cars on the street, or 
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the buzzing of my fridge. This is a question that Beckett had come across in his 
reading of Gestalt psychology. In his interwar notes Beckett informed himself of 
the Gestalt idea of ‘figure and ground’. At the same time as he read about the 
baby’s tendency to single ‘out a face or other compact visual unit’ in the visual 
sphere, he also noted how this process translated when one is presented with 
aural or tactile stimuli. A ‘noise figure’, Beckett notes, will be recognised against 
a ‘noise background’ and a ‘movement on skin’ will be recognised against a 
‘general mass of cutaneous sensation’ (TCD MS 10971/7/12). Thus, as Laura 
Salisbury (2010) has noted, the process by which signal is separated from 
noise, figure from ground, had captured Beckett’s interest.  
However, in the presentation of the aural stimulus in That Time, Beckett 
is negotiating a slightly different question. In presenting two voices 
simultaneously, Beckett would not have been asking an audience to separate 
figure from ground. Instead he would have asked them to choose between two 
aural figures, a process that became important in the study of attention in 
experimental psychology. Experiments by Broadbent (1958) and Moray (1959) 
studied this process through ‘selective shadowing’ tasks. Here ‘two different 
spoken messages were played at the same time’ (Driver 2001, 54). One 
message was played to each ear through headphones and listeners were 
required to concentrate on one message rather than the other. Driver isolates 
two fundamental empirical questions that experiments on this subject 
investigated: first, ‘what differences between two messages are needed’ for 
successful selective attention? Second, if one is able to selectively attend to 
one message, how much does one know about the unattended channel (54)? 
With regards to the first question, Beckett’s method poses some problems for 
selective attention. In That Time, the three channels presented are very similar 
in content so it would have been difficult to attend to one over the others. Voices 
A, B and C have the same voice and, as Gontarski notes all are apparently 
‘memories belonging to the visible head’ (Gontarski 1985, 150). The three 
channels share certain phrases – the titular ‘that time’, for example; they are 
presented at similar speeds; in a similar tone; and there is nothing in the text to 
suggest that one is any more significant than the others (Beckett 2006, 388-90). 
There is, however, one difference that might enable selective attention. 
Psychological experimentation suggested that, for efficient selective attention, 
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‘there needs to be a clear physical difference between the messages, such as 
their coming from different locations’ (Driver 2001, 54). As he explains in a letter 
to Alan Schneider, Beckett went down this route: 
The chief difficulty of A B & C being the same voice will be to make clear 
the modulation from one to another, as between attendant keys, without 
breaking the flow continuous except where silences indicated. I feel that 
dissimilar contexts and dislocation in space – one coming to him from 
left, a second from above, third from right – should be enough to do it 
(Harmon 1998, 329). 
Beckett’s method, then, gives just enough of a physical difference to give a 
sense of ‘modulation’ but he also wanted to keep the voices in a continuous 
flow. In this sense he would have made selective attention possible but effortful. 
With regards to Driver’s second question, it was found that, when one is able to 
select a particular channel for attention, little is picked up from the other 
channel. The experimenters found that, given a physical difference between the 
channels, ‘people appear to know surprisingly little about the non-shadowed 
message’ (Driver 2001, 54). They had little idea about the topic of the 
unattended channel, and in many cases could not detect a change in language 
or the repetition of a single word (54). In these experiments, the only changes 
reported were ‘unsubtle’ changes in physical properties, such as changes in 
pitch, or the sudden insertion of a loud tone (54). Thus, if Beckett had gone 
down the route of presenting simultaneous speech it would have likely resulted 
in chunks of A, B, or C becoming inaccessible. Performance would have 
probably seen random parts of the text undone.  
Gontarski suggests that Beckett’s deciding against the presentation of 
simultaneous voices was part of a wider move towards formalism in the genetic 
process. For Gontarski, Beckett moved from ‘a pattern of simple hostility among 
the voices’ to a ‘harmonious relationship’ (Gontarski 1985, 156). Beckett’s 
labour in the writing process, Gontarski suggests, was primarily devoted to 
‘orchestrating the fragments into increasingly complicated patterns’ (157). Here, 
he continues, ‘the analogy with music is particularly apposite’ (157). In 
Gontarski’s account, Beckett went away from the idea of presenting a dramatic 
conflict between three voices, towards one of presenting the voices as three 
elements of a single musical pattern. He goes on to suggest that Listener’s 
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closing smile can be explained in terms of an appreciation of form, rather than 
content: 
What Listener appears to be responding to at the end of the play is not 
the content of the voices but their pattern. In the play’s first section, 
Listener hears the ACB pattern broken by the final CAB. In the second 
section, the CBA pattern is broken by the ending BCA. But in the third 
section Listener can take some pleasure in the restoration of order, or at 
least a formal harmony, as the BAC pattern is retained throughout the 
third part (158). 
Now, the notion that Beckett was occupied by formal concerns during the 
writing of That Time is beyond question. However, I think Gontarski may 
overstate the case a little. With regards to the smile, as Shane Weller points 
out, Gontarski assumes that it is ‘rooted in pleasure’ – downplaying its 
enigmatic nature (Weller 2006, 130). Furthermore, in Gontarski’s reading, 
Beckett seems to overestimate a theatrical audience’s capacity to apprehend 
the pattern that he presents. As an audience member, I would have little chance 
of locating where each voice is coming from, let alone keeping track of the 
pattern that unfolds. Though it is possible that Beckett might overestimate his 
audience in such a way, I wish to advance another theory. Rather, than simply 
moving from a version of the play which focuses on conflict between voices, to 
one which focuses on pattern, I would argue that Beckett is interested in playing 
these two versions against each other. Beckett, I suggest, is not producing 
patterns for their own sake. Rather, the play investigates how we move between 
attending to three distinct elements, and apprehending that those elements are 
a single continuous whole. Here, we might go back to Beckett’s study of Gestalt 
psychology. The major point Beckett took from his notes on the Gestaltists was 
their insistence ‘that every act or experience should be studied as a whole & in 
its setting, rather than analysed into its elements’ (TCD MS 10971/7/7). 
Beckett’s presentation of the aural stimulus in That Time, though, does not 
allow us to do one or the other. In a stage note Beckett stipulated that the aural 
stimulus should produce a particular ‘effect’ in which the switch between voices 
is ‘clearly faintly perceptible’ (Beckett 2006, 387). He did not want the aural 
stimulus to be experienced as a continuous whole, but neither did he want the 
distinction between elements to be completely definite. Instead, he brings two 
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modes of attention into conflict. On the one hand, we might appreciate That 
Time’s aural stimulus as a single musical piece that moves through a series of 
formal progressions. But on the other we are presented with three voices that 
tell different stories and compete for attention. Beckett, I suggest, was 
interested in exploring the psychological strains that reside between these two 
modes of attention.  
 
Aesthetic Labours of Attention 
 
In That Time, then, reading faces and selectively attending to voices become 
psychologically strenuous tasks. Beckett brings an audience to question the 
way in which they are to attend to the sensory material that is presented. But 
what is the purpose of all this labour? Put another way, how does the 
psychological labour transition into aesthetic experience or theatrical 
entertainment? There seems always to have been a question in Beckett’s mind 
over That Time’s aesthetic credentials. Before it was performed, James 
Knowlson remembers Beckett telling him that the play would be working ‘on the 
very edge of what was possible in the theatre’ (Knowlson 1996, 602). In a 
sense, here, Beckett seems to understand his work as an attempt to extend the 
boundaries of artistic practice, and the play might be viewed as an experiment 
in this sense. But, if this is the case, in what ways are the boundaries being 
extended? I would argue that Beckett is extending the boundaries of aesthetic 
experience – working on the edge of what is possible in the theatre – by 
incorporating traditionally non-aesthetic modes of attention into an aesthetic 
environment. In one traditional aesthetic mode of attention (exemplified earlier 
by Beckett’s inspection of Mathias Grünewald’s painting) the subject devotes 
attention to a particular object and patiently tries to make out what that object is 
saying to them. This mode, though, is atypical in a modernity in which novel 
objects (or new channels of stimuli) frequently emerge to compete for the 
subject’s attention. As we have begun to see (and we will consider this more 
thoroughly in the next chapter), experimental psychology is heavily concerned 
with the subject’s capacity to deal with these competing stimuli – the ways in 
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which the modern subject manages their attentional load in everyday life.48 
Beckett’s experiment, I suggest, is characterised by the introduction of these 
modes of attention into an aesthetic environment. 
 Of course, in modernity aesthetic experience is also increasingly 
characterized by a kind of divided attention. In the contemporary world, where a 
room is frequently populated by numerous devices capable of transmitting 
aesthetic products (books, televisions, smartphones, tablets, laptops, radios 
etc.), there is always the possibility that one aesthetic product might compete 
for attention with another. The last time I read one of Beckett’s works,49 for 
instance, I was intermittently aware of the television drama that was playing on 
my partner’s laptop across the room. The question here, though, becomes one 
of whether this type of experience can still be labelled aesthetic. That Time, I 
argue, can be seen to anticipate this question. It presents sensory information in 
a way that requires the subject to manage or divide their attention and 
questions whether this process can be aesthetic, or even entertaining. For a 
response to the play that seems to register this question, we might look to John 
Pilling’s review of Alan Schneider’s 1977 production in New York. Unconvinced 
by the play’s aesthetic, Pilling notes that the work often feels ‘too languid to be 
dramatic’ and ‘nearly always seems too long’ (Pilling 1978, 128). From this, one 
might infer that Beckett’s play does not offer enough content to fill out the time it 
takes to perform. Pilling, though, is raising a slightly different concern. He 
suggests that the work might be ‘more compelling as a radio play or short prose 
text’ (128). The play, then, is seen to give out too much content. Pilling suggests 
that it may be more ‘compelling’ if the visual element was removed and the play 
became a purely aural or textual matter. There is the indication that less would 
have been more: the aural stimulus alone would have been enough to occupy 
Pilling, but when the visual and aural stimuli combine the play becomes a little 
boring. Here, Pilling is imaginatively separating the play out into discrete 
elements (what the speech would sound like without the visual stimuli; how the 
words would read if they were not being spoken). The play is perceived as a 
selection of stimuli competing against each other and Pilling does not feel that 
                                                          
48 For example, in the last two decades, there has been extensive research on the question of how the 
subject drives a car while speaking on a mobile telephone, see, for example Strayer and Johnston 2001; 
Treffner and Barrett 2004; Charlton 2009. 
49 Rough for Theatre 2, to be specific. 
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this competition is dramatically compelling. Instead, he reckons the play would 
be better if this competition was extinguished through the removal of certain 
channels. Rather than an aesthetic experience in which one concentrates on a 
single channel, the play produces a more laborious, everyday environment in 
which content comes from multiple sources and attention has to be managed 
and divided. By Pilling’s account, then, psychological labour fails to translate 
into aesthetic pleasure. 
 However, this reading ignores a key aspect of the play’s aesthetic 
practice: the telling of a personal story. Beckett’s play is ultimately the story of a 
particular individual, and we might question why Beckett has chosen to tell the 
story in this particular way. For an answer to this, we might look to the text in a 
little more detail. The text narrates a series of episodes from a protagonist’s life 
but (as was the case with Not I) it consistently raises the question of why these 
episodes are particularly worthy of our attention. The title of the plays gives an 
indication that there is one crucial time at the heart of the story, and the text 
hints that certain moments being described hold significance for the protagonist. 
At the same time, though, (to paraphrase Patrick Magee) Beckett’s text 
frequently resists the view that one can dig through it to find buried gold. For 
instance, when voice C describes the (above discussed) time in the portrait 
gallery, the passage ends with the question of whose face it was that appeared 
(Beckett 2006, 389). When C begins again it states that the protagonist was 
‘never the same after that’, hinting that a transformative moment ensued after 
the appearance of the face (390). However, this potential for insight is almost 
instantly refuted: ‘but that was nothing new if it wasn’t this it was that common 
occurrence something you could never be the same after crawling about year 
after year in your lifelong mess’ (390). The play prompts us to focus in on the 
episode before insisting that it actually recounts a single ‘mess’ in which no 
moment can necessarily be distinguished from the ‘blooming, buzzing 
confusion’. The text, then, seems to disqualify itself as a source that is likely to 
offer any keys to the protagonist’s story.  
In light of this, we might look in search of insight to the presence in front 
of us, namely Listener’s face. As mentioned, the play’s presentation may be 
interpreted to suggest that if one monitors the face for expression and listens to 
what the voices are saying an overall sense of the protagonist’s situation can be 
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gleamed. However, textual detail and embodied presence do not combine 
neatly. The face does not respond to the words of the text straightforwardly and 
the fragmentation of the play disrupts the sense that one is examining a 
protagonist in any holistic way. The face is live while the voices are recorded, 
and the voices themselves are dislocated in space. Furthermore, we are 
frequently reminded of the distinction between Listener and the actor playing 
him. Listener, for example, seems to be lying down – he is given ‘long flaring 
hair as if seen from above’ – but the actor playing him is presented facing the 
audience in an upright position (Beckett 2006, 388). AlthoughThat Time is 
ostensibly concerned with the life story of a single individual, the performance of 
the play gives the impression that many different things are going on 
simultaneously. In an effort to make out the personal story, one has to divide 
attention between numerous distinct figures. Thus, That Time offers insights on 
the experience of attentional management, and ultimately investigates how one 
produces (or fails to produce) meaning amid the competing channels of 
modernity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Beckett’s experimentation in That Time, then, works in a variety of ways. First, 
along with many psychological experiments, it investigates the way in which we 
attend to faces, questioning how a deliberate, effortful mode of attending to the 
face interacts with a more automatic, affective mode. Second, it engages with 
twentieth-century cultural attitudes towards the face which highlighted the 
unmanageability of the face, but also sought to manage this unmanageability. 
Here, Beckett’s work seems particularly interested in the ways in which a 
culture of managed spontaneity might be disturbed in a theatrical context – how 
an actor’s scripted facial movements might be made to look mechanical or 
zany, rather than spontaneously expressive. In these ways, the play might be 
seen as an experiment that is primarily concerned with the face. But beyond, 
questions of the face and facial culture, we have also seen that Beckett’s play 
employs a particular combination of stimuli in order to interrogate the boundary 
between two modes of attention: a mode in which one apprehends a continuous 
whole and a mode in which different elements compete with one another for 
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attention. As well as a face, That Time presents three voices which might be 
seen to compete for attention (with one another and with the face). But at the 
same time these elements have the potential to form a continuous whole and 
Beckett never privileges one interpretation over the other. Thus, seeming to 
draw on Gestalt psychology, Beckett’s play traverses the psychological strains 
that reside in between the whole and its elements.  
That Time, then, is a work that demands an appreciable amount of 
psychological labour from its audience and part of its aesthetic experimentation, 
I have argued, lies in an attempt to extend the boundaries of artistic practice by 
incorporating problems of selective and divided attention into a theatrical 
environment. The play questions whether psychological labour can transition 
into aesthetic pleasure, and I would argue that this question is still open for 
debate. In many ways, this is a question that has framed the entire modernist 
corpus. From the exacting literary projects of Proust, Eliot, Pound, Joyce and 
Woolf, to the systematic music of Terry Riley, Philip Glass and Steve Reich, 
prominent modernists all seem to work with the assumption that aesthetic 
pleasure can be derived from psychological labour. But Beckett’s work, with its 
emphasis on human incapacity and attentional strain, seems to interrogate the 
relationship between aesthetic pleasure and psychological labour in a much 
more open-ended way. It is often said that Beckett’s writing is hard work (and it 
would be difficult to argue that Beckett intended otherwise) but the works 
themselves frequently ask us to consider whether this psychological labour is 
worth it – whether focusing our mind on this novel, text or play for an extended 
period of time is likely to deliver an aesthetic pay-off. This question is 
particularly important in a society in which a single stimulus (aesthetic or 
otherwise) rarely obtains our undivided attention but competes with a variety of 
other channels of stimuli. Beckett, then, might be seen to work with many 
experimental psychologists in exploring the ways in which the modern individual 
manages attentional loads. Much psychological experimentation questions 
whether the human can perform multiple, unrelated tasks simultaneously, and 
analyses different modes of attention. Beckett’s play, though, might be 
distinguished from these experiments insofar as the tasks it asks us to perform 
are all linked to a single personal story. The attentional labour the play requires 
is geared towards an attempt to construct a more or less coherent life story. 
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And it is in this sense, I think, that we might most properly call That Time an 
aesthetic, or literary experiment. 
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Chapter 3 
Inattention in Footfalls 
 
Jonathan Crary suggests that in the late nineteenth century, a normative 
observer began to be conceptualized: 
Not only in terms of the isolated objects of attention, but equally in terms 
of what is not perceived, or only dimly perceived, of the distractions, the 
fringes and peripheries that are excluded or shut out of a perceptual field 
(Crary 1999, 40).  
Crary links this development to the ‘physiological discovery of the 
nonhomogeneous nature of the eye itself’, but this new model of vision, he 
argues, had a metaphorical impact that would transcend any particular empirical 
finding (40). Here Crary cites the Freudian model of ‘an unconscious actively 
denying certain contents to attentive awareness’, but he also suggests that 
Freud’s theory was one of many in the period to show a concern with themes of 
‘inhibition, exclusion, and periphery’ (40). Crary points to the development of a 
number of theories which suggested that sensory content is generally left 
inaccessible to consciousness, not in order to prevent psychic rupture, but 
because it is not task-relevant. In particular, he outlines Hermann von 
Helmholtz’s notion that sensory information which is ‘unlikely to be useful or 
necessary is involuntarily unattended to’ (40). To become aware of this inhibited 
information, Helmholtz suggested, one must make a ‘special effort’ to reorient 
attention (40). Thus one is not – as in Freud’s theory – repressing material with 
the potential to cause psychic rupture. Rather, attention becomes a matter of 
usefulness and necessity. One registers the material that is likely to be 
meaningful or useful and remains oblivious of that which is not.50  
                                                          
50 The question here becomes one of the procedure by which these perceptual decisions are made. Who 
(or what) decides what is potentially meaningful or useful? In experimental psychology, there has been 
the suggestion that certain stimuli (the sound of one’s own name, a smiling face or a stick figure, for 
example) are particularly likely to capture the attention of humans (Mack and Rock 1998, 155). This 
might be interpreted to suggest that certain biological mechanisms trigger humans to notice some 
stimuli over others. This, though, does not explain differences between individuals. Why do some 
individuals fail to register objects or events that are highly salient to others? This is a question to which I 
will return later in the chapter. 
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There are two aspects of Crary’s discussion that I want to bring into the 
context of the twentieth century, and Samuel Beckett’s Footfalls. First, Crary 
detects an opposition between theories that emphasise repression (such as 
Freud’s), and those that look at involuntary, task-oriented inattention. Debates 
around this opposition have undoubtedly continued through the twentieth 
century, and these debates will inevitably enter into my discussion. The 
opposition, though, will be a secondary concern in this chapter. I am primarily 
interested in the other concern that comes up in Crary’s discussion: the ‘special 
effort’ that is required to reorient attention so as to become aware of, or retrieve, 
inhibited information. Whether working with theories of repression or involuntary 
inattention, the twentieth century saw a sustained investigation into the 
experience of inattention. In the psychological laboratory, researchers used new 
technologies in order to manufacture attentional overload and produce 
observable moments of inattention. In psychotherapy, there was continued 
investigation into repression and dissociative states. Here questions of attention 
spill into questions of memory. With the development of trauma theory in the 
1970s, 80s and 90s, there was debate around the question of whether it was 
possible to retrieve memories of experiences that had been inhibited or 
repressed. Therapists also worked with patients in order to explore the 
qualitative experience of dissociative states. It is my contention that this is an 
important context in which to read Beckett’s work. Beckett, I will argue, was very 
interested in capturing ‘what is not perceived, or only dimly perceived’ – in ‘the 
distractions, the fringes and peripheries that are excluded or shut out’. However, 
Beckett’s method should be distinguished from those of the psychologists or 
psychotherapists. He is not working to reorient attention so as to enable the 
retrieval of repressed or inhibited information. Nor is he working to decide 
between those theories that assume repression and those that emphasise 
involuntary, task-oriented inattention. Instead, in works such as Footfalls, I 
argue in this chapter, he manipulates the theatrical environment so as to 
capture a particular affective state: the experience of perceiving things dimly 
and feeling as though a large amount of material is being shut out. Footfalls 
offers one the chance to attend to the experience of inattention. 
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Experiencing Nothing: The Case of Amy 
 
Towards the end of the text of Footfalls there is a moment in which Beckett’s 
interest in the experience of inattention is particularly evident. In the final part of 
the play, the protagonist, May, tells the story of Old Mrs Winter and her 
daughter, Amy. There are a couple of things that might be deemed peculiar 
about this story. For the sake of clarity, I will give my interpretation of these 
peculiarities before going any further. First, there is a close link between May 
and Amy. Besides the obvious typographical similarities between the two 
names, Amy is described to pace up and down in a manner that has been 
characteristic of May (Beckett 2006, 402). Second, Old Mrs Winter is linked to 
the voice of May’s mother with whom May has spoken earlier. Each, for 
example, wonder whether their daughter will ever ‘have done… revolving it all’ 
(400-3). Thus, May’s story seems to be a refraction of her life. The story may be 
deemed a fiction within a fiction but elements of the host fiction seep into the 
fiction that is being hosted. The strangeness of this situation is enhanced by the 
way in which it is presented to the audience. May does not tell her story from 
the beginning but describes it as a ‘sequel’ (402). The audience, it seems, has 
missed part of the story. This becomes apparent when May states that ‘the 
reader will remember’ Old Mrs Winter (402). Old Mrs Winter has not been 
introduced to the audience of Footfalls previously and nor is the theatrical 
audience, in any straightforward sense, a ‘reader’. Thus it emerges that May’s 
story is not addressed to the theatrical audience. Rather, the audience is 
overhearing May creating a semi-autobiographical story for a reader. The 
audience, then, is informed that it has missed something. However, the fact that 
May’s story recalls earlier events in the play so closely means that it is tempting 
to use the one as a means of shedding light on the other.  
Within this slightly unusual set-up, May narrates an exchange between 
Mrs Winter and Amy which, for its significance to what follows in this chapter, I 
quote at length. As they sit down to supper on a Sunday evening after church, 
Mrs Winter asks Amy whether she observed anything strange at the ceremony:  
Amy: No, mother I did not. Mrs W[inter]: Perhaps it was just my fancy. 
Amy: Just what exactly Mother, did you perhaps fancy it was? (Pause.) 
Just what exactly, Mother, did you perhaps fancy this…strange thing you 
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observed? (Pause.) Mrs W: You yourself observed nothing strange? 
Amy: No, Mother, I myself did not, to put it mildly. Mrs W: What do you 
mean, Amy, to put it mildly, what can you possibly mean, Amy, to put it 
mildly? Amy: I mean, Mother, that to say I observed nothing… strange is 
indeed to put it mildly. For I observed nothing of any kind, strange or 
otherwise. I saw nothing, heard nothing of any kind. I was not there. Mrs 
W: Not there? Amy: Not there. Mrs W: But I heard you respond. (Pause.) 
I heard you say Amen. (Pause.) How could you have responded if you 
were not there (Pause) How could you possibly have said Amen if, as 
you claim, you were not there? (Pause) The love of God and the 
fellowship of the Holy Ghost, be with us all, now, and for evermore. 
Amen, (Pause) I heard you distinctly (402-403). 
Again, the distinction made in the ‘Psychology Notes’ between experience and 
performance is at the core of the passage. For Mrs W, Amy is a performer. She 
has ‘distinctly’ heard Amy make the appropriate responses at church and Amy’s 
being there resides in this performance. Amy, by contrast sees herself as an 
experiencer. She has not been there because she has not experienced being 
there. But what, then, was the nature of her experience? Of course, we could 
take Amy at her word and assume she was physically absent from church – that 
she did not make the performance that Mrs W describes. Perhaps Mrs W’s 
report is the product of ‘fancy’ or hallucination. The text leaves this possibility 
open. When she is setting the scene, the authorial voice of May states that Mrs 
W is ‘sitting down to supper with her daughter after worship’ (403). She does 
not affirm that both attended worship, merely that both are sitting down to 
supper after worship. There is, then, some doubt about the reliability of Mrs W’s 
observation of Amy’s performance. It should be noted here, however, that Amy 
does not specify where she was, if not at church. She does not say: ‘I could not 
have been at X because I was at Y all the time’. Thus, Amy does not put herself 
anywhere else at the time of the sermon – she does not offer an alibi.  
The text, then, leaves an open question as to whether Amy was 
physically absent from church. Beckett, as ever, does not present events 
transparently. But let us assume that Mrs W was not hallucinating and Amy was 
responding at the church. How could she have made these responses without 
being there? One might suggest that Amy is subject to some kind of amnesia. It 
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may be that she was completely present and active at church, but has since, for 
reasons unspecified, forgotten the experience. However, this doesn’t seem 
quite right. There is a certainty to Amy’s statement that she ‘observed nothing of 
any kind’ at Evensong that denies it. Amy does not have a spot in her memory 
that is completely blank. She is certain of not being at church, which implies that 
she has some sense of memory. Rather than not remembering where she was 
at all, she remembers not being ‘there’. The church, for Amy, is a place in which 
she positively recalls performing an action of not-being. She is not failing to 
remember. Rather, she remembers failing to hear or see anything of any kind. 
Amy, then, seems to be recalling a negative experience. This idea of negative 
experience had long been familiar to Beckett. In his reading of the 1930s, 
Beckett took notes on Democritus’s statement that ‘“Naught is more real than 
nothing”. Non-Being is as real as Being’ (TCD MS 10967/75). These notes pop 
up frequently in Beckett’s work. Shane Weller finds their influence in this 
passage from Murphy: ‘Murphy began to see nothing, that colourlessness which 
is such a rare postnatal treat, being the absence (to abuse a nice distinction) 
not of percipiere but of percipi’ (Beckett 2009c, 154). As Weller observes, for 
Murphy, ‘“the Nothing” becomes an object of experience’ (Weller 2006, 70). 
Amy’s account of her own experience may be an example of this phenomenon 
in which the ‘somethings give way, or perhaps simply add up, to the Nothing’ 
(Beckett 2009c, 154). However, there are differences in the way in which these 
experiences are presented in the respective works. In Murphy we are presented 
with a narrator’s report of Murphy’s negative experience but in Footfalls 
something slightly different is going on. Amy’s account of her own experience is 
placed next to Mrs W’s account of her performance. In his use of the Latin 
terms percipere and percipi in Murphy Beckett seems to hint at this opposition. 
There is a sense that Murphy is able to perceive without detecting his own 
perceptions. The possibility is left open that he may be able to perform without 
experiencing his own performance. In Footfalls Beckett seems to develop this 
idea: Amy is observed to perform something (which suggests she is able to 
perceive) while experiencing nothing. This suggests that she is unable to attend 
to her own perceptions. A positive experience of nothing is occupying Amy so 
that she is unable to experience her own performance at church. 
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There is also a question of what, if anything, the nothing that Amy 
experiences is made of. In Murphy the narrator wonders whether ‘the Nothing’ 
is experienced because the ‘somethings’ have given way to it, or added up to it 
(154). It could be that ‘the Nothing’ has overridden the somethings, but it could 
also be that the Nothing is composed of somethings. In Footfalls Beckett also 
seems to develop this idea. Amy claims to have ‘observed nothing of any kind’ 
but Mrs W opens up another possibility. She asks Amy: ‘Will you never have 
done… revolving it all […] in your poor mind’ (403)? This might suggest that 
Amy’s nothing is composed of many somethings – ‘it all’. Ultimately, we cannot 
tell whether Amy is experiencing too much or too little. Either way, though, her 
experience amounts to ‘nothing’. The focus of the passage is not on the 
particular matters that are occupying Amy at church, but in her experience of 
not being there, or anywhere else. We are left with the question of how this 
experience of non-being can be reconciled with a performance that suggests a 
degree of attentiveness to the ceremony. Here we can see Beckett’s study of 
philosophy tying in with his study of experimental method. Amy undergoes an 
experience of non-being that recalls Democritus, but this experience is weighed 
against her responsive performance. The individual, then, is portrayed as both 
performer and experiencer, and one is left with the question of which constitutes 
the individual’s being ‘there’. 
 
Missing Something: Inattention in the Laboratory 
 
In Footfalls, then, Beckett seems to become interested in the individual’s 
capacity to remain oblivious to ‘strange’ events that occur right in front of their 
eyes. This was a phenomenon that was also being investigated in the twentieth-
century psychological laboratory. Recall Mrs W’s inquiry as to whether Amy 
noticed ‘anything strange’ at church. A similar question became crucial to the 
psychological study of inattention. A foundational experiment of this nature was 
carried out by Neisser and Becklen (1975). Neisser and Becklen essentially 
took the selective listening experiments discussed in the last chapter into the 
realm of vision. Subjects were presented with two optically superimposed video 
screens, ‘on which two different kinds of things were happening’ (Neisser and 
Becklen 1975, 480). The experiment investigated whether ‘subjects would 
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easily be able to follow one episode and ignore the other’ (482). As the 
episodes were presented on top of each other, both episodes were to be looked 
at, but only one attended to. The question, then, was whether subjects could – 
quite literally – overlook one episode in favour of another. This ‘binocular’ 
viewing task was compared with a ‘dichoptic’ task in which one episode was 
played to the left eye and one to the right (482). The experimenters made 
attention observable and measurable by asking subjects to press ‘a button 
when a significant event occurred’ in the selected episode (480). Each episode 
showed a kind of game being played. One showed two sets of hands playing a 
hand slapping game, the other showed three men passing a basketball and 
moving around ‘as irregularly as possible in the camera’s field of view’ (483-4). 
It was found that subjects were generally very good at selecting one event to 
attend to and inhibiting the other: they ‘had little difficulty in following a given 
episode even when another was superimposed on it’ (490).  
But in addition to the video showing standard actions being performed, 
Neisser and Becklen also videotaped ‘a number of “odd” episodes to determine 
whether unusual events in an unattended episode would be noticed’ (484). To 
give some examples of these unusual events: handshakes were introduced into 
both the basketball and hand slapping episodes; a ball was introduced into the 
hand slapping game; a ball was taken away from the basketball game; the three 
men in the basketball game exited one by one to be replaced with women, who 
were then replaced by the original men (484-5). At the end of the trials, subjects 
were asked if they had seen anything odd in these events (in progressively 
more leading ways). It was found that these ‘odd’ events were ‘rarely noticed 
and then only in a fragmentary way’ (490). Out of twenty-four subjects, for 
instance, only one ‘spontaneously reported seeing a handshake in the 
handgame’, and ‘only three others mentioned it in the postexperimental inquiry’ 
(491). In the episode where the men were replaced by women, some subjects 
noticed something strange but could not describe it exactly and questioned their 
own perception (490-1). One subject, for instance, reported: ‘I thought I saw a 
different person, but I thought it was my imagination’ (491). There was little 
difference between the performances in which viewing was dichoptic and those 
in which it was binocular – though subjects were slightly better at following the 
attended episode with binocular presentation (490). All in all, half of the subjects 
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gave no indication that they had observed or responded to the odd events and, 
according to the experimenters, the ‘most common response to the inquiry was 
incredulity’ (491). Subjects not only missed the strange events, but were 
reluctant to believe that the events happened. This incredulity implies a feeling 
of there-ness, or at least the absence of not-there-ness. The subjects evidently 
felt as though they were, on some level, experiencing both episodes. If they had 
recognised the extent of their own inattention to the unattended episode they 
would not have been surprised when told of the events that they had missed. 
Alternatively, their incredulity could be a retrospective phenomenon – a 
reluctance to believe that they could have missed something that was right in 
front of them. In any case, the experiment suggests a gap between 
performance and experience. In half the subjects’ performances, there is no 
indication that the unattended episode was being registered in any way. 
However, it seems they did not experience their own inattentiveness. This is the 
direct opposite of Amy’s experience in Footfalls. Asked about her experience at 
church, Amy suggests that she was ‘not there’, and so ‘observed nothing of any 
kind, strange or otherwise’, but, for Mrs W at least, her performance has 
suggested some kind of attention. There is a mutual interest, on the part of 
Beckett and the experimenters, in how an observer can be experientially ‘there’ 
without anything in the viewing performance suggesting it; or, how one can be 
experientially ‘not there’ even when one’s viewing performance suggests an 
attentive presence. 
The method of Neisser and Becklen was later incorporated into a slightly 
more striking experiment by Simons and Chabris (1999). In this experiment, 
subjects were again shown a video of a group playing basketball and asked to 
monitor the number of passes (Simons and Chabris 1999, 1066). There were 
two teams playing basketball: a team wearing black shirts and a team wearing 
white. Subjects were either asked to monitor the passes of the white team or 
the black team. This time there was no second event presented, subjects 
merely had to attend to the one team and ignore the other (1066). However, two 
‘unexpected’ events were placed into the midst of two separate versions of the 
basketball episode (1066). In one, a tall woman with an umbrella walked 
through the scene and, in the other, a shorter woman wearing a gorilla costume 
did the same (1067). In total, it was found that 54% of 192 observers noticed 
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the unexpected event (1068). Thus attention to a counting task was found to 
make 46% of observers blind even to very peculiar, unrelated events. Also, 
different subjects were shown different videos with the counting task being more 
difficult in some videos than others. It was found that, as the counting task grew 
more difficult, subjects became less likely to notice the gorilla, or the figure with 
the umbrella (1069). Finally, similar results were found in new subjects, even 
when the gorilla stopped in the middle of the walk through the basketball 
players, looked to the camera, and thumped its chest (1070). Again, it is crucial 
that strange events in the unattended channel will be missed even when this 
channel is on the same visual field as the one that is being attended to: ‘strange 
events can pass through the spatial extent of attentional focus (and the fovea) 
and still not be “seen” if they are not specifically being attended to’ (1070). 
These results have become the most famous proof of an effect known as 
‘inattentional blindness’: the idea that without attention many subjects have no 
awareness at all of a stimulus object (Mack and Rock 1998, 13-14). There is no 
evidence to suggest that Beckett had any familiarity with this branch of scientific 
study, but his work can certainly be seen to interrogate a related concern. In 
Footfalls, Beckett is not investigating the phenomenon of inattentional blindness 
exactly. Instead, he is interested in what one might call an attention to 
blindness: a capacity to experience one’s inattention and recognise that one is 
‘not there’. 
 
Staging Inattention 
 
The experiments into inattentional blindness I have discussed are, in many 
ways, dramatic. They present observers with recordings of scripted 
performances and these performances make use of a number of dramatic 
conventions: performers wear costumes and move in and out of shot. However, 
the experiments all aim at a kind of mimesis – they are trying to simulate real-
life experience. The episodes that Neisser and Becklen produced were, for 
example, supposed to be ‘naturalistic’, though they note that the ‘unrelated and 
optically superimposed displays’ they use ‘do not occur in ordinary vision’ 
(Neisser and Becklen 1975, 482). Simons and Chabris pick up on this. They 
observe that video superimposition gives the displays ‘an odd appearance’, and 
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(without endorsing it) rehearse the opinion that this ‘unnatural’ presentation 
might cause inattentional blindness (Simons and Chabris, 1999 1064). There is, 
though, a frequent insistence within the experimental literature that the 
phenomenon of inattentional blindness is not limited to the artificial conditions of 
the laboratory. The literature on the subject is characterised by a tendency to 
draw ‘real-world’ analogies. Simons and Chabris describe missing friends 
waving at a crowded theatre because attention is occupied by the pursuit of a 
seat (Simons and Chabris 1999, 1059). Jeremy Wolfe describes the failure to 
notice a change in interlocutor when one is concentrating on giving directions 
(Wolfe 1999, 1). Cathleen M. Moore describes missing someone doing a back-
flip in a crowd because of an attempt to pick out a close friend or, more 
seriously, ‘missing a child in the path of your car because you are carefully 
focussing your attention on other cars’ (Moore 2001, 178). Obviously there is 
nothing unusual in a psychologist’s wanting an experiment to be applicable to 
the ‘real world’, but the study of inattentional blindness seems particularly 
concerned with naturalistic simulation.  
This tendency towards mimesis manifests most clearly in an experiment 
carried out by Chabris et al. (2011). The experiment was based on a specific 
event. In January 1995, Kenny Conley, a Boston police officer, was chasing the 
suspect of a shooting (Chabris et al. 2011, 150). Also engaged in this chase 
was a plain-clothes police officer, Michael Cox (150). Cox was mistaken by 
other police officers for the suspect, assaulted from behind and brutally beaten 
(150). In his pursuit of the suspect, Conley ran right past this beating and 
eventually apprehended his original target (150). He was later convicted for 
perjury and obstruction of justice because he maintained that he had not seen 
the assault on Cox, while admitting that he ran right past it (150). This was not 
accepted as possible: ‘the investigators, prosecutors, and jurors in the case all 
assumed that because Conley could have seen the beating, Conley must have 
seen the beating, and therefore must have been lying to protect his comrades’ 
(150). In the experiment, conditions that amounted to a similar event were 
created. Subjects were asked to pursue ‘a male confederate’ for 400 metres. In 
doing this, they were asked to maintain ‘a distance of 30 feet (9.1 meters) while 
counting the number of times the runner touched his head’ (151). But an 
unexpected event was also produced: 
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At approximately 125 meters into the route, in a driveway 8 meters off 
the path, three other male confederates staged a fight in which two of 
them pretended to beat up the third. These confederates shouted, 
grunted, and coughed during the fight, which was visible to subjects for 
at least 15 seconds before they passed by it (151). 
Conditions such as the light and the difficulty of the task were varied and it was 
found that as the pursuing task got easier subjects had more chance of noticing 
the fight. Overall, though, ‘a substantial number of subjects failed to notice a 
three-person fight as they ran past it’ (153). Thus the conclusion is drawn that 
Conley may have been truthful in his assertion that he did not see the fight 
(153).   
 Again this experiment involves numerous dramatic performances. The 
confederates are being asked to play certain roles: the role of a suspected 
criminal on the run, or that of a man engaged in a fight. As was the case in the 
experiments discussed above, though, the observer (the chasing participant) of 
these performances is being artificially manipulated. Their attention is directed 
towards the confederate being chased and away from the fight, so that a 
substantial number of subjects do not notice the latter performance. Thus, the 
dramatic performance of the fight is only experienced in retrospect. The point of 
the experiment, then, is not the performances per se but the fact that they can 
be missed. The experiment produces, in the observer, a retrospective feeling of 
having missed something. Beckett’s play is also concerned with producing a 
feeling of inattention in observers but the inattention that Beckett attempts to 
stage is more present than that of Chabris and colleagues. In Footfalls, I 
contend, Beckett is working to capture the qualitative experience of inattention – 
a feeling of not-quite-there-ness. In the text, the sense of not being ‘there’ has 
been seen to arise in Amy’s consciousness. But Beckett also attempts to raise 
this sense in his theatrical audience. This attempt manifests in a number of 
methods used in the staging of the play. The material that is accessible to the 
audience in Footfalls is presented at a low, flickering level and one is frequently 
confronted with the feeling of missing something. The play equips its audience 
with a slow, fuzzy and narrow field of awareness. The visuals are presented in a 
light that doesn’t exceed dimness; the voices of the characters are ‘low and 
slow throughout’; and there is the ‘faint single chime’ of a bell (Beckett 2006, 
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399). There is the sense, here, that background events are being foregrounded 
without any amplification. These effects manifest in the reviews of Lisa Dwan’s 
recent production of the play. Writing for The Independent, Paul Taylor (2014) 
describes how ‘the spectral lighting […] keeps tapering into an almost uncanny 
faintness’, and numerous reviewers describe the sounds of the play as echoes 
(Martin 2014; Billington 2015). The reviewers can attend to the not-quite-there-
ness of the play’s sensory material. Here we might compare the experiences 
produced by Beckett’s play with the introspective accounts of Neisser and 
Becklen when taking part in their own viewing experiments. They suggest that, 
in the dichoptic presentation task, ‘the unwanted episode really does disappear 
(or parts of it do), and we can attend to its disappearance’ (Neisser and Becklen 
1975, 493, emphasis in original). The experimenters are attending to their own 
inattention. They know exactly what they should see – they produced the 
episodes – but can feel themselves not seeing it.  However, in Beckett’s play 
there is no primary episode layered on top of the flickering episode. The primary 
scene is presented as though it were secondary. One hears the faintness of the 
echo without there being a primary sound. 
At the same time, though, attention is drawn to certain bits of this faint 
scene. For example, the only element that is ‘clearly audible’ (and not faint) is 
the ‘rhythmic tread’ of the feet (399). Similarly, in the visual field May’s faint, 
pacing figure is surrounded by darkness. Billie Whitelaw, who first played the 
role, describes May as ‘caged by one little strip’ of light (Whitelaw 1995, 109). 
This does, to some extent, make May’s figure stand out but the figure is not a 
continuous whole. Rather, the lower part of her body is highlighted: the lighting 
is ‘strongest at floor level, less on body, least on head’ (Beckett 2006, 399). This 
presentation narrows attention and encourages a focus on the feet. This 
narrowing gets across the feeling that one is missing something. What insight, 
we are left to wonder, can be gleamed from the material in the darkness that 
surrounds May, or from her barely visible face? This feeling of missing 
something is mirrored in the play’s appeal to the intellect. As mentioned above, 
May presents the story of Amy as a ‘sequel’ but we are not presented with the 
original (402). Thus, ‘old Mrs Winter’ is presented as a character that ‘the reader 
will remember’ (402). This brings into question whether something has gone 
amiss in the previous exchange, or what one is supposed to have read. The 
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audience’s confidence in their own attentiveness is interrogated. There is the 
sense that one is twice removed from events. The scene is not quite there and 
one is not quite able to attend to it. As Lyn Gardner puts it in her review, ‘it feels 
like being trapped in somebody else's nightmare’ (Gardner 2014). What I’m 
arguing, then, is that both Beckett’s work and experiments on ‘inattentional 
blindness’ are concerned with staging experiences in which one fails to attend 
to an event, or attends to it partially. Again, both experimental psychology and 
the literary experiments of Beckett seem to put into practice a Schopenhauerian 
conception of the human. Both the aesthetic and the scientific experiment 
emphasise the degree to which the human apprehends only partially and 
successively. But why was this conception of the human observer deemed so 
enticing at this point in time? In what follows, I will attempt to place the interest 
in historical context. Why, I will ask, has the experience of inattention been 
explored so extensively since the second half of the twentieth century? 
 
Holding Something Back: Inattention and the Failure to Witness 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I want to put forward three contexts with which 
we might frame the late twentieth century’s experiments on inattention: the 
politics of non-seeing that characterised post-war discourse, the rise of trauma 
theory, and the demands of capitalist modernity. We might begin this discussion 
by taking another look at the experiment conducted by Chabris and colleagues. 
The experiment addresses a particular historical event. A brutal beating has 
occurred in the vicinity of a police officer and he purports not to have noticed it. 
The experiment takes his non-noticing as an issue of attentional capacity – 
questioning whether his occupation with other events might have caused him to 
miss the fight. However, a number of complications arise when one applies the 
study of inattentional blindness to a specific, divisive historical situation. The 
experimenters essentially marginalise the particular political context in which the 
Conley case took place and proceed from the assumption that Kenny Conley 
could have been anyone and Boston could have been anywhere. They are not 
interested in why Kenny Conley would not want to see but in the theoretical 
question of whether he could have not seen.  
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Debates around the Conley case, however, were not only concerned with 
the empirical question of human capacity. The plain-clothes police officer that 
fell victim to the brutal beating – Michael Cox – was black, and Conley was 
white. In the context of late twentieth-century America this fact was hard to 
ignore. Boston, in particular, was recovering from a period of severe racial 
turmoil. From 1974 until 1988, the city had been subject to a hugely 
controversial court-ordered de-segregation plan, in which children from mostly 
white neighbourhoods were bussed to schools in mostly black neighbourhoods, 
and vice versa (Lehr 2009, 56-7). The implementation of de-segregation 
sparked a wave of violent protest and the legacy of these protests affected 
public perceptions of the Conley case substantially. Kenny Conley was from the 
Southie area of Boston, a mainly white district which had seen particularly 
unpleasant protests in the 1970s. Even in 1995, according to journalist Dick 
Lehr, the effects of these protests remained and the area retained a largely 
negative public image (56). The neighbourhood in which Conley grew up, then, 
was deemed severely xenophobic and, for Lehr, this affected the way in which 
Conley’s act of not-seeing was judged. Furthermore, in Boston and other parts 
of America, there had been numerous violent incidents involving white police 
officers and black victims. Most infamously, in 1991, a video emerged showing 
an African-American, Rodney King, being attacked by a gang of white police 
officers. Police brutality was (and still is) a national problem but Boston’s police 
department was undoubtedly afflicted heavily at this point in time. For example, 
1992 had seen the trial of the ‘Brighton 13’; a group of Boston police officers 
who had been seen savagely beating a suspect named John L. Smith (74-7). 
These officers all refused to testify against each other, one going so far as to 
claim that ‘in all his years he had yet to see another officer commit so much as 
an infraction of the department’s regulations’ (75). This was true to form. In 
Lehr’s words, when it came to reporting the wrongdoings of other officers, 
Boston police were known to adhere to one code: ‘see no evil, hear no evil, and 
speak no evil’ (75). In the wake of cases such as this, the Boston police force 
was increasingly perceived as racist, violent and dishonest. Thus, when a black 
police officer was found brutally beaten on a street occupied solely by police 
officers, and those officers claimed he had ‘slipped on a patch of ice’, there was 
more at issue than the question of human capacity (3-4). In failing to witness, 
Kenny Conley was not only seen as a police officer protecting violent police 
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officers but also a white man protecting violent white men.51 In short, Conley’s 
claim not to have seen the beating was taken to be racially motivated. He was, 
as some saw it, part of a blue wall of silence and a white one. 
 This context makes little infringement on the experimenters’ discussion of 
the Conley case. Race, in fact, goes completely unmentioned in the paper 
(though the authors do acknowledge Lehr’s book which emphasises the political 
context). What are the implications of this omission? The first thing to stress is 
that the experiment did not exert any influence on Conley’s case. By the time of 
the experiment, Conley had been cleared on other grounds (Chabris et al. 2011, 
153). Another important point is that the authors are not claiming that their study 
has provided any definitive answers as to what Kenny Conley saw. They note 
that ‘no scientific study can prove or disprove a particular cause of a specific 
historical event’ (153). Their aim, then, is not to close down the possibilities. 
They conclude that Conley could have missed the fight because of inattentional 
blindness, not that he definitely did so. The text leaves open the possibility that 
Conley saw the beating and wilfully denied it. The psychologists, then, do not 
play judge. They merely assert the physical possibility of the inattentional-
blindness explanation based on the performances of a collection of subjects. 
This physical possibility, though, is not weighed up against an assessment of 
Conley’s identity, motives and testimony. The possibility of wilful denial is not 
refuted but marginalised. In this way, the experiment concurrently moves 
towards politics and away from it. A failure to witness is de-politicised insofar as 
we are prompted to put aside the political context and ask whether Conley’s 
missing the assault was a physical possibility. Kenny Conley, a white police 
officer from Boston chasing a murder suspect, becomes a man ‘running 
outdoors at night chasing a moving target at some distance’ (151). Identity, 
here, is a kind of background noise that is filtered out in order to establish the 
mechanics of the situation. 
But at the same time, there is a kind of politics at work here. The 
experimenters have chosen to de-contextualise, but also draw attention to, an 
event that is politically and ethically atrocious. The details of the beating that 
Conley seems to have missed are in themselves sickening. Lehr gives Michael 
                                                          
51 Though, in fact, some of the police officers that are believed to have been involved in the beating 
were black. 
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Cox’s account of how, as he climbed a fence in pursuit of the assailant he was 
pulled down and struck in the head repeatedly (Lehr 2009, 134). Then, as he 
was ‘down on all fours wobbly like a dog on its last legs’ he saw ‘a cop, a white 
cop’ (134). He raised his head to get a better look only for a boot to come down 
‘flush into his face’ and this was followed by a series of blows from all directions 
(134). The beaters subsequently ran away on discovering that Cox was a police 
officer, leaving him, in Cox’s words, ‘like an animal to die, you know on the side 
of the highway’ (195). Not only this, but there was a deliberate effort to cover up 
the event. As mentioned, there was an initial claim that Cox had slipped on the 
ice but, even after the nature of the beating became clear, potential witnesses 
refused to co-operate and Cox experienced intimidation (slashed tyres, 
threatening phone calls) when he sought justice (194). Cox, himself, was certain 
that his treatment was racially motivated. Speaking of why he was left for dead 
after the beating he states: ‘They were able to leave me because they thought 
less of me because of what I am […] It wouldn’t have happened if I were white’ 
(195). By choosing to base their experiment on this particular event, the 
psychologists seem to be gesturing towards this context but they do not 
address it directly. One is forced to look beyond the text in order to find it and 
this leaves the question of whether the atrocity is being invoked and 
memorialised, or whether it has been omitted because it does not fit in with the 
theoretical interests of the researchers. I think that we might confront this 
question through Samuel Beckett’s writing. 
Beckett’s work, particularly that which came after the Second World War 
has frequently been looked upon as de-contextualising and apolitical. Mark 
Nixon observes that ‘up until the 1990s, Beckett in the eyes of most critics and 
commentators was a homeless, stateless writer who shunned geo-political 
problems and specificity, creating fictional worlds in order to examine the 
universal nature of human existence’ (Nixon 2009, 31). This perception 
emerged from the tendency in Beckett’s writing to dislocate, or vaguen the 
places and events that are invoked in his work. As Seán Kennedy puts it, ‘the 
major works that secured Beckett’s reputation give the distinct impression that 
they are set “both anywhere and nowhere”’ (Kennedy 2009, 1). The perception 
that these major works were apolitical saw Beckett attacked in some circles. 
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Most famously, in reviewing Beckett’s work for television in 1977, the dramatist 
Dennis Potter asked:  
Is this the art which is the response to the despair and pity of our age, or 
is it made of the same kind of futility which helped such desecrations of 
the spirit, such filth of ideologies come into being (Knowlson 1996, 636)? 
There is the sense, here, that Beckett’s methods of dislocation and vaguening 
fail to respond to particular historical atrocities and, furthermore, might facilitate 
these atrocities. In effect there is the accusation that Beckett is turning a blind 
eye, wilfully denying the atrocities of his age. Now, this notion of Beckett’s 
writing is peculiar because, as an individual, Beckett did a great deal to bear 
witness to, and fight against, the ‘filth of ideologies’ to which Potter surely 
alludes. Most obviously, he served in the resistance cell ‘Gloria SMH’ during the 
Second World War and risked his life in the fight against Fascism, later 
explaining that ‘you simply couldn’t stand by with your arms folded’ (Knowlson 
1996, 303-4). In life, then, Beckett did not turn a blind eye to the atrocities that 
surrounded him, but what of his writing? 
As Nixon’s statement implies, the last three decades have seen attempts 
to re-situate Beckett’s work in relation to the historical contexts from which it 
emerged. There has been a critical move to read Beckett’s work as a series of 
responses to particular historical events, many of which the author experienced 
at close hand. But – if taken as responses – Beckett’s responses are rarely 
direct. They are veiled, oblique and inscrutable in tone. In a discussion of the 
allusions to the Second World War that are found in Watt, James McNaughton 
outlines the key questions that are raised by this technique: 
First, had Beckett wanted us to consider contemporary history, would he 
not have written about his, or others’ experience in the war directly? 
Second, is it reasonable to assume that all readers know Beckett’s 
biographical involvement in history, or are willing to take textual hints to 
the archive to figure out their importance (McNaughton 2009, 55)? 
The key critical task that emerges from these questions is one of explaining 
why, if Beckett’s work is a response to the particular historical events that he 
encountered, it responds to these events in such an oblique way. This is where 
the critical work that’s been done on Beckett’s writing can be used to elucidate 
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the experiment of Chabris and colleagues. Beckett’s writing seems to invoke 
particular atrocities that happened in his lifetime. McNaughton, for example, 
takes the discussion of high barbed wire fences in Watt as an allusion to the 
holding camps that Beckett would have been detained in, had the Gestapo 
caught him after ‘Gloria SMH’ was betrayed (53). Beckett, McNaughton points 
out, does not reference the camps directly but ‘trusts that they will re-appear as 
the elephant in the room, as a guilty and mirthless laugh that obviously relies on 
the reader’s awareness of contemporary history’ (53). Beckett, McNaughton 
suggests, does not represent the atrocity but leaves its effect to be felt by those 
with the means to feel it.  
Thus, as in the Chabris et al. experiment, details of a specific historical 
atrocity are invoked but the text occludes key elements. McNaughton sees the 
methods of Watt as an interrogation of the reader’s attention. In the novel, he 
suggests, ‘the formal gymnastics distract us from darker interpretations’ (52). 
‘Beckett’s experimental style’, McNaughton continues, presents the reader, ‘in 
the form of literary and aesthetic conundrums, similar interpretive challenges to 
those propaganda presents’ (66). We are distracted from the atrocity so we do 
not believe it is there. In this line of thought, Beckett’s concern is not with 
representing ‘what happened’52 but ‘the more important questions of why it 
happens’ (55). Beckett is seen to rehearse the distracting processes of 
propaganda in an aesthetic context so as to bring into focus the ways in which 
such processes ‘affect us well beyond the literary text’ (67). On a similar note, 
Laura Salisbury draws on the intelligence work Beckett performed during the 
Second World War and observes that works such as Watt arise out of a 
historical moment in which language is being manipulated in novel ways. At this 
time, Salisbury suggests, it came be recognised that language is ‘plastic 
enough to be broken down into bits, the information it carries to be condensed 
and displaced or submitted to encryption’ (Salisbury 2014, 157). In the same 
way that propaganda seeks to draw attention away from certain unpalatable 
facts, the coding practices of the twentieth century sought to hide crucial 
information behind banal appearances. In this environment, Salisbury argues, 
‘one is forced to submit to very close, very attentive forms of speaking, writing, 
                                                          
52 Indeed, as critics such as Robert Eaglestone have convincingly argued, the events of the twentieth-
century (most particularly the Holocaust) problematized the notion of representing ‘what happened’ 
through conventional historical narrative (Eaglestone 2004, 137-246). 
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reading and listening’ in order to discern the latent content behind the façade 
(157). For Salisbury, Watt is not a code to be cracked; one cannot access 
hidden meanings in the text by reading it in a particular way. Rather Beckett is 
interested in ‘materialising doubt’ – producing a mind-set of multiple channels in 
which one is aware that something important always has the potential to pass 
by unregistered (166). The experiment of Chabris and colleagues can be seen 
to work in a similar way. They are less interested in what happened than in why 
these things happen. The point is not merely that we can be distracted from 
atrocities, but also that we are not sufficiently aware of how easily it happens. 
They speak, for example, ‘of the common but mistaken belief that people pay 
attention to, and notice, more of their visual world than they actually do’ 
(Chabris et al. 2011, 150). These explorations of inattention may not document 
atrocities fully, but they respond to the atrocities of modernity by allowing us to 
understand how easily they can be missed. 
 
Inattention and Trauma 
 
The notion of inattention I have put forward so far leans heavily on an idea of 
attentional capacity. One is seen to miss an event because of being occupied 
by something else. In the case of Beckett’s reader, ‘formal gymnastics’ have 
been seen to distract from ‘darker interpretations’, and in the case of Kenny 
Conley the demands of a police chase have been seen to distract from a violent 
beating. However, it is important to note that the late twentieth century saw the 
rise of another theory which seeks to explain the failure to witness: trauma. 
Though the concept of trauma was part of nineteenth-century psychological and 
medical discourse, it reached popular consciousness more fully in the period 
after the Second World War. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), for 
example, was recognised as an illness by the American Psychiatric Association 
in 1980 (Luckhurst 2008, 1). As Roger Luckhurst observes, PTSD covers a 
large cluster of symptoms, many of which fit together in odd ways, but there are 
two aspects of trauma theory that are relevant to my discussion of inattention. 
First, there is the question of the subject’s capacity to experience, process, or 
recall traumatic, ‘stresser’, events. It is commonly observed that the individual’s 
inability to bear witness to an event is a sign of trauma. As trauma theorist, 
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Cathy Caruth has put it, ‘the most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as 
an inability to know it’ (Caruth 1996, 91-2). Second there is the question of how 
the traumatic event affects the subject’s attentional capacities in the medium to 
long term. In what follows, I will outline how these questions of trauma are 
working in the background of both the experiment and the play. But I will also 
suggest that, in Footfalls, Beckett becomes particularly interested in the second 
of these questions. The play, I will argue, is ultimately not an investigation of the 
potentially traumatic, missed event but may be seen to capture the qualitative 
nature of the post-traumatic experience. 
  With regards to the first question, trauma may be put forward as an 
alternative lens with which to look at the Kenny Conley case. Given the violence 
of the event that occurred in Conley’s vicinity, one might put forward the idea 
that, rather than completely missing the event through inattentional blindness, 
Conley – to paraphrase Caruth – saw the event directly but was unable to know 
it. This alternative explanation is not brought up by Chabris and colleagues. 
Here, we can see the opposition between theories that emphasise inattention 
through repression (Caruth’s idea of trauma) and theories that emphasise a 
task-oriented inattention (the theory of inattentional blindness). I will not attempt 
to choose between the theories in this space; one could defend either 
interpretation.53 What I do want to show, though, is the extent to which the 
events of the Conley case were permeated by questions of repression – 
questions of the extent to which we know the atrocities that we have seen, or 
been exposed to. 
The case unfolded at a time when these questions were hotly debated. 
The early 1990s saw bitter disputes around the question of whether therapeutic 
techniques could be used to access repressed memories (Luckhurst 2008, 73). 
Some asserted that techniques such as hypnosis could be used to ‘retrieve 
memories in their pure, objective form’, while others countered that ‘traumatic 
events are likely to be the most malleable memories’ and are ‘particularly open 
to therapeutic suggestion’ (73). These debates spilled into the courtroom as 
                                                          
53 Conley’s account of his experience seems to link him more closely with the inattentional blindness 
theory. He repeatedly spoke of ‘tunnel vision’ and being ‘locked in’ on the suspect he was chasing’ even 
before he knew about ‘inattentional blindness’ research (Lehr 2009, 183). He also does not seem to 
have shown any symptoms of PTSD (132). However, given that the signs of PTSD can ‘appear belatedly, 
months or years after the precipitating event’ the possibility of a traumatic inability to know the event 
cannot be completely ruled out (Luckhurst 2008, 1). 
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psychologists on both sides of the debate were called up as expert witnesses 
(73). The relevance of this controversy to the Conley case might be seen in two 
main ways. First, one might speculate that therapeutic techniques such as 
hypnosis could be used to unlock Conley’s memory of the event. But there 
would still be the serious question of whether these memories were truly 
retrieved, or merely moulded by the technique. Second, and more concretely, 
the cultural salience of these questions at the time is highlighted when one 
looks to the reason for Conley’s eventual reprieve. Conley was cleared because 
the testimony of the witness who placed him in a position to see the beating 
was brought under question. Richard Walker, a fellow police officer, gave a 
variety of different accounts of what he saw that night and when questioned 
about the inconsistencies ‘proposed his own truth-seeking exercise: hypnosis’ 
(Lehr 2009, 264). Writing in 2009, Lehr calls this a ‘zany, almost circus-
sounding idea’ (and it is possible that Walker was simply being evasive), but 
Walker’s invocation of hypnosis shows the influence of contemporaneous 
debates around trauma, the failure to witness and memory retrieval. The core 
difficulty, here, lies in a tension between the aporetic nature of trauma theory, 
on the one hand, and a cultural need for certainty on the other. Roger Luckhurst 
notes (paraphrasing Bruno Latour) that the debates of the 1990s ‘emphasized 
the extent to which trauma was not “a matter of fact”’ but an ‘enigmatic thing 
that prompts perplexity, debate and contested opinion’ (Luckhurst 2008, 33). 
This, Luckhurst continues, led to the assertion that ‘the authority of psychology, 
particularly in relation to the natural sciences, is not always secure’ (34). The 
theory of ‘inattentional blindness’ might be seen as a response to this perceived 
loss of authority. It offers a framework with which to explain the failure to 
witness without producing the aporias that come with trauma theory. The idea 
that Conley never saw the event is more culturally digestible than the 
interpretation that he saw the event but does not know that he saw it. This is 
evident when one compares Lehr’s view that hypnosis was a ‘zany, almost 
circus-sounding idea’ with the credence he gives the theory of inattentional 
blindness (Lehr 2009, 183). Again it should be emphasised that Chabris et al. 
are not claiming that inattentional blindness is a definite explanation for 
Conley’s non-noticing, and their research was not used as legal evidence. What 
the theory does seem to reach for, though, is a more clear-cut way in which 
psychology might intervene in debates around the failure to witness. 
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The association between trauma and the failure to witness was, of 
course, nothing new. The link goes back to the nineteenth century and the 
advance of industrialisation. Wolfgang Schivelbusch has suggested that the 
railway accident was ‘the site of the first attempt to explain industrial traumata’ 
(Schivelbusch 1986, 14). Luckhurst picks up on this. He cites an article in The 
Lancet in 1862 which suggests that ‘the violent jarring of the body in an accident 
might induce permanent but invisible damage’ (21). There is the idea that a 
‘jarring’ event such as a railway accident might not leave obvious traces on the 
individual but is likely to affect them in detrimental ways. In nineteenth-century 
psychology, this notion developed to incorporate the idea that details of the 
jarring event might not be accessible to the individual’s consciousness. In the 
1880s, psychologists such as Pierre Janet began to suggest that particularly 
shocking events might be held out of conscious recall (42). This line of thought 
did not escape the notice of Samuel Beckett. Beckett may have had some 
awareness of Janet’s ideas,54 but he seems to have attained the mainstay of his 
knowledge of repression-based inattention through his reading of later 
psychoanalytic works. This is most evident in his notes on Ernest Jones’s 
Papers on Psychoanalysis (1913). Beckett, for example took this note on 
repression:  
Repression & Memory: “There exist in the mind certain inhibiting forces 
which tend to exclude (& keep excluded) from consciousness all mental 
processes the presence of which would evoke there, either directly or 
through association, a feeling of Unlust.  Forces of repression (censors) 
act at 2 points of junction between unconscious & preconscious & (less 
important) between preconscious & conscious” (TCD MS 10971/8/7). 
Beckett, then, was familiar with the idea that ‘inhibiting forces’ in the mind 
exclude material that is likely to evoke ‘a feeling of Unlust’. However, this idea of 
‘hedonic repression’ is balanced against an idea that one represses material 
that is not task-relevant:  
Likelihood of primarily hedonic mechanism of repression being 
appropriated for further purpose of excluding material that is merely 
                                                          
54 Janet is name-checked in Beckett’s notes from Woodworth (TCD MS 10971/7/13). 
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irrelevant, without necessarily being disturbing.  “Hedonic repression” & 
“utilitarian repression” - latter derived from former (10971/8/8). 
In Jones’s account, task-based inattention (or ‘utilitarian repression’) is seen to 
be derived from the ‘Hedonic’ realm. The process of missing what one would 
rather not see is privileged over that of missing what is merely irrelevant. 
Beckett, though, I want to argue, would go on to investigate the boundary 
between not seeing and not wanting to see – between wilfully denying that one 
has seen something, repressing it, and simply being occupied by another 
matter. 
This investigation manifests at the at the end of the radio play, All That 
Fall (1957), when we hear that a little child has fallen ‘under the wheels’ of Mr 
Rooney’s train (Beckett 2006, 199). Even though Mrs Rooney has repeatedly 
inquired about the journey, Mr Rooney has not mentioned this accident to her in 
earlier discussions. Instead, when giving an account of his train journey he 
suggests that his mind has been occupied by financial matters: 
Alone in the compartment my mind began to work as so often after office 
hours, on the way home in the train, to the lit of the bogeys. Your 
season-ticket, I said, costs you six a day, that is to say barely enough to 
keep you alive and twitching with the help of food, drink tobacco and 
periodicals until you finally reach home and fall into bed (193). 
Mr Rooney’s mind, it seems, has been working on calculating the economies of 
his working life and so we are left to question whether this task might have 
occupied him to the extent that he simply failed to notice the train accident. 
Alternatively, one might speculate that Mr Rooney’s silence on the topic of the 
child’s death can be put down to ‘hedonic repression’. Finally, it might be 
suggested that Mr Rooney wilfully refuses to bear witness to the accident – that 
he noticed it but does not want to dwell on it, or talk about it. The text ultimately 
privileges neither interpretation and the audience is left to question the 
distinction between wilful denial and ‘hedonic’ or ‘utilitarian’ non-seeing. This 
question is again evoked in That Time as the protagonist sits in the post office 
fearing that his ‘loathsome’ appearance will mean that he is ejected (394). It 
dawns on the protagonist, however, ‘that for all the loathing you were getting 
you might as well have not been there at all the eyes passing over you and 
through you like so much thin air’ (394). Again there is the question of whether 
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the people in the post office are occupied with other tasks; repressing the 
protagonist’s ‘loathsome appearance’, or consciously avoiding interaction (393). 
Beckett’s writing is interrogating the boundary between can’t see and won’t see. 
In Footfalls, this question is again raised. Adam Piette has recognised 
the parallels between the character of May and a ‘traumatized hysteric’ of one 
of Janet’s case studies, Irene (Piette 1993, 47). In this reading, the mother’s 
death becomes the traumatic event at the centre of Footfalls and May has been 
unable to witness, or know, this event. Hints of ‘hedonic’ or traumatic repression 
can also be seen when May first introduces the pacing Amy. Some nights, when 
walking up and down the church we are told that Amy ‘would halt as one frozen 
by some shudder of the mind’ (Beckett 2006, 402). Her halting, here, might hint 
that there is a moment in her past that periodically resurfaces to jolt her mind 
and trigger a kind of systemic shutdown but this moment is never identified. Mrs 
W’s suggestion that Amy is continually ‘revolving it all’ in her poor mind is 
interesting in this regard. It creates the image of Amy’s mind as a kind of wheel 
in which the same matter constantly rotates – one might draw an analogy with 
the stones that Molloy rotates between pockets and sucks ‘turn and turn about’ 
(Beckett, 2009d, 63-9). The shudder, though, suggests that the matter does not 
always rotate smoothly. Rather, there is the occasional jolt. The physicality of 
this image might recall the child who has fallen ‘under the wheels’ of Mr 
Rooney’s train in All That Fall. But in Footfalls there is no original event. 
Instead, we are merely presented with suggestive imagery. Amy’s mind is 
conceptualised as a jolting wheel but we don’t know what, if anything, is causing 
the jolts. Laura Salisbury has argued that rumination is ‘part of the formal 
signature’ in works such as Watt as ‘the novel becomes entangled in evocations 
of permutation that force a hiatus in its forward movement’ (Salisbury 2011, 75). 
One can also see the kind of ruminative hiatuses that Salisbury finds in Watt in 
the characters of Amy and ultimately May. For May and Amy, the idea of 
forward movement is taken away. They are condemned to circularity, revolving 
it all over and over (embodied in their pacing up and down). But this perpetual 
process of rumination is punctuated by jolts, which suggests that some 
unspecified mental matter is forcing a hiatus in their circular movements. 
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However, Beckett again juxtaposes the hints of traumatic inattention with 
a more utilitarian idea. This can be seen in the portrayal of May’s attempt to 
care for her mother: 
M: Would you like me to inject you again? 
V: Yes, but it is too soon 
(Pause.) 
M: Would you like me to change your position again? 
V: Yes, but it is too soon 
(Pause.) 
M: Straighten your pillows? (Pause.) Change your drawsheet? (Pause.) 
Pass you the bedpan? (Pause.) The warming pan? (Pause.) Dress your 
sores? (Pause.) Sponge you down? (Pause.) Moisten your poor lips? 
(Pause.) Pray with you? (Pause.) For you? (Pause.) Again. 
(Pause) 
V: Yes, but it is too soon (Beckett 2006, 400). 
In a sense, May’s performance seems compassionate and attentive. She is 
continually offering to perform acts of care for her mother. However, there is 
something in her performance that raises a question about her experience: is 
she quite there? The acts of care, which May has presumably performed for her 
mother ‘again’ and ‘again’, are absorbed into a list of proposals which she can 
reel off. May does not wait for a response to one proposal before going to the 
next but recites them mechanically. There is the sense that neither May, nor her 
mother, need to be wholly ‘there’ in order for May to produce her performance. 
The words are at once compassionate and inattentive. When questioned about 
the nature of this exchange, Beckett suggested that May is ‘occupied with her 
story’ (Asmus 1977, 87). Beckett is suggesting that May’s conversation seems 
inattentive because, as the exchange goes on, her attention is shifting towards 
the attempt to re-narrate her life. May’s ruminating is seen to distract from 
immediate experience and give the impression that she is not wholly there. The 
mother’s voice seems to recognise May’s state of distraction when she asks the 
question: ‘Will you never have done …revolving it all’ (Beckett 2006, 400)? 
128 
 
Though her performance is dutiful, May is deemed too busy ‘revolving it all’ to 
be attentive.  
Ultimately, in Footfalls, the notion of utilitarian inattention cannot be 
separated from trauma. If May is ‘occupied with her story’ it may be argued that 
this pre-occupation is post-traumatic. Her rumination, it is hinted, is triggered by 
a traumatic event. As is often the case with Beckett’s characters, the traumatic 
event in May’s life – assuming there is one – seems to be birth itself. This is 
gestured towards in the exchange between May and her mother which opens 
the play.  
V: I had you late. (Pause.) In life. (Pause.) Forgive me again. (Pause. No 
louder.) Forgive me again. 
(M resumes pacing. After one length halts facing front at L. Pause.) 
(Beckett 2006, 400). 
It seems hard to deny that the Beckett is working with ideas of birth trauma 
here. Beckett had read about the topic in Otto Rank’s The Trauma of Birth 
(1924), noting that: ‘all anxiety goes back to anxiety at birth’ (TCD MS 
10971/8/34). What should be noted, though, is that the details of the traumatic 
moment itself were removed as Beckett went through drafts of the play. S. E. 
Gontarski notes that Beckett’s manuscripts show him going back and forth on 
how much detail to reveal about May’s birth. In an early draft, for example, 
Beckett included a passage revealing that the doctor delivering May had ‘made 
a mess of it’ but this detail was later omitted (Gontarski 1985, 165). Beckett 
hints at the traumatic event but the play, it seems is ultimately concerned with 
May’s attentional patterns – with whether she is quite there. 
 Beckett’s portrayal of May’s not-quite-there-ness certainly seems to echo 
many accounts of the post-traumatic subject. Evidence of this might be found in 
the aftermath of the assault on Michael Cox. Post-traumatic stress was a well-
established phenomenon in mainstream medicine by the time of the incident 
and Cox was, in fact, diagnosed with chronic PTSD (Lehr 2009, 279). Lehr 
summarises an account of the effect of the event on Cox, given by his wife in a 
police hearing: 
Now Mike seemed only partly there. “If we’re having a conversation he’ll 
walk out of the room in the middle of the conversation. I’m talking about 
129 
 
one thing and he’ll leave that subject and go to something else, or he’ll 
pick up the phone and he’ll, you know, start dialling, calling someone on 
the phone and, like, Hey, we’re talking” (Lehr 2009, 284). 
One can see in this account the kind of jolting attentional pattern that Beckett 
portrays in Footfalls. We do not know that the traumatic event is necessarily 
revolving around Cox’s mind any more than we know what is revolving in the 
minds of May or Amy. Rather, Cox’s wife observes him moving between there-
ness and not-there-ness. She also states that they ‘argue every day about 
sitting in a semi-dark house because the lights hurt his eyes’ (285). The 
traumatic event is in the background but foregrounded is a low level, inattentive 
atmosphere. Cox’s wife draws a clear distinction between the man she knew 
before the trauma and after the trauma. Her account offers a clear cause and 
effect. Beckett’s text is slightly different in that we are never offered a ‘before’ 
moment. The lives of Amy and May cannot be divided so neatly into a pre-
traumatic and a post-traumatic period. But in Footfalls Beckett is interested in 
the day-to-day not-quite-there-ness that characterises the account of the post-
traumatic Cox. Again, Beckett is reluctant to represent events directly and in 
their entirety; this is not a before-and-after trauma narrative. Instead he focuses 
on the qualities of an experience in which the subject is not wholly attentive to 
their own life. However, in the conception of the mind as a jolting wheel, there is 
more than a hint of the post-traumatic in Beckett’s presentation of this 
experience. Both Beckett and Chabris et al., then, can be seen to negotiate 
ideas of trauma in their investigations of inattention. In the psychological 
experiment, trauma theory is excised and the experimenters put forward a more 
clear-cut utilitarian theory, but in Beckett utilitarian inattention is always 
interwoven with the traumatic. 
 
Inattention and the Modern Self 
 
When discussing the idea of post-traumatic inattention in Footfalls one begins to 
move away from the type of inattention that is investigated in experimental 
psychology and towards psychotherapeutic approaches. In his discussion of 
Footfalls, Beckett himself linked the play to his encounters with psychotherapy, 
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particularly the analytical psychology of Carl Jung. James Knowlson recalls that 
the character of May was ‘specifically linked by Beckett with the young female 
patient of Jung, of whom Beckett heard him speak in 1935’ (Knowlson 1996, 
616). Asmus recalls Beckett suggesting to a cast member the ‘connection’ 
between May’s character and ‘the Jung story’ of a girl who ‘existed but didn’t 
actually live’ (Asmus 1977, 87-8). From this, Knowlson suggests that May is 
‘Beckett’s own poignant recreation of the girl who had never really been born’ 
(Knowlson 1996, 616). Beckett had made more overt links to this lecture in 
earlier works. In All That Fall Mrs Rooney describes attending a lecture of ‘one 
of these new mind doctors’ whose name she cannot remember (Beckett 2006, 
195). She recalls this unnamed doctor giving the opinion that a patient of his 
‘had never really been born’ (195-6). Now, critics have disagreed on the 
significance of Beckett’s repeated invocation of Jung’s lecture. David Melnyk 
notes that Beckett adapted and re-contextualised Jung’s words and points out 
that Beckett never simply repeated Jung’s phrase (which was ‘never been born 
entirely’) but continually modified it in different situations (Melynyk 2005, 355). 
He also notes that the particular patient Beckett references was only discussed 
briefly by Jung in the post-lecture discussion (359). It was a small detail in a 
lecture that served as a broad introduction to Jung’s approach. Thus, for 
Melnyk, Beckett found Jung’s discussion evocative but this should not be taken 
as evidence of a close relationship between Beckett’s work and Jung’s theories. 
Julie Campbell takes a markedly different line, making an argument for a 
congruence of aim. Both Beckett and Jung, Campbell argues, are interested in 
unconscious personalities and complexes. She notes that, in the lecture Beckett 
attended, Jung discussed his notion of a complex: ‘an agglomeration of 
associations … sometimes of traumatic character, sometimes simply of a 
painful or highly toned character’ (Jung 1968, 79). Campbell makes the case 
that this notion of the complex might help us understand Beckett’s dramatic 
technique. Jung spoke of how, in dreams, novels, dramas and poems an 
individual’s complexes often appear in personified form, an observation that 
Campbell argues was important for Beckett’s writing (81). For Campbell, 
Beckett uses art to ‘personify his dream images […] by accessing the 
personages or bodies within his own unconscious’ (164). In his drama, 
Campbell continues, Beckett is not only attempting to access his own 
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unconscious personalities but also ‘encouraging the audience to recognise the 
image’ (165). 
Now, I hesitate to accept the link Campbell draws between Jung’s 
specific theory and Beckett’s dramatic technique. Melnyk is right to point out the 
way in which Beckett twisted Jung’s phrase to suit his own purposes and I 
sympathise with the argument that, for Beckett, Jung’s idea was more evocative 
than foundational. However, when one reads Jung’s phrase in the context of his 
discussion, there is a definite relevance to Footfalls. Jung’s invocation of the girl 
who (he thinks) has ‘never been born entirely’ comes in response to a question 
from an audience member. The audience member has a five-year-old daughter 
and he effectively asks Jung to interpret her dreams (Jung 1968, 105-6). The 
girl has had two peculiar dreams: one in which ‘a wheel is rolling down a road 
and it burns me’, and one in which the girl is being pinched by a beetle (105). 
Jung suggests that these are examples of the ‘strange archetypal dreams 
children occasionally have’ (106). These archetypal dreams, Jung suggests, 
can be explained ‘by the fact that when consciousness begins to dawn’, the 
child is still close to ‘the original psychological world from which he has just 
emerged: a condition of deep unconsciousness’ (106). This closeness is seen 
to give children ‘an awareness of the contents of the collective unconscious’ 
(106).55 If this awareness of the mythological content of the collective 
unconscious remains for too long, Jung continues, ‘the individual is threatened 
by an incapacity for adaptation; he is haunted by a constant yearning to return 
to the original vision’ (106). This incapacity produces ‘ethereal children’ who live 
their life in ‘archetypal dreams’ and cannot adapt (107). The patient that had 
never been born entirely, for Jung, was one such child.  
Now, one might debate the extent to which Beckett was interested in 
Jung’s overall theory of the collective unconscious.56 But regardless of Beckett’s 
theoretical interest, he certainly seems to have picked up on the content of 
Jung’s discussion. Two aspects of Jung’s discussion surface in Footfalls. First, 
it is peculiar that the motif of the rolling wheel emerges in both of the texts in 
                                                          
55 For Jung the ‘collective unconscious’ is made up of contents that are characterised by mythological 
motifs –for example ‘the Hero, the Redeemer, the Dragon’ (Jung 1968, 40-1). They are not peculiar to 
any particular mind or person but are peculiar to mankind in general’ (40-1). 
56 He did note down Woodworth’s summary of Jung’s theory in the “Psychology Notes”. Here the term 
used is the ‘racial’ – rather than collective – unconscious (TCD MS 10971/7/15). 
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which Beckett alludes to Jung. Recall that in All That Fall a little child has fallen 
‘under the wheels’ of Mr Rooney’s train and that, in Footfalls, Amy and May are 
seen to be ‘revolving it all’. Beckett seems to incorporate into his work the 
archetypal dream content that Jung interprets (‘a wheel is rolling down a road 
and it burns me’). More importantly, though, I think Beckett is interested in the 
incapacity for adaptation that Jung discusses. Beyond the archetypal contents 
themselves, I would argue, Beckett is interested in how these contents (images 
from an individual’s past) produce a kind of not-quite-there-ness –  a failure to 
adapt and attend to the world. As Campbell notes, ‘not quite there’ was, a term 
Beckett used to describe the character of May and, in what follows, I want to 
further interrogate and historicise this idea of not-quite-there-ness (Campbell 
2005, 164). I will suggest that the concept is linked with the need to adapt to a 
capitalist modernity in which the individual’s attentiveness is not just founded on 
their capacity to perform particular tasks, but also produce a story of self. In this 
period, there is the emergence of a consumer economy of personality in which 
the individual is required to construct a self out of their past and make decisions 
on their future, while giving the impression that they are present and engaged.57 
It is telling that Mr Rooney’s failure to witness in All That Fall occurs as he is 
deliberating on the profitability of his job, and that the people in the post office in 
That Time fail to notice the protagonist in the bustle of Christmas preparations. 
In each case, questions of the future are seen to distract from present 
experience. Beckett, I will argue, along with therapists such as D. W. Winnicott, 
can be seen to respond to the challenge of witnessing the present in the context 
of a modernity in which one is continually pulled from tense to tense. 
 Of course the question of how present experience is affected by the 
pressure to negotiate or construct a past or future plays a crucial role in 
twentieth-century psychotherapy. The psychoanalytic theory of Melanie Klein, 
for example, emphasises the ways in which subjects negotiate their past, 
particularly the ‘losing of caring or cared for people’ (Segal 2004, 46-7). When a 
subject feels as though a caring/cared for object has been lost, Kleinian theory 
argues, the goodness of that object may come under attack (46).58 Put another 
                                                          
57 For discussions of this we might look back to the ideas of Hochschild and Ngai discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
58 By loss, here, one might mean the death of a loved one but also any experience in which the subject 
feels a loss of care e.g. when an elder child feels that a parent cares less for them upon the birth of a 
younger sibling. 
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way, in order to minimise the pain caused by loss, the subject might come to 
think that the lost object was never that good in the first place. This denigration 
of the lost object, for Kleinians, is potentially damaging and (for good psychic 
health) one needs to go through a process in which the denigrated object 
undergoes reparation. This reparation, however, requires a large amount of 
psychic labour; one is forced to re-narrate one’s past. Rina Kim has argued that 
this labour is crucial to much of Beckett’s later work including Footfalls. Kim’s 
observation derives from two aspects of Beckett’s biography: his relationship 
with his mother and his feeling for Ireland. For Kim, where Beckett’s earlier work 
is characterised by the drive to denigrate his mother and Ireland, later works 
such as Footfalls evidence a drive towards reparation (Kim 2012, 22-3). In 
Footfalls, Kim suggests, Beckett can be seen to represent and perform this act 
of reparation. If May is occupied by her story in the first part of the text, Kim 
argues, it is a story in which the mother figure is represented as the attentive 
Mrs Winter (157). May, it seems, is so consumed by the labours of re-narrating 
the mother figure that she seems removed from a present in which she 
performs an act of care. This representation, Kim goes on, served a particular 
purpose for Beckett. Along with the character of May, in Kim’s reading, Beckett 
is attempting to reconstruct his feelings towards the mother figure (158). There 
is, though, always the sense that the re-construction of a past can draw one’s 
attention from present experience. 
Kim’s reading is persuasive in many ways but, again, I think there is 
danger of being overly specific when discussing Beckett’s approach to not-
quite-there-ness. Beckett’s investigation of inattention, I would suggest, does 
not hinge on Kleinian ideas of the mother-child relationship, Jungian notions of 
a collective unconscious, or any trauma-based theory. Nor is Beckett purely 
interested in a utilitarian account of inattention. Rather, Beckett’s interest seems 
to reside in the phenomenology of inattention – how one experiences oneself as 
inattentive and perceives it in others. To help study this further we might look to 
one of Winnicott’s later case studies. The study is interesting for its analogues 
with the cases of May and Amy, and as a comparison with Jung’s patient. But 
more than this there is a certain theoretical approach that ties the study to 
Beckett and to Jung. It is less interested in going back and finding a cause for 
the patient’s not-quite-there-ness, than in investigating the qualitative 
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experience itself. In his ‘Psychology Notes’ Beckett quoted Jung’s statement 
that: ‘I no longer find the cause of the neurosis in the past, but in the present. 
What is the necessary task which the patient will not accomplish?’ (TCD MS 
10971/7/15). It is this looking to present experience that I think is crucial for 
Beckett and for Winnicott. In ‘Dreaming, Fantasying and Living’ (1971) Winnicott 
gives the case history of a patient who ‘swings from well to ill and back again to 
well’ (Winnicott 2005, 37). This is because she is caught between fantasying 
and imagination.59 Imagination, for Winnicott, is a healthy process. It ‘enriches 
life’ and becomes accessible to the individual either consciously or in dreams. 
The patient’s life, though, has been dominated by the unhealthy process of 
fantasying. Fantasying, in Winnicott’s construction, is an ‘isolated phenomenon’, 
which absorbs energy but does not contribute to dreaming or living (36). The 
key difficulty with fantasying, here, lies in its ‘inaccessibility’ (36). It takes up the 
individual’s mental resources but cannot be used practically or emotionally. The 
two processes are very difficult to tell apart qualitatively. Their differences, 
Winnicott suggests, ‘can be subtle and difficult to describe’ and are not 
necessarily discernible from verbal reports ‘of what goes on in the patient’s 
mind’ (36-7). For example, ‘the patient may sit in her room and while doing 
nothing at all except breathe she has (in her fantasy) painted a picture, or she 
has done an interesting piece of work in her job’ (37). In this state she is 
presently doing something in her fantasy and her activity in this dissociative 
state competes against lived activity. By contrast, while still sitting in a room 
doing nothing observable, she may be ‘thinking of tomorrow’s job and making 
plans, or thinking about her holiday and this may be an imaginative exploration 
of the world’ (37) These acts of imagination do not compete against life but 
hold, supplement and enrich it. In both scenarios the patient is inactive in terms 
of performance, but there is a difference in experience. Imagination can be held 
by the individual and put to use where fantasy cannot. Put another way, the 
patient experiences the act of imagining but not that of fantasying.  
 Winnicott goes on to give a description of the patient’s life story, though 
he does not claim that the details are exactly true. He finds it useful to describe 
                                                          
59 Winnicott’s distinction derives from Melanie Klein’s separation of fantasy from phantasy but his 
discussion is something of a departure from Klein’s. For Klein fantasying is something akin to conscious 
daydreaming and phantasying is quite a broad term that covers most unconscious thought (Spillius 
2001, 364). Winnicott’s distinction is slightly different as both fantasy and imagination can be either 
conscious or unconscious.  The two processes are instead distinguished by their utility for the individual. 
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the type of fantasying partaken in by the patient as rooted in the nursery. She 
had older siblings who had worked out ways of playing together before her 
arrival, so ‘found herself in a world that was already organized before she came 
into the nursery’ (380). Being ‘intelligent’ she managed to ‘fit in’ with the way 
things were organized but could only do so ‘on a compliance basis’ (38-9). Thus 
she could play whichever role was ‘assigned to her’ but this play was 
‘unsatisfactory to her’ because she did not really have any say in it (39). Others 
also ‘felt something was lacking in the sense that she was not actively 
contributing’ to the play (39). This lack of contribution is put down to a state of 
dissociation. When she was functioning as a part of ‘other people’s games’ she 
was ‘essentially absent’ as the most part of her was ‘all the time engaged in 
fantasying’ (39, emphasis in original). For Winnicott, this childhood habit 
became the basis for the patient’s life. Her life became constructed in such a 
way that ‘nothing that was really happening was significant to her’ and ‘the main 
part of her existence was taking place when she was doing nothing whatever’ 
(39-40). She also disguised this ‘doing nothing’ with certain ‘futile’ activities – 
originally thumb-sucking but also ‘compulsive smoking’ and a series of ‘boring 
and obsessive games’ (40). The patient has ‘health enough’ to give promise, 
but this promise cannot be fulfilled because fantasy has consistently overcome 
imagination and she has been unable to attend to lived experience (40). For this 
reason, she is described to be ‘missing the boat’ (37).  
There are certainly some points of comparison between Winnicott’s case 
and Beckett’s presentation of May and Amy. In all there is a sense of absence, 
pre-occupation or inattention. We might also detect the ‘compliance’ of 
Winnicott’s patient in the way that May plays the role of carer to her mother and 
the way that Amy responds to the sermon at church. May’s repetitive pacing 
might also recall the ‘futile’ activities that Winnicott’s patient uses to disguise her 
fantasying. At the core of these apparent similarities, though, Beckett and 
Winnicott seem to be addressing a common concern. At issue in each of the 
texts is not a failure of performance but a failure to attend to performance. 
Winnicott’s patient is able to ‘fit in’ with the way things are organized and is 
more or less able to function from day-to-day but there is the feeling that 
something is ‘lacking’ and that she is ‘missing the boat’. She is performing 
certain tasks but there seems to be the lack of a self being actively engaged in 
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these tasks. Similarly, in Footfalls the problem is not what May or Amy do; May 
seems to perform the duties of caring for her mother and Amy seems to have 
been responsive in church. Again, though, there is the sense that each is 
otherwise occupied. Winnicott suggests that his patient is engaged in fantasying 
and the mothers in Footfalls suggest that their daughters are ‘revolving it all’. In 
both cases, there is the sense that a (sometimes unconscious) pre-occupation 
with producing a story-of-self distracts from immediate experience. This story-of 
self, though, is by no means optional in capitalist modernity. In The Experience 
of Modernity (1983), Marshall Berman observes the degree to which capitalism 
‘fosters, indeed forces, self-development for everybody’ (Berman 1983 96). In 
the world of the C.V., the interview and the retirement plan there is a continual 
need to develop a story of past and future, and this inevitably distracts from 
present experience. One might argue that Beckett’s characters are often far 
removed from the competitive world of employment, but I would contest this. As 
mentioned above, Mr Rooney is contemplating retirement on the train, and even 
the text of Footfalls draws May in competition with her peers. As May paces we 
are told that ‘when other girls of her age were out at…lacrosse she was already 
here’ (Beckett 2006, 401).60  
Winnicott and Beckett, then, articulate the pressure that is placed on the 
individual to be self-present while all the time producing a story of past and 
future. For practical purposes, the study of inattention that we have seen in 
experimental psychology tends to be structured around two definite perceptual 
tasks. Reading these studies alongside the texts of Beckett and Winnicott, 
though, can broaden our view of inattention. Inattentional blindness is not 
merely a matter of one terminable task distracting from another – of, say, 
listening to the radio’s distracting one from reading a newspaper article. There 
is another sense in which the interminable story of life distracts from the events 
that unfold in front of the subject. Beckett and Winnicott’s concern with 
inattention, I contend, is rooted in the desire to raise awareness about this 
tendency. This is evident in the case of Winnicott for whom success with his 
patient comes in the form of her being able to recognise her own 
                                                          
60 On a similar note, one should not forget the degree to which Beckett himself was subject to the 
modern individual’s need for a career. Before he became a successful literary writer Beckett had, for 
example, sent job applications to work as a trainee for Russian film director Sergei Eisenstein, and as a 
lecturer in Italian at the University of Cape Town (Knowlson 1996, 226; Knowlson and Knowlson 2006, 
76). 
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inattentiveness. For example, as she discusses her symptoms with him, she 
interrupts herself to tell him she is slipping into fantasy: 
She said: “We need another word, which is neither dream nor fantasy”. 
At this moment she reported that she had already “gone off to her job 
and to things that had happened at work” and so here again while talking 
to me she had already left me (Winnicott 2005, 44). 
The crucial point, here, is that therapy has enabled the patient to become aware 
that she is not attending to the conversation wholly. She can recognise and 
report the experience of inattention. This increased awareness, Winnicott 
hopes, will give the patient some choice about her way of living. In a modernity 
in which there is a continual pressure to construct a past and a future, there will 
always be moments when the individual is not quite in the present. In different 
ways, though, Beckett, Winnicott and the experimental psychologists can help 
us attend to and (perhaps) manage a penchant for not-quite-there-ness. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I want to conclude this section with some remarks on the nature of Beckett’s 
experimentation in Not I, That Time and Footfalls. In a recent review of Lisa 
Dwan’s Perth Festival performance of Not I, Footfalls and Rockaby, Van 
Badham opined that, though ‘impressive’, the production was ‘not quite 
entertaining’ (Badham 2015). She compared the experience to ‘watching the re-
enactment of a once bold experiment whose conclusions have long been 
accepted as fact’ (Badham 2015). One might take this criticism in a couple of 
ways depending on how the term ‘experiment’ is understood. In one sense, 
Beckett’s plays are experiments insofar as they are innovative and cutting-edge. 
In this line of thought, they extend the boundaries of artistic practice and prove 
that one can produce successful theatre when presenting nothing but a mouth, 
a face, or a pacing figure on stage. If the term ‘experiment’ is understood in this 
way, then, it may be fair to argue that the plays were ‘once bold’ but there is 
little at stake when they are staged today. We know that these set-ups can work 
as theatre and so, while we be might impressed with their technique, we cannot 
be thrilled by their discoveries. They have already extended the boundaries of 
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artistic practice and cannot be expected to extend them any further. It is my 
argument, however, that we might understand the term ‘experiment’ in another 
sense. Rather than focusing on how Beckett’s plays extend artistic practice, this 
section has treated them as more direct experiments on the nature of modern 
experience. In this way, I have argued that these plays investigate the 
processes by which the individual adapts to a modernity in which one is 
required to attend to, in Crary’s words, ‘an endless sequence of new products, 
sources of stimulation, and streams of information’ (Crary 1999, 13-14). 
Crucially, the plays do not just test the individual’s capacity to perform 
perceptual tasks, though they certainly do this. Rather, the novel streams of 
stimuli that Beckett presents are always accompanied by a concern with the 
production of a story of self. In Not I the rapid speech and striking darkness is 
accompanied by a focus on the production of an I. In That Time one needs to 
read faces and isolate voices in order to get at a story of Listener’s life. And in 
Footfalls we are presented with May whose occupation with her story – her 
‘revolving it all’ – distracts her from present experience. Beckett’s plays, I argue, 
can be deemed experimental in the sense that they investigate the ways in 
which the modern individual strains to process a given body of material while 
endlessly developing a sense of self. 
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Chapter 4 
Beckett and the Mental Image 
 
In the first section of this study, the material that Beckett presented in his 
theatre of the 1970s (the frenetic mouth of Not I, the inactive face of That Time 
and the pacing figure in Footfalls) was largely discussed in terms of perception 
and attention. To take the example of Not I, the mouth was treated as a 
projector of sensory stimuli, and the actors and audience were discussed in 
terms of their capacity to process, attend to, experience and interpret these 
stimuli. In this respect, I argued that, like many psychological experiments, 
Beckett’s works are spaces in which we can study the responses of human 
subjects when they are exposed to novel sensory environments. But of course 
there is a distinction to be made here insofar as Beckett’s experimentation 
works to produce a different, more experiential knowledge to that which is 
frequently sought in experimental psychology. The psychological experiments I 
have looked at so far are primarily interested in the human subject’s capacity for 
performance. They are interested, to give some examples, in how quickly 
speech can be processed; how many voices can be comprehended at once; or 
how attentional loads affect the subject’s ability to notice an event. Beckett’s 
experiments are also interested in the performance of tasks such as speech 
perception and selective attention but the concern in the context of Beckett’s 
work is more consistently with the experience of the performing subject – the 
ways in which the subject becomes conscious of that which they perform. This 
section will continue to understand Beckett’s works as experiments on 
subjective experience but I will focus less on perceptual experience than on 
what is left behind in the wake of perception: the images that the subject is able 
to apprehend or recall without direct sensory stimulation. Put simply, I will treat 
Beckett’s works less as experiments on perceptual experience and more as 
experiments on mental imagery. 
 What one might question here is the degree to which the percept can be 
separated from the mental image in the context of Beckett’s work. Recent 
criticism has frequently argued that a large part of the power of Beckett’s works 
resides in their resistance to this categorisation of experience. Ulrika Maude, for 
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example, has argued that Beckett’s works see ‘categories such as perception, 
memory and imagination lose their differentiating characteristics’ (Maude 2009, 
37). This is an important point and the distinction that will be drawn between 
perception and mental imagery in this section is most certainly not a sharp one. 
I will talk about the mental image and the percept as two areas insofar as I hold 
that there are differences in the extents to which the two phenomena are 
capable of affecting the sensory world. Here I use William James’s observation 
that the properties of ‘real’ or perceptual phenomena ‘always accrue’ 
consequences on the sensory world, where the properties of mental imagery do 
not (James 2008, 15). As James puts it, ‘mental triangles are pointed, but their 
points won’t wound’ (15). However, my argument will be that Beckett is 
interested in the moments at which these two areas blur into one another and it 
becomes difficult to sift perceptual experience from the experience of mental 
imagery. The section, then, aims to extend, rather than contradict, Maude’s 
argument. To illustrate this, we might look to the context of Maude’s statement. 
It comes in the midst of a discussion of vision in Beckett’s work and Maude is 
making the suggestion that imaginative experience frequently interferes with the 
perceptions of Beckett’s subjects. In a discussion of the short story The End 
(1946), for example, Maude notes that ‘the narrator’s observations vacillate 
between vision and imagination, making the certainty of what is seen precarious 
and erratic’ (Maude 2009, 38). Maude, here, is arguing that percept and image 
blur into one another in Beckett’s work but her focus is on how this blurring 
affects our understanding of perception. The possibility that images of 
imagination blur with the narrator’s visual perception of the outside world is 
seen to shed doubt on the reliability of his vision. In this way, Beckett’s work is 
seen to counter the tendency in the Western philosophical tradition to privilege 
the objectivity and reliability of sight in comparison to other senses such as 
hearing and touch (24-5). I find this argument convincing but it does leave an 
important question unaddressed. In suggesting that Beckett’s troubling of 
distinctions between perception and imagination might affect attitudes towards 
perception, Maude opens up a question of how this strategy might also alter 
conceptions of the imagination and imagery. If the work of Beckett allows us to 
see elements of the image in the percept, is the opposite true in the case of the 
mental image? Does Beckett’s work allow us to understand the mental image 
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as an entity that, like the percept, needs to be processed, attended to and 
interpreted? This is the concern that animates this section. 
 
Beckettian Imagery 
 
To begin to confront this question we might return to the reception of Not I and 
specifically Michael Billington’s observation that the play is ‘compelling’ because 
it ‘leaves behind an ineradicable image’ (Billington 1973). In this account, the 
artistic value of Not I lies not just in the perceptual process in which the figure 
on stage is observed. Rather, the play is adjudged successful because the 
sensory experience that it presents stays with the observer in imagistic form 
long after the performance has finished. This contention has also been made in 
more recent criticism. Drawing on approaches to the image taken by Henri 
Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, Anthony Uhlmann has advanced the argument 
that, while all Beckett’s works (and presumably the works of other authors) 
‘make use of images of various kinds’, there is a ‘true Beckettian image’ which 
possesses a singular aesthetic power (Uhlmann 2008, 62). This ‘true’ image, for 
Uhlmann, ‘is something which appears, or is created, and vanishes, but in 
vanishing leaves a strong impression, an impression which lingers or even 
transforms the one it affects’ (62). As in Billington’s account, the image is seen 
as something that is left behind in the wake of perception. For Uhlmann, 
Beckett’s images ‘are impressed upon us as we watch and more or less burnt 
into our retinas, leaving afterimages which linger’ (62).61 The observations of 
Billington and Uhlmann are useful in helping us distinguish between the object 
of perception and the mental image in Beckett’s work because they help us to 
identify two separate stages in the reception of a given stimuli. There is a 
perceptual stage in which we are concerned with what is objectively presented 
and the observer’s capacity to process, attend to and interpret this material in 
real time. But there is also an imagistic stage in which our concerns are with the 
quasi-sensory impressions that linger in the observer’s consciousness. For 
                                                          
61 The idea of the afterimage is of course drawn from scientific experimentation and, as we saw in 
chapter 1, Beckett had read about this body of scientific research in Woodworth (TCD MS 10971/7/7). 
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Billington and Uhlmann it seems that Beckett’s works are distinguished by the 
emphasis they place on this imagistic stage.  
Works such as Not I, then, seem to have a peculiar power to leave 
behind mental images but what are the nature of these images? Here it might 
be useful to compare Billington and Uhlmann’s accounts of the image left 
behind by Beckett’s work with some other types of mental imagery. Uhlmann, 
for example, implies a link between the lingering Beckettian image and retinal 
afterimages, suggesting that the image left behind by Beckett’s work is a static 
entity that is stamped down on our minds. This, though, does not account for 
the ‘endless’ mobility described by Billington. In Billington’s account, the image 
of the mouth does not seem to be a static representation. Instead, Billington 
gives the sense that he is involuntarily re-experiencing the visuals of Not I as a 
kind of replay. This might suggest that the imagery he describes is similar to 
that of the traumatic ‘flashback’ memory in which individuals frequently report ‘a 
vivid perceptual content’ and a sense that this imaginal content is ‘happening in 
the ‘‘here and now’’’ (Speckens et al. 2007, 250). On further inspection, 
however, it is difficult to argue for a strong link between Beckett’s lingering 
imagery and the imagery of traumatic memory. Neither Uhlmann nor Billington, 
for example, report the ‘feeling of travelling in time’ that is common with 
traumatic memory (250). As Billington and Uhlmann describe it, the subject of 
the Beckettian image does not have the impression of returning to an original 
event. Rather, there is the idea that certain sensory elements are lingering as 
definite but decontextualized impressions. Also, the Beckettian image does not 
seem to cause personal distress in the manner of a traumatic image. It may be 
experienced as significant but this significance is not necessarily negative. 
Uhlmann, for instance, suggests that the Beckettian image might transform ‘the 
one it affects’, but the transformation envisioned by Uhlmann is not necessarily 
damaging. The Beckettian mental image, then, might be characterised as a 
concrete and affective presence but there remains something faint or vague 
about its nature insofar as it is difficult to locate this concrete presence in space, 
or define the affect that it produces.  
In ‘The Exhausted’ (1995), Gilles Deleuze also observes these 
characteristics in the Beckettian image. For Deleuze, Beckett’s work is 
frequently occupied by the attempt to produce ‘something seen or heard’ which 
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is ‘called Image’ (Deleuze 1995, 8). He identifies three languages (I, II, and III) 
in Beckett’s work and the ‘Image’ forms the basis of ‘language III’ (8). In 
Deleuze’s schema, language I is concerned with the enumeration and 
combination of objects, language II with ‘inventing stories or making inventories 
of memory’, but language III is distinguished by its capacity to escape these 
projects (8). For Deleuze, languages I and II make use of images (or the 
imagination) but the images of both of these languages are bound by reason 
and/or memory. The image of language III, by contrast, is ‘liberated from the 
chains it was kept in by the other two languages’ and becomes ‘the Image’ (8). 
This entity, Deleuze goes on, ‘appears in all its singularity, retaining nothing of 
the personal, nor of the rational, and ascending into the indefinite as into a 
celestial state. A woman, a hand, a mouth some eyes’ (9, emphasis in original). 
The ‘Image’ then, for Deleuze, is a concrete, apprehensible form but – because 
it is decontextualized (torn away from reason and memory) there is something 
‘indefinite’ and distant about it. Again there is a sense that the Beckettian image 
is vivid and immediate but also somehow faint and faraway.  
But how is this vivid faintness produced? Deleuze’s account, gives two 
insights that might help us begin to answer the question. First, he highlights 
Beckett’s use of space, arguing that language III ‘proceeds not only with images 
but with spaces’ (10). Beckett’s singular but indefinite image, by this account, 
can only emerge from a space that shares its singular but indefinite nature; a 
space which Deleuze calls ‘any-space-whatever’ (10). This space is ‘disused’ 
and ‘unassigned’, but ‘entirely geometrically determined’ (10). Like ‘the Image’, 
then, the ‘any-space-whatever’ is a definite form but one that is not assigned to 
anyone, or associated with a particular practice. The de-contextualised image 
can only exist in a decontextualized space. Thus, Deleuze outlines a kind of 
recipe in which one has to produce space and image in sequence. In his 
readings of Ghost Trio (1976) and ...but the clouds… (1976), for example, 
Deleuze identifies a two stage process, in which the concern is, firstly, with the 
creation of ‘any-space-whatever’ and, secondly, with ‘the mental image to which 
it leads’ (19). 
 Deleuze’s second insight lies in the animation of the image. In Deleuze’s 
argument, the image is defined in terms of motion. He argues that the image of 
language III is ‘not a representation of an object, but a movement’ in any-space-
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whatever (19).62 Thus, the image is seen to be embedded in the any-space-
whatever but it is distinguished from that space by its motion. However, the 
motion of the image is of a flickering, precarious kind. Deleuze continues:  
And insofar as it is a spiritual movement, it is not separated from its own 
disappearance, of its dissipation, premature or not. The image is a pant, 
a breath, but expelled on the way to extinction. The image is what dies 
away, wastes away, a fall. It is a pure intensity, which defines itself as 
such through its height – its level above zero, which is only described in 
falling (19).  
For Deleuze, the Beckettian image acquires its power through the manipulation 
of context and motion, a manipulation which is made possible by the precision 
of television. The Beckettian image, according to Deleuze, must be embedded 
in a particular decontextualized space and presented at a particular flickering 
intensity, and ‘only television […] is able to satisfy these demands’ (20). These 
demands, however, are deemed to come from more than a desire to create 
compelling aesthetic objects. Instead Deleuze seems to suggest that Beckett 
has a mimetic project in mind: that of producing a perceptual form with the 
qualities of a mental image. He argues, for example, that Beckett’s works refuse 
‘artificial techniques, which are not suited to the movements of the mind’ (20). 
For Deleuze, then, Beckett’s television plays, are not concerned with 
representing perceptual objects but with expressing (or perhaps even imitating) 
particular mental ‘movements’. This insight is one way of explaining Beckett’s 
work’s tendency to leave behind ‘ineradicable’ images. Beckett’s works, one 
might suggest, stay with us as mental images because they are presented to us 
in the language of a particular type of mental image. 
Deleuze’s reading certainly opens up some interesting possibilities but 
what it perhaps lacks is a detailed account of how Beckett developed this 
method. For this, we might turn back to Uhlmann who traces a movement from 
an aesthetic of relation to one of non-relation in Beckett’s writing. He argues 
that, in early works such as –  the posthumously published first novel –  Dream 
of Fair to Middling Women (1992) and Murphy (1938), Beckett makes heavy 
use of relational techniques such as allusion and metaphor, seeming to ‘prize 
                                                          
62 Drawing on Murphy, Deleuze defines this any-space-whatever as a ‘world of the spirit’ or mind. This 
space is contrasted with the space of the physical or bodily world (Deleuze 1995, 19-20). 
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the process of skilfully drawing links’ between image, context and meaning (42). 
However, Uhlmann suggests that these early works also exhibit a ‘growing 
sense of distrust’ of this process which reflects an interest in how the image 
might be allowed to stand alone (42). For Uhlmann, even as Beckett made 
heavy use of allusion and metaphor in his early novels, ‘he was also already 
very much aware of the idea of the image itself as that which can carry affective 
power’ (54). This interest, Uhlmann argues, pervaded later works as Beckett 
began to ‘find a form’ which eschewed the aesthetic of relation and 
accommodated non-relation. Thus Beckett began to draw attention to images 
that ‘offer themselves as meaningful, but […] exceed straightforward 
interpretation’ and demand interpretive work (64).  
Uhlmann places this aspect of Beckett’s work within a long (though 
intermittent) philosophical tradition which is concerned with the idea ‘that the 
apprehension of the image […] is fundamental both to our understanding of 
what the world is and how we know that world’ (Uhlmann 2008, 5). Thus the 
image is adjudged to set the tone for all thoughts about what has been sensed. 
For Uhlmann, this idea might be seen to begin with the Ancient Greek Stoics, 
before continuing in modern philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, Henri 
Bergson, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce and Deleuze (5-6). In his 
study, Uhlmann focuses particularly on the philosophers of the late nineteenth 
century, arguing that the approaches to the image taken by these authors were 
‘developed and transformed by an army of modernist writers and artists’ – 
ranging from the imagist poets to the painter Francis Bacon and Beckett 
(Uhlmann 2008, 6). The ideas of the philosophers, then, are seen to trigger a 
major change in aesthetic attitudes to the image.  
To Uhlmann’s argument, I want to add the idea that this philosophy also 
influenced scientific approaches to the image. For evidence of this, we might 
look to one particular name on Uhlmann’s list, William James. Though James’s 
ideas have undoubtedly had a lasting impact on both philosophy and aesthetics, 
it should be stressed that his primary concern when discussing images was, 
more often than not, the practice of psychology. For example, the famous 
discussion of the ‘stream of thought’ in Principles of Psychology (1890) 
specifically targeted the way in which the image had been approached in 
‘traditional psychology’: 
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What must be admitted is that the definite images of traditional 
psychology form but the very smallest part of our minds as they actually 
live. The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river 
consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful and 
other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots all 
actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would 
continue to flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that 
psychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image in the mind is 
steeped and dyed in the free water that flows around it (James 1890, 
255). 
James, here, is addressing the discipline of psychology. He is defining a 
‘traditional psychology’63 in opposition to what he sees as his own non-
traditional form of psychology. This is important because the way in which the 
term ‘image’ is used in psychology is slightly different from its use in Uhlmann 
and Deleuze’s discussions of philosophy and aesthetics. In Uhlmann and 
Deleuze, the term is used very broadly to refer to something that may be 
presented to the mind but might also be presented on page, stage, or screen. In 
this sense, the image is both the thing that we see on the television screen and 
the mental impression that we recall after the television has been switched off. 
Though psychologists may sometimes use the term in this broad way, the 
image of psychology is more commonly understood in its narrower sense as 
something we recall or imagine. In the words of the Oxford English Dictionary: 
‘a mental representation of something […] created not by direct perception but 
by memory or imagination’.64 The images James describes are located ‘in the 
mind’, not on page, stage, or screen, and he is making a point about the way in 
which psychology should conceive of these mental images. The ‘traditional 
psychology’, for James, conceives of the mind as a collection of ‘definite’ 
images. James’s problem with this conception is not exactly that these images 
do not exist but that psychology tends to reduce thought and experience to a 
series of static, definite images. For James, images may be apprehended in the 
mind as definite entities but the images exist within a stream of thought and so 
                                                          
63 Here James is targeting the ’ridiculous theory of Hume and Berkeley that we can have no images but 
of perfectly definite things’ (254). 
64 OED Online s.v. ‘image’, accessed November 22, 2016, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91618?rskey=2F2EBK&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid 
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are never as definite, or permanent, as they appear. As was the case in 
Deleuze’s account of the Beckettian image, James’s mental images are defined 
by their mobility and impermanence. As James puts it, apprehension of the 
image is escorted by ‘the dying echo of whence it came to us’, and ‘the dawning 
sense of whither it is to lead’ (255). The mental image is defined as an 
impression of something but one that is always on the cusp of modification or 
dissipation.   
James applies this model to the reception of aesthetic productions. 
‘What’, he questions, ‘is that shadowy scheme of the “form” of an opera, play, or 
book, which remains in our minds and on which we pass judgment when the 
actual thing is done?’ (255). It may be tempting, here, to suggest that the 
‘shadowy’ form to which James alludes is simply our consciousness of an 
aesthetic piece – what we think of it. But James seems to have in mind a kind of 
double process of interpretation in which we, firstly, form a ‘shadowy’ version of 
the – now absent – ‘thing’ and, secondly, pass judgement on this shadowy 
version. Here we seem to be getting very close to Bergson’s formulation of the 
image as, in Uhlmann’s words, ‘a bridge between those objectively existing 
things and our thoughts’ (Uhlmann 2008, 8). In the wake of sensation, by this 
account, a shadowy version of the experience undergone is constructed and 
evaluated in the mind. The presence of this form allows us to re-experience and 
think about a version of the thing that has been sensed. The image of the thing, 
then, seems to mould our thoughts about that thing. Thus, through James, the 
ideas of the image that emerge in late nineteenth-century philosophy seem to 
cross over into psychology.  
 
The Image in Twentieth-Century Experimental Psychology 
 
The understanding of the image as a shadowy version of sensory experience 
remains crucial to experimental psychology’s approach to mental imagery 
today. In a recent summary of imagery research, Pearson et al. define the term 
‘mental imagery’ as follows:  
Representations and the accompanying experience of sensory 
information without a direct external stimulus. Such representations are 
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recalled from memory and lead one to re-experience a version of the 
original stimulus or some novel combination of stimuli’ (Pearson et al. 
2015, 590). 
Again, there is the idea that the image is a version of an original stimulus (or set 
of stimuli) which gives the subject ‘the experience of sensory information’. The 
image might affect the subject in a manner that is similar to ‘a direct external 
stimulus’, even though it is only in the mind. As Waller et al. point out in another 
summary, this contemporary understanding of the image is based on a body of 
fairly recent behavioural and neuroscientific research which has been taken to 
show that that mental imagery ‘engages many’ – though not all – ‘of the 
psychological structures and processes used in perception’ (Waller et al. 2012, 
295). Thus, though mental imagery is understood to be encountered ‘without a 
direct external stimulus’, research suggests that its apprehension requires many 
of the psychological mechanisms that one would use to apprehend an external 
stimulus. Not only this, but mental imagery is seen to give the ‘experience of 
sensory information’ which suggests that it may not always be possible for the 
subject to distinguish the mental image from the object of perception.  
Though advances in technology have allowed the case to be made with 
more rigour, this assertion is nothing new. Experimental psychology has long 
been scrutinising the distinction between imagery and perception. For an early 
investigation of this, we might look to 1896 and E. W. Scripture’s paper on 
‘Measuring Hallucinations’. Scripture’s experiments found that subjects who had 
been trained for several trials to detect a very faint sound, began to report the 
presence of that sound even when it was absent (Scripture 1896, 762-3). 
Though Scripture does not make the case explicitly, there is the hint that the 
subject experiences a version of a perceived stimulus even when that stimulus 
is no longer present. By the turn of the twentieth century, then, experimental 
psychology was beginning to illustrate the continuities between imagery and 
perception. For a more explicit investigation, though, we must cross over to the 
early twentieth century and, in particular Chevez Perky’s 1910 article: ‘An 
Experimental Study of Imagination’. This article – which I will discuss in more 
detail in the next chapter – documented numerous experiments on the 
relationship between perception, imagery and the imagination, but the most 
famous of these sought to compare the object of perception with ‘the image of 
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imagination’ (Perky 1910, 428). Here Perky and her co-investigators attempted 
to ‘build up a perceptual consciousness under conditions which should seem to 
the observer to be those of the formation of an imaginative consciousness’ 
(428). In other words, they attempted to make an object from the perceptual 
world look like an image of imagination, to the extent that an unknowing 
observer would confuse the two (428). They did this by presenting perceptual 
objects – cardboard cut-outs of bananas for example – to observers at a very 
low (dim, blurry, and flickering) level of illumination and then asking them to 
imagine those particular objects (429-30). It was found that these low-level 
perceptual stimuli were almost always mistaken for images of the observers’ 
imagination – observers could perceive the cardboard cut-out of the banana but 
thought they were imagining it (433). The results, then, gave cause for 
questioning the boundaries between percept and image. As Waller et al. put it, 
‘the fact that highly degraded, nearly subliminal sensory information can be 
mistaken for a mental image seems to suggest that perception and imagery 
draw on the same mental systems, processes, or resources’ (Waller et al. 2012, 
292-3). These findings remain influential in contemporary psychology and 
cognitive science but it should be stressed that two developments in early 
twentieth-century psychology would limit the immediate impact of Perky’s study: 
first the imageless thought controversy and then behaviourism.   
 Of these two developments, the imageless thought controversy is 
perhaps less crucial. Debate on the subject pre-dates Perky’s experiment and, 
in itself, the notion of imageless thought does not oppose the idea that there is a 
link between perception and imagery. As R. S. Woodworth notes, those 
advocating imageless thought tended to assert that ‘an act might be thought of 
without any representative or symbolic image’ but this assertion does not deny 
that some – if not most – thoughts are accompanied by images (Woodworth 
1915, 1).65 Woodworth gives an account of how this might work by detailing his 
own introspective experiment. He attempted to recall a series of events from his 
past and evaluate what elements of the recall were image-based and which 
were rooted in other ‘imageless’ forms of thought (Woodworth 1915, 12). His 
                                                          
65 I use Woodworth, here, not only because he was the source of the majority of Beckett’s knowledge of 
experimental psychology, but also because he is still considered a key authority on the subject of 
imageless thought. Waller et al., for example, cite Woodworth’s summary of the imageless thought 
controversy in their review of image research. 
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analysis seems to suggest that while his thought does, to some extent, depend 
on images, there are imageless aspects. In the attempt to recall a colleague’s 
speaking in a faculty meeting, for example, Woodworth notes:  
What I got was a certain quality of voice and precise manner of 
enunciating, rather different from the conversational tone of this 
individual. There were no words nor particular vowel or consonantal 
sounds present in recall, but simply the quality of the voice and 
enunciation (13). 
Here Woodworth seems to apprehend a shadowy, incomplete form of the 
colleague’s speech and he recognises that his thoughts are, in this respect, 
image-based. This, though, is not the only part of Woodworth’s recall: 
I got also the fact that the speaker was speaking as chairman of a 
committee, and something of the rather critical attitude of the faculty 
towards him, these facts being recalled in the “imageless” way (13). 
Thus, for Woodworth, there is a relational, or factual way of recalling past 
events that does not depend on one’s analysing images of this event.66 This 
statement is compatible with my own experience. If I try to recall my experience 
of watching Not I at the theatre, for example, I get a vivid visual image of the 
mouth in darkness, an image of the texture of the voice, as well as the first few 
words of the play being spoken. But I also recall who I attended the theatre with 
and their opinion of the play in a factual way without getting an image of those 
people. There seems to be a mixture of image-based and imageless 
recollection. This, however, might not satisfy a critic of imageless thought who 
could say that, when I recall the people sat next to me, I do in fact form images 
but simply do not have the introspective skill to apprehend them. This is a 
viewpoint that was espoused by psychologists such as Edward Titchener67 who 
argued that all thoughts ‘had imaginal cores but some of these cores were so 
faint as to be imperceptible to all but the most highly skilled introspectors’ 
                                                          
66 Psychological research has also emphasised variations between individuals in this respect. There is an 
overall consensus that some individuals are more able to recall events by means of imagery, while 
others make use of different means. Indeed, recent research has found that there are individuals who 
cannot produce visual imagery at all (a condition that has been termed ‘aphantasia’. These individuals 
are still seen to function normatively through other means of thought. For a summary of this research 
see Zeman, Dewar and Della Salla, 2015. 
67 Perky’s experiments were, in fact, performed at Titchener’s laboratory at Cornell University (Perky 
1910, 429). 
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(Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007, 278). As we will see, this debate depends 
heavily on the degree to which the subject is deemed capable of analysing their 
own experience and so is not easily resolved. However, on either side, there 
seems to be an acceptance that some thoughts are image-based and these 
images are shadowy versions of things that have been perceived. In this way, it 
is accepted that images shape many people’s understanding of the world to a 
certain degree; the debate is merely one of the extent to which this is the case. 
 The imageless thought controversy did, however, have a more indirect 
impact on the psychological study of the image. It caused, as Beckett himself 
noted, a ‘parting of the ways in modern psychological theory’, and this parting 
had a severe impact on twentieth-century psychology’s approach to mental 
imagery (TCD MS 10971/7/7). The debate around imageless thought went on 
over a long period and psychology’s failure to attain any kind of consensus on 
the topic caused many to doubt whether the experimental models at work were 
capable of producing valid scientific data. The most prominent critic in this 
regard was John Broadus Watson. Woodworth describes Watson’s critique:  
Watson pointed an accusing finger at the “imageless thought” 
controversy and other recent examples of divergent results obtained in 
different laboratories by presumably well-trained introspectionists. If even 
your best observers cannot agree on matters of fact, he said, how can 
you ever make psychology a science instead of a debating society 
(Woodworth 2013, 74)? 
From Watson’s point of view, if one has discovered scientific facts then these 
facts should be demonstrable in any setting. They should not depend on an 
individual’s being trained in a particular introspective technique at a particular 
laboratory. Watson’s resolution to this problem was drastic. As Woodworth 
notes, Watson’s behaviourist psychology would take words such as ‘imagery’ 
and ‘consciousness’ out of psychological parlance. (74). Thus, rather than 
merely reducing experimental psychology’s dependence on trained individuals, 
the rise of behaviourism saw the experimental study of imagery completely 
marginalised. The popularity of behaviourism in the early part of the twentieth 
century meant little research was carried out on the subjects of imagery or the 
imagination until the 1960s. This was not only because behaviourism took terms 
such as ‘imagery’ out of mainstream psychological discourse. Watson argued 
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that it was a delusion to think that mental states could be made into the objects 
of observation, and so marginalised the methods of introspective observation 
that are crucial to the study of the topic – namely asking subjects for accounts 
of their imagistic experience (70-1). Waller et al. suggest that these 
‘methodological prohibitions’ were largely ‘responsible for the absence of 
research on imagery throughout the first half of the twentieth century’ (Waller et 
al. 2012, 300).68  
 For a variety of reasons, which I will discuss in the next chapter, the 
psychological study of mental imagery did become theoretically viable again in 
the second half of the century. But in these later experiments one can still see 
the imprint of behaviourism. In this period, there is increased emphasis on the 
physiology and performance of the imagining observer. This is exemplified in a 
1967 study carried out by Segal and Glicksman, which questions whether 
‘lowered levels of arousal’ would affect the individual’s imaginative experience 
and diminish their ability to discriminate ‘between imagery and veridical 
perception’ (Segal and Glicksman 1967, 258). The study was a repeat of 
Perky’s experiment on the relationship between the percept and the image but it 
also took into account the more recent findings of ‘sensory isolation 
experiments’ (258). The findings of these experiments, the researchers note, 
suggested that depriving the human subject of sensory stimulation might result 
in a ‘diminution of logic, attention and inhibitory control and the weakening of 
these factors leads to poor reality testing, hallucinatory, dream-like and simple 
optic imagery’ (258). The experiment, then, is concerned with how manipulating 
the subject’s sensory environment might affect their capacity to distinguish 
between perceptual experience and imagery. In the later part of the century, 
psychologists also made much more attempt to quantify imaginative 
experience. Stephen Kosslyn, for example, asked subjects to ‘construct an 
image of a cat’ upon hearing the word cat ‘and then inspect this image for 
claws, indicating when he “sees” them as quickly as possible’ (Kosslyn 1975, 
344). Here, the experimenter can measure the time it takes subjects to 
apprehend the claws of the imagined cat in order to give an idea of how a 
mental image is scanned for information. The image is treated as a constructed 
                                                          
68 On a similar note, Pearson et al. note that the ‘theoretical orientation’ of behaviourism ‘rejected the 
study of internal representations, including mental imagery’ (Pearson et al. 2015, 590). 
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entity that, when perused by the observer, yields something similar to the 
experience of sensory information. Because the image is being treated like a 
percept, the observer’s process of acquiring information from it can be 
measured using methods derived from the study of perception. 
There are, of course, some objections that might be raised to this 
understanding of the mental image. In the next chapter, I will address the 
concerns that were voiced by a number of twentieth-century philosophers such 
as Jean Paul Sartre, Gilbert Ryle and Zenon Pylyshyn. For now, though, I want 
to stress that from the mid-twentieth century onwards experimental psychology 
has continued to blur the distinction between perception and mental imagery. 
Practitioners of twentieth-century experimental psychology, then, seem to 
develop some of the ideas that emerged in the work of Bergson and James. 
The image, in these examples, is treated as something that is left over from 
sensory experience but has its own particular qualities that need to be 
interpreted, described or analysed. Thus, if the ideas of Bergson and James 
were, as Uhlmann argues, ‘developed and transformed by an army of modernist 
writers and artists’, it might also be asserted that a comparable process was 
occurring in twentieth-century experimental psychology. 
 
The Romantic Image 
 
In many ways the idea that a writer such as Beckett would be interested in the 
materiality of the image is unsurprising. After all, at least since Romanticism, the 
writer or artist has frequently been portrayed as a specialist in the practice of 
translating mental imagery into tangible material. However, there are obviously 
important ways in which the Romantic literary tradition differs from the 
experimental studies of mental imagery that we have so far encountered. We 
have seen that in twentieth-century experimental psychology the image was 
often treated as a shadowy version of sensory experience which the subject 
might apprehend and describe. But, for the Romantics, this procedure is very 
far from the vocation of the creative artist. Rather than merely apprehending an 
image in the mind, the Romantic artist is endowed with the capacity to 
rejuvenate this image by giving it a transcendent meaning. For an illustration of 
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this, we might look to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s notion of the poet in 
Biographia Literaria (1817).69 ‘The poet’, Coleridge suggests, uses ‘the synthetic 
and magical power’ of the imagination to diffuse ‘a tone, and spirit of unity’ on 
his experience (Coleridge 1927, 166). Through the imagination, then, the poet is 
able (among other things) to balance ‘the general with the concrete; the idea 
with the image; the individual with the representative’ (166). The imagination, by 
this account, is not just the means by which images are produced; it is a faculty 
that transforms, and gives meaning to imagery. It does not just allow one to re-
experience a version of a sensory object but makes that object represent 
something else. The presentation of an image, here, is not an end in itself. 
Instead, the poet’s imagination draws out the significance of the image by 
relating it to the idea. 
This contention might be supported by Percy Bysshe Shelley’s 
comparison of the creative mind with a fading coal: ‘the mind in creation is as a 
fading coal which some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to 
transitory brightness’ (Shelley 2009, 696). There is the sense, here, that in the 
wake of the fire of sensory experience, one can only apprehend a dull, fading 
version of what has been sensed. To apprehend and describe this, for Shelley, 
is not to create poetry. Instead ‘some invisible influence’ has to stir the coal and, 
however fleetingly, alight it. Apprehension of the mental image is not enough; 
the poet has to bring the image to life through artistic expression. ‘A poem’ 
Shelley writes, ‘is the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth’ (693). The 
poet, then, not only apprehends the image of lived experience but also 
expresses this image in a form that transcends the particular and reaches for 
the universal. Where the capacity to do this comes from, however, remains 
undetermined. Poets, for Shelley, are subject to ‘some invisible influence’ which 
enables the transitory illumination of fading images. Many critics have noted the 
influence that ideas such as Shelley’s would exert on later artists and writers. 
Dirk Van Hulle, for example, has observed that Shelley’s formulation would go 
on to capture the interest of two twentieth-century writers, James Joyce and 
Samuel Beckett (Van Hulle 2007, 22-3). Van Hulle points out that Joyce would 
                                                          
69 Beckett evidently knew Coleridge’s work, though it is difficult to know how thoroughly he engaged 
with it. In a 1962 letter to Mary Hutchinson, for example, Beckett stated that he had recently read 
Biographia Literaria ‘without much pleasure’ (Van Hulle and Nixon 2013, 35). 
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refer to Shelley in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) when Stephen 
Dedalus is describing the moment of artistic inspiration: 
The mind in that mysterious instant Shelley likened beautifully to a fading 
coal. The instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear 
radiance of the aesthetic image, is apprehended luminously by the mind 
which has been arrested by its wholeness and fascinated by its harmony 
(Joyce 2000,179). 
In distinguishing Joyce’s use of Shelley from Beckett’s, Van Hulle makes the 
important point that where the ‘overconfident young Dedalus’ stresses the 
radiance of the coal, Beckett's works seem to have more affinity with the 
“fading” aspect’ (Van Hulle 2007, 22). Van Hulle’s observation comes in the 
context of a wider discussion of Beckett’s relationship with Romanticism, and he 
does not analyse the significance of the ‘fading coal’ image in any detail. 
Nevertheless, his observation might be adapted to illustrate the relationship 
between the Romantic approach to the mental image and that of Beckett. It 
seems that Beckett can be distinguished from the Romantics in terms of the 
approach taken to the fading image. Where the Romantic tradition is interested 
in the poet’s capacity to illuminate it, Beckett is working to get across the 
experience of apprehending the image in its fading state. In view of this, it is 
tempting to assert that the Beckettian image has more in common with the 
‘shadowy’ mental images of experimental psychology, than with the radiant, 
aesthetic image that is produced by the Romantic imagination. This, though, 
would be an oversimplification.70 There are certainly points of contrast between 
the aesthetic approach to the image advocated by Coleridge and Shelley and 
that of Beckett, but I would also argue that there are crucial similarities.  
The key contrast between Beckett’s image and that of the Romantics 
seems to lie in the degree of meaning that is attached to the aesthetic image. 
Neither Coleridge, nor Shelley, seem to deny that images exist in the mind as 
                                                          
70 The existing critical literature shows divergent opinion on Beckett’s relationship with the Romantic 
imagination. In the earlier criticism – Knowlson and Pilling (1979); Kearney (1988) – there was a 
tendency to stress the degree to which Beckett was writing against Romantic conceptions of the 
imagination. Later critics such as Michael Rodriguez (2007), on the other hand, have aligned Beckett’s 
approach to the imagination with that of the Romantics. What we might say with some certainty is that 
Beckett had a conflicted relationship with the Romantic imagination and Romanticism in general. He 
may not have necessarily liked the Romantics but he was undoubtedly influenced by them. As Mark 
Nixon puts it, ‘whether he wanted to or not, Beckett's own temperament opened his work up to 
Romantic influences’ (Nixon 2007, 73). 
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fading versions of sensory experience. In this sense, the Romantic conception 
of the mental image does not differ drastically from that of twentieth-century 
experimental psychology. What distinguishes the Romantics, though, is the 
belief in a creative imagination which elevates the material image and 
transforms it into the aesthetic image. The imagination, here, seems to uproot 
the image from the psychophysiological world and introduce it to the lofty world 
of ideas. The image, in light of this process, is no longer a mere shadowy form; 
it is endowed with meaning – made to stand for something beyond itself. In 
Coleridge’s terms, the image is balanced with the idea. This aesthetic approach 
seems at odds with the accounts of the Beckettian image given by Uhlmann 
and Deleuze in which it was suggested that the ‘true’ Beckettian image is not 
balanced with ideas but detached from them. Here we might return to 
Uhlmann’s contention that Beckett’s images do not come to us ‘more or less 
completely interpreted by being drawn into a stable relation’, but need to be 
‘actively interpreted’. Perhaps this distinction can best be drawn by reference to 
two of the examples I have mentioned above. If we look, firstly, at Shelley’s 
image of the ‘fading coal’ it is clear that the image is a representation of 
something, namely the ‘mind in creation’. The image is, in Uhlmann’s words, 
‘being drawn into a stable relation’ with something else. This representative 
image contrasts with Beckett’s portrayal of the mouth in Not I which left Michael 
Billington with an ‘ineradicable image: an endlessly mobile mouth, rimmed by 
white clown-like makeup pouring out words of agony’. Here the mouth is not 
drawn into a stable relation with anything else but stands on its own for the 
observer to interpret. Where the Romantics are interested in the poetic 
imagination’s balancing of image and idea, Beckett’s image has a being in its 
own right. 
 This point of departure, however, does not mean that Beckett’s approach 
to the image is completely estranged from Romanticism. Points of contact 
remain. Like the Romantics, for example, Beckett is concerned with the potency 
of the image. The significance of Beckett’s images may not come ready-
interpreted like Shelley’s fading coal but Beckett’s works do seem to make the 
claim that the images presented have a significance. As Uhlmann puts it, 
Beckettian presentations of images ‘still involve resonance (the sense that a 
meaningful link exists), even as they refuse relations’ (Uhlmann 2006, 108). To 
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illustrate this, we might contrast Beckett’s approach to the image with those of 
the experimental psychologists discussed above. When Perky asks subjects to 
envision a banana or Kosslyn requests that they scan their image of a cat for 
claws, there is no suggestion that the content of these images has any 
particular significance. The images that are being produced are only a means 
by which to study the process of generating images. Beckett’s images seem to 
have more to them than this. Beckett, I would argue, is frequently concerned 
with the significance that particular images hold for particular subjects and the 
circumstances that inspire these images. This concern is particularly apparent 
in Beckett’s earliest writing. In the critical work Proust (1931), for example, 
Beckett discusses Proust’s portrayal of voluntary and involuntary memory, 
suggesting that, while the former reproduces ‘impressions of the past that were 
consciously and intelligently formed’, the latter restores ‘not merely the past 
object but the Lazarus that it charmed or tortured’ (Beckett 1999, 33). Put 
another way, while voluntary memory allows us to re-experience shadowy 
versions of sensed objects, involuntary memory reconnects us with the past self 
that originally experienced these sensations. The impressions which, Beckett 
suggests, are brought about by voluntary memory seem to resemble the images 
of bananas and cats that are produced in the experiments of Perky and 
Kosslyn. They do not restore past objects themselves (only shadowy versions 
of them) and neither do they hold any significance for the subject producing 
them. Beckett says of voluntary memory: ‘the images it chooses are as arbitrary 
as those chosen by imagination, and are equally remote from reality’ (32). 
Beckett, here, is not denying that we can, through imagination and memory, 
summon up shadowy versions of sensory experience. He is, however, 
suggesting that the role of the artist goes beyond this voluntary process. He is 
interested in the moment of inspiration in which Proust’s narrator is confronted 
with his past through involuntary memory, ‘an unruly magician’ that ‘chooses its 
own time and place for the performance of its miracle’ (33-4). This, for Beckett, 
is observable when ‘the long-forgotten taste of a madeleine steeped in an 
infusion of tea’ stimulates the narrator’s involuntary memory and brings his 
childhood back to him (34). It is this process, Beckett suggests, which enabled 
Proust to produce something of artistic value: his [Proust’s] entire book is a 
monument to involuntary memory’ (34). Beckett is stressing that Proust’s artistic 
creation is more than the voluntary apprehension and description of imagery. 
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The images communicated by Proust’s narrator, it seems, are artistically 
valuable because there is a mysterious process of inspiration behind them and 
they can be seen to hold a personal significance. 
 It is possible to overstate the importance of Beckett’s early discussion of 
voluntary and involuntary memory. After all, it comes in a reading of Proust and, 
as many critics have noted, Beckett’s later work would go on to complicate the 
Proustian models of memory that Beckett outlines in his early critical work.71 
Nevertheless, the idea that artistic creation might be brought about by ‘an unruly 
magician’ that ‘chooses its own time and place for the performance of its 
miracle’ seems to have much in common with the ideas of Romanticism. It 
resonates, for instance, with Shelley’s idea that ‘some invisible influence’ might 
awaken the fading coal of the mind and endow it with a ‘transitory brightness’. In 
both cases, there is a concern with an involuntary moment of artistic inspiration 
which re-invigorates past experience. One might suggest that this point of 
contact between Beckett and Romanticism would serve to distance Beckett’s 
work from the materialistic understandings of mental imagery that were 
emerging in twentieth-century experimental psychology. Again, though, this 
would be an oversimplification. Of course, the statements that art is inspired by 
‘an unruly magician [Beckett’s term]’, ‘some invisible influence [Shelley’s]’ or ‘a 
synthetic and magical power [Coleridge]’ hint at a metaphysical understanding 
of artistic creation which might seem difficult to reconcile with scientific 
psychology. But I would suggest that the attitudes of these authors towards 
artistic inspiration was not so far removed from materialistic understandings of 
the mind as one might initially think. In the cases of Shelley and Coleridge, Alan 
Richardson (2001) has shown that the separation between British Romanticism 
and scientific conceptions of the mind was never total. Rather the attitudes of 
the poets often developed in dialogue with contemporaneous science, 
producing significant – though often fractious – points of relation.72 The 
complexity of this relationship can be seen in the attitudes of Shelley and 
                                                          
71 The extent to which later works such as the Trilogy depart from Proustian ideas about memory has 
been debated. Nicholas Zurbrugg (1987), for example, has argued that Beckett departs from Proustian 
ideas in later works while James H. Reid (2003) has argued for a close relationship. 
72 Richardson states that ‘no account of Romantic subjectivity can be complete without noting how 
contemporary understandings of psychology were either grounded in, deeply marked by, or tacitly 
(when not explicitly) opposed to the brain-based models of mind being developed concurrently in the 
medical sciences’ (Richardson 2001, 2). 
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Coleridge to artistic inspiration. In Shelley’s image, for example, the force that 
stirs the fading coal of the mind does not remain completely ineffable but is 
likened to ‘an inconstant wind’. Though the influence is invisible, Shelley does 
locate it in the physical world. He gestures towards the immaterial without ever 
leaving the material. Perhaps more striking, though, is the case of Coleridge 
and particularly his preface to ‘Kubla Khan’ (1816). Here we get an account of a 
moment of creative inspiration but one that is described in peculiarly 
physiological terms. As Richardson puts it, ‘what Coleridge describes in the 
introductory notice to ‘Kubla Khan’ might be seen as the most spectacular 
psychophysiological experiment of his career’ (Richardson 2001, 47). The 
preface describes Coleridge falling asleep while reading, having taken a 
painkiller (thought to be opium) for a ‘slight indisposition’ (Hill 1978, 147). This 
‘profound sleep’, the passage goes on, lasted for about three hours: 
During which time he [Coleridge] has the most vivid confidence that he 
could not have composed less than from two to three hundred lines […] 
in which all the images rose up before him as things with a parallel 
production of the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or 
consciousness of effort’ (147-8, emphasis in original).  
As Richardson observes, this account questions ‘the relationship between 
mental events and the organic body’ (Richardson 2001, 48). It suggests that 
imaginative composition might be stimulated by particular physical events (in 
this case, a chemically induced sleep). Thus, rather than ‘a synthetic and 
magical power’ (as in Biographia Literaria), poetic composition, here, is seen to 
be inspired by a particular set of psychophysiological circumstances.  
 Beckett, I would suggest, inherited from Romanticism a tendency to 
alternate between understandings of artistic inspiration as a magical and 
mysterious phenomenon on the one hand, and a psychophysiological reaction 
on the other. To return to Proust, this can be seen in the way in which he 
describes the madeleine steeped in tea. For Beckett, as we have seen, Proust’s 
narrator’s story was inspired by involuntary memory but, Beckett continues, 
involuntary memory was itself ‘stimulated or charmed by’ the forgotten taste of 
the madeleine (Beckett 1999, 34). In his description of the madeleine, Beckett 
seems to move between the language of science and that of magic. The 
madeleine becomes both a psychophysiological stimulus and a mysterious 
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charm. This oscillation between the material and the ethereal, the physical and 
the metaphysical, I contend, would continue into Beckett’s later writing, 
particularly when he came to tackle questions of the mental image. Beckett 
frequently makes clear that his images are material entities rooted in particular 
sets of psychophysiological circumstances but, at the same time, the images he 
presents seem to carry with them a mysterious significance. Though Beckett’s 
images seldom hold a self-explanatory meaning, they are rarely portrayed as 
arbitrary or neutral. Rather, particularly in the later work, they seem to hold a 
transfixing power over the protagonists that apprehend them. In light of this, we 
might situate the Beckettian image somewhere between Romanticism and 
experimental psychology. This is a view that has been touched upon in recent 
critical discourse. Steven Connor, for example, has argued that in Beckett’s 
work, the imagination is a faculty that ‘alternates between the visionary 
inheritance of Romanticism and a much more limited, often almost mechanical 
faculty conceived as the power of forming images’ (Connor 2014, 7). ‘For 
Beckett’, Connor continues, ‘imagination is not a spontaneously indwelling and 
upwelling power, but a strenuous and exhausting labour that comes close to the 
ideas of staging, seeing through or putting into practice’ (7). The suggestion that 
Beckett’s work conceives of the imagination ‘as the power of forming images’ 
seems to identify Beckett with the study of imagery that I have described in 
experimental psychology. There is the suggestion, here, that the Beckettian 
subject might ‘stage’ an image in the same way as Kosslyn’s subjects stage 
images of cats. But, as Connor seems to recognise, this is not quite the case. 
The Beckettian imagination is, for Connor, at least intermittently influenced by 
Romanticism. This, though, is where Connor’s argument provokes a question. 
If, as Connor notes, the Beckettian imagination does not have the 
‘spontaneously indwelling and upwelling power’ of the Romantic imagination, 
where can the influence be seen? I argue that it is observable in the emphasis 
Beckett places on the circumstances that inspire mental imagery and the 
mysterious significance of this imagery to the subjects that apprehend it.  
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The (Im)material Image in Nacht und Träume 
 
Beckett’s particular approach to the mental image shows up clearly in the late 
teleplay Nacht und Träume. As Uhlmann observes, the play describes a 
process of ‘image production’ (Uhlmann 2006, 2). It presents a Dreamer (A) 
producing an image of his dreamt self (B) as he sits at a table with his head 
resting on his hands (Beckett 2006, 465). The image, in turn, seems to produce 
images of two hands – L and R – that offer him comfort: mopping his brow, 
offering a cup to his lips and caressing him (465-6). Thus we are presented with 
the peculiar televisual image of a man producing a mental image of a man 
producing mental images.73 In this set-up, Beckett enables the viewer to tell the 
mental images apart from the man that is apprehending them, partly through 
positioning (the images hover above and to the right of A), and more importantly 
through the kindness of the light in which each is presented (465). The dreamer 
is presented, first, in a faint ‘evening light’ that comes from behind him, and then 
(as the images appear) in a ‘minimal’ light (465). The images he produces, on 
the other hand, appear in a ‘kinder’, almost hazy light (465). The difference 
between the lights in which man and image are presented, then, is not one of 
intensity but tone. Both are presented faintly but where A’s light is ‘minimal’, that 
of the images is ‘kind’. Crucial, here, is the point that both dreamer and image 
are made of the same material (they are both –  faintly –  perceived as images 
on a TV screen) but each is presented in a different way. A is seated at floor 
level in a harsh gloom while A, L, and R hover above him in soft focus.  
 This mise-en-scène neatly encapsulates the nuances of Beckett’s 
approach to the image. On the one hand, the portrayal of the image in Nacht 
und Träume resonates with the scientific understandings of imagery that 
developed in the twentieth century. The play invites us to compare the 
experience of perception with that of imagery by presenting a percept (A) and 
an image (B) side-by-side. Both figures are, of course, perceived as part of a 
televisual image but, in the fiction of the play, A is supposed to exist in the 
physical world and B is supposed to exist as mental imagery. However, though 
Beckett marks this distinction by illuminating image and creator in different 
                                                          
73 It should be remembered, here, that the image is being produced in a particular way, through 
dreaming. This is an important point and one I will return to momentarily. 
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types of light, both are presented at a level that makes one strain to apprehend 
them. It is as difficult to make out the figure that is (within the fiction) located in 
the physical world as it is to apprehend the image that is generated by this 
figure. Neither the image nor the percept can be fully made out without a 
straining of the eyes and it is difficult to be sure that one is apprehending either 
fully. Indeed, when I look closely at the figure of A it becomes difficult to adjudge 
what is actually perceptible and what I am filling in with imagery. When I look at 
A’s hand, for example, I see fingers but it is difficult to tell whether those fingers 
are actually visible or whether I am producing images of fingers – and thus 
giving artificial definition to a white blur. To paraphrase Enoch Brater, the more I 
study the images on screen, ‘the more ambiguous they become’ (Brater 1980, 
50). In this way, Beckett follows psychologists such as Perky in scrutinising the 
boundaries between the faintly lit percept and the mental image. Both Beckett 
and Perky are interested in vaguening the material that they present to the 
extent that the image starts to blur with the percept. 
There also seems to be a link between A’s sensory environment and the 
emergence of the image, and this resonates with scientific approaches to 
mental imagery. A’s production of B, it seems, requires minimal lighting and the 
resting of the head on the hands. One might question whether this is really 
surprising – in a sense there is nothing unusual about a man starting to dream 
when he takes a position of rest – but there is something very schematic, 
almost mechanical, about Beckett’s presentation of this moment. The image 
appears almost as soon as A’s head sinks into his hands. And, when the image 
vanishes and the evening light re-appears, the head rises up almost 
immediately. Not only this, but the process is repeated. When the light 
disappears again, A’s head sinks back into the hands, prompting the image to 
return ‘as before’ (466). James Knowlson notes that this repetition seems 
‘almost ritualistic’, but there is, I think, also an element of the stimulus-response 
experiment at work here (Knowlson 1996, 683). As we have seen, Beckett 
came across the behaviourist idea of stimulus-response in his reading of 
Woodworth and the influence of these ideas on Beckett’s work has been 
observed throughout this study. It is also my contention that the influence of 
behaviourism is observable in Beckett’s approach to the mental image. This 
becomes particularly apparent when one places Nacht und Träume alongside 
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the late prose. As we will see in the next chapter, the images that are produced 
in Worstward Ho appear in the stare of a ‘head sunk on crippled hands’ and, in 
Stirrings Still (1989), the protagonist sees ‘himself rise and go’ one night as he 
sits ‘at his table head on hands’ (Beckett 2009a, 84; 107). In Beckett’s work 
from this period, there certainly seems to be a correlation between this 
particular position (in the darkness with head on hands) and the production of 
images. Here we might compare Beckett’s work with the experiments carried 
out by researchers such as Segal and Glicksman, which tested whether 
manipulating an observer’s sensory environment might make them less able to 
distinguish perception from imagery. Beckett, like the experimenters, I would 
suggest, is interested in the ‘hallucinatory, dream-like and simple optic imagery’ 
that ensues when subjects are placed in particular positions. The images that 
are produced by Beckett’s protagonists may have, what James Knowlson calls, 
‘a mysterious quality’ but they are usually seen to be stimulated by, or grounded 
in, the sensory environment (Knowlson 1996, 683). 
There are, then, ways in which we might relate Beckett’s late portrayals 
of image production to the experimental study of mental imagery that developed 
in the twentieth century. However, to read works such as Nacht und Träume 
purely as investigations into the psychophysiological process of image 
production would be slightly reductive. Surely more is going on here. Of course, 
if one is looking for significance in the images that appear, it is easy to find. B is, 
after all, explicitly described as a version of A so it would be difficult to argue 
that the content of the image has no significance for the figure that apprehends 
it. A reading which takes the action of the play at face value, then, might 
conclude that the ritualistic caresses that L and R perform on B fulfil the wishes 
of the lonely A, who sits at a table in darkness. In this way the images might be 
seen, in the words of Ulrika Maude, to present A with ‘a release from physical 
discomfort and suffering’ (Maude 2009, 130). However, as commentators such 
as James Knowlson have pointed out, if this personal story was the focal point 
of the play, the work might seem a little thin and sentimental (Knowlson 1996, 
683). In light of this, many scholars have argued that the play’s power is rooted 
in its formal experimentation. Here, we come back to the argument that Beckett 
was more interested in the psychophysiological process of image production 
than the content of the images. Enoch Brater, for instance, argues that the 
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‘visualization’ of the images ‘not their meaning, were the dramatist's true 
subject’ (Brater 1985, 51). In a similar fashion, Ulrika Maude reads the play as a 
drama of ‘virtuality’, focusing on the process by which the work ‘reproduces or 
doubles the dreamer’s body’ (Maude 2009, 128-9).74 Thus there has been a 
tendency for critics to see the play as a study of process rather than content.  
I would suggest, though, that the content of the play is far from arbitrary. 
The images produced in the action certainly seem to have held personal 
significance for Beckett himself. For example, as James Knowlson notes, the 
presentation of the dreamt hands, was deliberated on extensively:  
Hands had always fascinated Beckett in painting. As a young man he 
had a reproduction of Dürer’s wonderful etching of praying hands 
hanging on the wall of his room at Cooldrinagh. Beckett insisted to Dr 
Müller-Freienfels that “the sex of the hands must remain uncertain. One 
of our numerous teasers”. To me, he said that these “sexless hands” 
“might perhaps be a boy’s hands”. But in the end he concluded: “I think 
no choice but female for the helping hands. Large but female. As more 
conceivably male than male conceivably female” (Knowlson 1996, 682-
3).75 
Knowlson’s account does not suggest that Beckett was purely interested in 
processes of visualisation in Nacht und Träume. Rather, the content of the 
images that are produced in the action of the play seems to have been a major 
concern. It is important to point out, though, that Beckett wanted to endow this 
content with an ill-defined significance. Here we might, once more, use 
Uhlmann’s terms and suggest that the dreamt hands in Nacht und Träume are 
presentations rather than representations (Uhlmann 2008, 53). They do not 
come to us ready-interpreted as the hands of a particular person or even a 
particular gender, but instead are ‘teasers’: concrete entities with particular 
qualities that demand interpretation. The sense that they are not neatly 
representative, then, should not lead to the conclusion that they are arbitrary. 
                                                          
74 Here, Maude reads the play in the context of the late twentieth century and relates Beckett’s interest 
in virtualisation to the development of emerging ‘visualising devices’ such as the electrocardiograph, 
which ‘seemed to reduce the body to a diagram’ (Maude 2009, 128). 
75 Beckett also seems to have been keen to point out the religious significance of the images that are 
produced in the play, telling cameraman Jim Lewis, for example, that the cloth used to mop the head of 
B ‘alluded to the veil that Veronica used to wipe the brow of Jesus on the Way of the Cross’ (Knowlson 
1996, 682). 
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Rather, Beckett presents concrete images that seem to hold a significance 
without defining what this significance is. 
What we might also question, here, are the implications of the fact that B, 
L, and R appear to a dreaming protagonist. Does this heighten, or reduce the 
degree to which the imagery in question is understood to be significant? In my 
view, the dreamt status of the mental images in Nacht und Träume detaches 
them from the mundane and the everyday, and furthers their ill-defined 
significance. One might respond to this with the assertion that dream imagery is 
not necessarily significant – that it is quite capable of being mundane and 
occurring frequently. To this, though, I would argue that Beckett is concerned 
with a particular type of dream. The sense in which the term dream is used in 
the play has been considered by numerous critics and it is frequently argued 
that the dream in question is not of the kind that one might passively experience 
during a good night’s sleep. Instead, a more active, compositional process is 
often mooted. In his reading of the play, for example, Deleuze questions 
whether ‘we are supposed to think that he [A] is asleep’ and answers in the 
negative (Deleuze 1995, 20). Instead, Deleuze argues that the dream in Nacht 
und Träume is that of ‘the exhausted, of the insomniac, of the aboulic’ (21). This 
dream, Deleuze contends, ‘is not like the sleeping dream that fashions itself all 
alone in the depths of desire and the body, it is a dream of the mind that has to 
be made, manufactured’ (21). A similar sentiment is voiced by Franz Michael 
Maier and Angela Moorjani who focus on Beckett’s use of Franz Schubert’s 
1825 Lied (also called Nacht und Träume). In the works of both Beckett and 
Schubert, for Maier and Moorjani, the dream ‘describes a state of vision and 
activity, not a state of passivity and rest’ (Maier and Moorjani 2007, 96). The 
authors also locate this attitude to the dream in the work of Arthur 
Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer, Maier and Moorjani argue:  
Distinguished dreams that are engendered by the physiology of the 
dreamer and do not enlarge his knowledge of the outer world 
(Hallucinationen) from dreams that are perceptions of a special kind 
(Wahrtradume). The latter provide additional objective knowledge to the 
dreaming subject (95).  
For Maier and Moorjani, Beckett is working with Schopenhauer’s conception of 
the dream. They assert that the dream portrayed in Nacht und Träume should 
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be placed in the latter category as ‘a special kind’ of perception. These 
arguments might be supported with reference to the passage in Murphy in 
which the protagonist’s body is described to be in a ‘less precarious abeyance 
than that of sleep, for its own convenience and so that the mind might move’ 
(Beckett 2009c, 71). Beckett, then, showed an interest in a type of bodily 
inactivity that is more stable than that of sleep and enables the subject to 
experience, and partake in, the movements of their own mind. ‘As he lapsed in 
the body’, we are told that Murphy ‘felt himself coming alive in the mind, set free 
to move among its treasures’ (71). 
However, if Nacht und Träume’s mental images are consciously 
experienced, or even manufactured, by the subject, how do they differ from the 
arbitrary images of bananas and cats that subjects were asked to produce in 
the experiments of Perky and Kosslyn? The answer to this question, I would 
argue, lies in the degree to which we can access the intentions of the subjects. 
We know why the subjects of Perky and Kosslyn produce those particular 
mental images; it is because an experimenter has told them to do so. In 
Beckett’s play, by contrast, A exists in the isolation of his dream. We have no 
way of knowing the reasons behind the production of B, L and R, and so the 
images acquire a mysterious significance. There is a sense that A is composing 
mental imagery but we are left with the ineradicable question of why he is 
composing this imagery. In light of this, as well as emerging scientific 
understandings of imagery, I would relate Beckett’s portrayal of image 
production in Nacht und Träume to a Romantic tradition that is perhaps best 
exemplified by Coleridge’s introduction to ‘Kubla Khan’. Both Beckett and 
Coleridge are concerned with a moment of semi-conscious76 inspiration in 
which images rise up before the protagonist in a manner that seems to hold a 
revelatory significance.77 In neither case, though, is it clear why these particular 
images are experienced as significant. Of course there remain crucial 
differences between the two examples. In the preface to ‘Kubla Khan’, for 
                                                          
76 In the case of Coleridge, there is also a question of whether the subject is asleep. The 1816 preface to 
the poem mentions a ‘profound sleep’ but in the “Crewe” manuscript, Coleridge is described to be in ’a 
sort of Reverie’ (Hill 1978, 150). 
77 Repetition is an important indicator of significance here. In Beckett’s play the dream is repeated ‘in 
close-up and slower motion’ and Coleridge is described as having an impulse to repeat the content of his 
vision. ‘On awaking’, we are told, ‘he [Coleridge] appeared to himself to have a distinct recollection of 
the whole and, taking his pen, ink, and paper, instantly and eagerly’ wrote it down (Beckett 2006, 466; 
Hill, 1978, 148). 
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example, the images that rise up are linked to ‘correspondent expressions’ and 
both the images and the expressions are linked to the book that Coleridge has 
been reading (Hill 1978, 147-8). The images encountered by Beckett’s dreamer, 
on the other hand, are not contextualised in such a manner and so their 
significance is much more ambiguous. Nevertheless, Beckett seems to inherit 
from the Romantic period an interest in how the subject experiences imagery as 
significant and, in this way, I think we might well place the Beckettian image in 
between the scientific study of image production and, what Connor calls, ‘the 
visionary inheritance of Romanticism’.  
 The chapters of this section seek to develop the lines of thinking set out 
above. They will proceed with the understanding that Beckett’s work is 
concerned both with the processes by which mental imagery is apprehended 
and the significance of its content. Through readings of Ill Seen Ill Said and 
Worstward Ho, the first chapter will address the question of process, positioning 
Beckett’s approach to the mental image in relation to experimental psychology’s 
identification of image and percept. Taking as its starting point Waller et al.’s 
statement that mental imagery ‘engages many’ – though not all – ‘of the 
psychological structures and processes used in perception’, the chapter will 
address the question of how, in light of this understanding, it should be 
discussed. Can one use the language of perception unproblematically when 
referring to mental imagery, or does it need its own particular vocabulary? By 
bringing Beckett’s work to bear on this question, the chapter hopes to both 
nuance our readings of the Beckettian image and find ways in which Beckett’s 
work might inform ongoing debates around the topic of mental imagery. The 
second chapter will focus more on the revelatory possibilities of the mental 
image, and the conditions by which this revelation might occur. Here I will read 
Beckett’s Company alongside the psychological research on sensory isolation 
that emerged after the Second World War. My central concern, here, is with the 
role that physical isolation played in Beckett’s writing and how this use of 
isolation might be interpreted when one comes to position Beckett’s writing in 
relation to a wider culture. With these chapters, then, I hope to build on the 
conclusions of the first section and, ultimately, find a position from which to 
answer three questions: how Beckett’s work relates to twentieth-century 
experimental psychology; how Beckett’s interest in experimental psychology 
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relates to his other aesthetic and ethical concerns; and how the experimentation 
of Beckett, and that of the experimental psychologist, fit into the larger story of 
modernity. 
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Chapter 5 
Percept and Image in Ill Seen Ill Said and Worstward Ho 
 
We have so far seen that the blurring of boundaries between perception and 
mental imagery has been a major concern in the history of experimental 
psychology. It is important to remember, though, that Western civilization had 
been drawing links between that which is sensed in the external world and that 
which is apprehended in the mind long before the advent of the psychological 
laboratory. This is evident in the common expression in which one claims to 
have seen or heard something in the ‘mind’s eye’ or ear. In English, the visual 
version of this expression goes back as far as Chaucer and, looking back even 
further, one can see the analogy at work in the post-classical Latin phrase 
oculus mentis, which is found in British sources from the 8th century.78 Earlier 
writers can also be seen playing with this analogy, drawing attention to those 
vague moments in which the distinction between the percept and the image 
becomes difficult to draw. Perhaps the most famous example of this can be 
found in the second scene of Shakespeare’s Hamlet (1603) when Hamlet and 
Horatio describe their sightings of Hamlet’s (recently deceased) father: 
HAMLET: 
Thrift, thrift, Horatio! the funeral baked meats 
Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables. 
Would I had met my dearest foe in heaven 
Or ever I had seen that day, Horatio! 
My father! – methinks I see my father. 
HORATIO: 
Where, my lord? 
HAMLET: 
In my mind's eye, Horatio. 
                                                          
78 The auditory version of this expression, the mind’s ear’, has a shorter history, the earliest known use 
being in the early eighteenth century (OED Online s.v. ‘mind’, accessed November 22, 2016, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/118732?rskey=ItR8Yj&result=1&isAdvanced=true#eid36945177) 
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HORATIO: 
I saw him once; he was a goodly king. 
HAMLET: 
He was a man, take him for all in all, 
I shall not look upon his like again. 
HORATIO: 
My lord, I think I saw him yesternight. 
HAMLET: 
Saw? who? 
HORATIO: 
My lord, the king your father. 
HAMLET: 
The king my father! (Shakespeare 2015, 33) 
One of the many striking things about this passage is the sheer variety of ways 
in which Hamlet’s father, is said to be seen or looked upon. Not only are there 
descriptions of both imagistic and perceptual sightings in the past and present 
(Hamlet’s seeing the king in his ‘mind’s eye’ and Horatio’s seeing him ‘once’ in 
the distant past as ‘a goodly king’), but there are also variations in the certainty 
with which the sightings are described. Horatio can say with certainty that he 
saw the king ‘once’ but only thinks that he ‘saw him yesternight’. Similarly, 
Hamlet seems to move from certainty to doubt in a single line as he looks upon 
the image of his father: ‘My father! – methinks I see my father’. More salient, of 
course, is the point that, while both Horatio and Hamlet claim to have seen the 
king after his death, only Hamlet can locate the sighting in the mind’s eye. 
Horatio thinks he has seen Hamlet’s father (who he knows to be dead) out in 
the physical world. Horatio, though, does not quite believe his own eyes.79 
Thus, when he describes the movements of the king he uses the pronoun ‘it’ 
rather than ‘he’, suggesting that he was not looking at the king himself but some 
shadowy version: 
                                                          
79 The ghost has been explicitly referred to as an image earlier in the play when Horatio initially sees the 
ghost with Marcellus and Bernado (13). 
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HORATIO: 
It lifted up its head and did address 
Itself to motion, like as it would speak; 
But even then the morning cock crew loud, 
And at the sound it shrunk in haste away 
And vanish'd from our sight (33).   
The overall effect of this exchange is one of flux and uncertainty. The king is 
continually being seen but there is a constant fluctuation, both with regards to 
what he is seen as – now an image, now a percept, now a supernatural being – 
and the certainty with which this classification is made. Shakespeare is allowing 
apprehensions of the king to flicker between the material and the immaterial 
and, in doing so, interrogating the distinction between perceptual, imagistic and 
supernatural experience.  
There is a danger, here, in overemphasising Shakespeare’s interest in 
the classification of experience. It seems likely that Shakespeare’s interest in 
the possibility of confusing percept and image lay in its dramatic potential (and 
in the phenomenon’s relevance to contemporaneous debates around the 
supernatural).80 The uncertainty surrounding Horatio and Hamlet’s sightings of 
the ghost, I would argue, is an example of Shakespeare’s penchant for what 
Stephen Greenblatt has called ‘strategic opacity’ (Greenblatt 2004, 324). For 
Greenblatt, by creating a sense of uncertainty around the action of his later 
plays, Shakespeare found that he could release ‘an enormous energy’ in his 
audience ‘that had been at least partially blocked or contained by familiar, 
reassuring explanations’ (323-4). Shakespeare, then, might be seen to use the 
occasional continuities between perceptual and imagistic experience for his own 
aesthetic purposes. As an artist, Shakespeare is not alone in this respect. In a 
mid-twentieth-century survey of approaches to mental imagery, the psychologist 
Alan Richardson observes that artists have ‘usually been particularly sensitive 
to the fragile and fluctuating boundary between fantasy and reality’ (Richardson 
                                                          
80 Some recent criticism has argued that Hamlet shows Shakespeare’s interest in the process of 
perception. Raphael Lyne, for example, reads ‘the second ghost scene in Hamlet as an experiment in 
social cognition’ (Lyne 2014, 79). However, as Lyne acknowledges, much more criticism has focused on 
the element of the supernatural and how Shakespeare is working within a tradition in which the ‘theatre 
is a medium for explicit questioning about the existence of ghosts’ (91). 
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1969, 1). ‘The rest of us’ Richardson continues, ‘have muddled through and felt 
that our personal survival was proof enough that we could make the distinction 
when it really counted’ (1). There is the sense, here, that humanity’s occasional 
difficulty in telling the image apart from the percept has, historically, been 
viewed as a slightly lofty topic, suitable for the stage, page or ivory tower but of 
little practical interest to the majority.  
However, as the tense of Richardson’s statement seems to imply, this 
begins to change in the nineteenth century, and the change becomes 
particularly noticeable in the mid-twentieth century. In this period, the human 
subject’s capacity to tell fantasy from reality, percept from image, becomes a 
much more pressing concern. We might return to Jonathan Crary’s observation 
that, from the late nineteenth century, the concept of inattention ‘began to be 
treated as a danger and a serious problem’ (Crary 1999, 23). A similar process 
occurs from the early nineteenth century with regards to the mistaking of image 
for percept. This is particularly evident in medical discourse. In 1817, for 
example, the psychiatrist Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol introduced the term 
‘hallucination’ – the sense of perceiving something which is not observable in 
the external world (McCarthy-Jones 2012, 61). And going forward to 1911, 
Eugen Bleuler placed hallucinations in the symptom cluster we still call 
‘schizophrenia’ (Heinrichs 2001, 53). Nineteenth century psychiatry undoubtedly 
placed a huge emphasis on the physiology of the brain,81  but there was also an 
interest in the role of personal circumstance. Here, the influence of 
psychoanalysis undoubtedly changed attitudes. Bleuler, for example was an 
admirer of Freud and partly through this influence, came to emphasise the 
psychological underpinnings of hallucinations. Bleuler argued, for example, that 
the voices heard by schizophrenics commonly express the ‘thoughts, fears and 
drives’ of the individual hearing them and the symptom is likely ‘precipitated by 
psychic occurrences’ (Bleuler 1950, 388-9). Furthermore, Bleuler suggested 
that a voice might come to one by way of some kind of personal crisis: the 
symptoms of schizophrenia, he argued, were likely ‘the expression of a more or 
less unsuccessful attempt to find a way out of an intolerable situation’ (460). 
The failure to distinguish percept and image was viewed as a pathological 
                                                          
81 The Italian psychiatrist Augusto Tamburini, for example, identified particular parts of the brain that he 
thought were responsible for hallucinations (McCarthy-Jones 2012, 69). 
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symptom and numerous psychiatrists and psychotherapists strove to find the 
underlying causes. 
Beyond models of pathology, though, certain sociological developments 
seemed to draw increased attention to the fluctuating boundaries between 
image and percept. For a reflection on this idea, we might look to a 1964 article 
by the American psychologist Robert R. Holt, which questioned why the mid-
twentieth century had seen a revival of interest in mental imagery within 
psychology. For Holt, in spite of the doctrines of behaviourism (which, as 
discussed in previous chapters, made the topic of mental imagery something of 
a taboo), twentieth-century psychologists had been forced to return to the topic 
of mental imagery for a variety of theoretical and socio-economic reasons. For 
example, Holt suggests that the mistaking of image for reality had long been 
treated as an ‘exclusively pathological manifestation’ (Holt 1964, 263). But at 
the moment in which he writes, Holt argues, ‘it is being rediscovered that 
normal, prosaic folk, and not just psychotics, can hallucinate, given the right 
circumstances’ (263) This, he argues, can partly be attributed to the 
commencement of new kinds of occupation: 
Radar operators who have to monitor a scope for long periods; long-
distance truck drivers in night runs over turnpikes, but also other victims 
of "highway hypnosis"; jet pilots flying straight and level at high altitudes; 
operators of snowcats and other such vehicles of polar exploration, when 
surrounded by snowstorms—all of these persons have been troubled by 
the emergence into consciousness of vivid imagery, largely visual but 
often kinesthetic or auditory, which they may take momentarily for reality 
(Holt 1964, 257). 
Developments in society, for Holt, have created scenarios in which an 
increasing number of people are asked to operate technology for long periods 
of time. These scenarios require subjects to perceive or respond to minimal 
sensory material and this lack of sensory input causes them to produce imagery 
in a way that has the potential to cause ‘serious accidents’ (257). Thus, for Holt, 
one of the reasons that psychology is required to investigate mental imagery 
lies in an economic need for humans to be able to perform these duties without 
losing their grip on reality.  
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Additionally, Holt points to the political atrocities of the twentieth century 
and the emergence of ‘a series of first-hand accounts of persons who have 
been imprisoned in concentration camps and interrogated by the secret police 
of totalitarian regimes’ (257):  
A recurrent theme in such stories is what one former captive called “the 
famous cinema of prisoners”: pseudohallucinatory imagery brought on by 
prolonged isolation, sleep deprivation, and the multiple regressive 
pressures of forcible indoctrination or thought reform (257).82 
What seems to be at issue, here, is a combination of the material and the 
personal. On the one hand, there is the sense that particular physiological 
situations produce moments in which one fails to distinguish between image 
and percept. Here we might point to the reduced levels of sensory stimulation 
experienced by the long-distance truck driver or the prisoner. On the other, 
looking again to the prisoner but also to Bleuler’s idea that the hallucination 
might derive from an ‘intolerable situation’, there is the sense that personal 
duress is a major trigger. Thus it is Holt’s argument that the twentieth century is 
producing more of these situations – more experiences in which the boundaries 
between perception and imagery seem to blur – and so there is a greater 
number of ‘customers looking for psychological help’ on these topics (263).  
This seems to me a reasonable hypothesis but there are a couple of 
aspects of Holt’s argument that need to be made clear. First it is important to 
mark the distinction between the experiences themselves and their penetration 
into public discourse. Imprisonment and solitary confinement are, of course, by 
no means exclusive to the twentieth century. Criminologist Peter Scharff Smith 
suggests that use of solitary confinement may be traced back to the middle 
ages and the inquisitional mode of imprisonment known as murus strictus 
(Smith 2006, 441).83 And modern use dates back to the popularisation of the 
Pennsylvania model of incarceration in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Here, isolation was supposed to prompt inmates to ‘turn their 
thoughts inward, to meet God, to repent of their crimes, and eventually to return 
                                                          
82 Holt also relates the upsurge in interest in mental imagery to popular interest in hallucinogenic drugs 
and the ‘great to-do about flying saucers or Unidentified Flying Objects’ (257-8). 
83 Here, penitent heretics were confined to narrow single-person cells and frequently chained to the 
walls (Haskins 1902, 647; Peters 1998, 26). 
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to society as morally cleansed Christian citizens’ (Smith 2008, 1049).84 Earlier 
centuries, then, produced environments in which one might expect ‘the famous 
cinema of prisoners’ to emerge. Indeed, Smith notes that numerous nineteenth-
century scientific studies investigated the effects of the Pennsylvania model on 
prisoners, and hallucinations were commonly reported (Smith 2006, 466).  
However, within the discourses of earlier periods there was less focus on the 
idea that the material circumstances of isolation could cause hallucinations. In 
the religious environment of the middle ages metaphysical explanations were, 
unsurprisingly, common, and in the nineteenth century the effects of isolation 
were frequently explained through racial theory or ideas of degeneration (Kroll 
and Bachrach 1982, 41; Smith 2006, 458; Smith 2008, 1060). Crucial, then, 
were the decline of metaphysical and degenerative theories and an increased 
acceptance that a set of psychophysiological circumstances could trigger a 
blurring of percept and image, fantasy and reality. Equally, I would suggest that 
the advance of technological stimulation from the late nineteenth century 
onwards made the concept of under-stimulation a much more pressing concern. 
It is unlikely that more people were being exposed to darkness and silence in a 
modern world of increased mechanical noise and artificial light. Rather, I would 
suggest that the advance of modernity made the effects of darkness and silence 
seem novel and worth researching. Finally, it should be noted that among Holt’s 
‘customers’ looking for ‘psychological help’ with regards to the effects of solitary 
confinement and sensory deprivation seem to have been a number of Western 
governments. In the Cold-War and post-911 eras, a military demand for 
‘potentially effective interrogation techniques’ prompted a large amount of 
research on techniques such as hypnosis, isolation and extreme sensory 
deprivation (Soldz 2008, 593-5). Indeed, much of the research carried out on 
sensory deprivation was funded, indirectly, by the United States’ Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Raz, 2013, 382-3).85 Thus, new understandings of 
                                                          
84 The influence of the Pennsylvania system can still be seen in contemporary penal systems. For 
example, the ‘supermax’ prisons that are now found across the world employ many of the same 
methods (Jewkes 2015, 20). 
85 This relationship between experimental psychology and psychological torture is deeply troubling and 
the American Psychological Association’s role in the acts of ‘enhanced interrogation’ performed at 
Guantanamo Bay remains the subject of much controversy and anger (see, for example, Kory 2016). I 
will consider experimental psychology’s investigation of isolation and sensory deprivation in more detail 
in the next chapter. Here, though, I merely want to advance the historical argument that military 
demands are likely to have shaped twentieth-century psychology’s approach to mental imagery. 
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the relationship between imagery and perception are likely to have been 
shaped, in part, by post-Second World War military policy. Overall, though, I 
think Holt’s point stands. The social developments of the twentieth century did 
seem to intensify Western civilization’s long standing interest in the ‘difference 
between the nature of images and imaging on the one hand, and the nature of 
percepts and perceiving on the other’ (Richardson 1969, 2).  
 This chapter will argue that, for a variety of reasons, the work of Samuel 
Beckett (and in particular his post-war prose) should be seen in this context. In 
one sense, it will view Beckett as an artist in the tradition of Shakespeare, 
interested in the aesthetic effects that can be derived from drawing attention to 
(in Richardson’s words) the ‘fragile and fluctuating boundary between fantasy 
and reality’. Anthony Uhlmann has picked up on this. Drawing on Greenblatt’s 
reading of Shakespeare, he suggests that Beckett is part of a long artistic 
tradition that presents objects which resist classification. This tradition, for 
Uhlmann, is concerned with the powerful affects that can be derived when one 
occludes key details about an object, ‘rather than attempting to represent the 
essential components’ (Uhlmann 2008, 105). Thus, Beckett’s interest in the 
continuities between perception and mental imagery can, in one way, be seen 
as part of an aesthetic strategy. Particularly in the later works, Beckett 
frequently refuses to define particular figures and objects as either perceptual or 
imagistic. Instead he seems interested in the powerful affects that are located in 
between the two categories.  
However, there is also a sense in which the chapter will view Beckett as 
a citizen of the twentieth century, suggesting that he was very much embedded 
in the period’s changing attitude towards mental imagery. Evidence for this can 
be found in in the books that Beckett read and the books that he wrote. With 
regards to his reading, Beckett showed an interest in twentieth-century 
theoretical debates around the distinction between the percept and the image. 
Dirk Van Hulle and Mark Nixon, for example, note that Beckett possessed a 
copy of Jean Paul Sartre’s L’Imagination (1936) in which Sartre addresses 
psychology’s tendency to undermine the distinction between image and percept 
(Van Hulle and Nixon 2013, 167). Sartre himself was highly dubious about this 
tendency. He writes: ‘If I examine myself without prejudice, I will realize that I 
spontaneously make the distinction between existence as thing and existence 
177 
 
as image’ (Sartre 2012, 5). ‘Whether or not their evocations are voluntary’, 
Sartre continues, ‘images give themselves, at the very moment they appear as 
something other than presences. I am never mistaken about this’ (5). Indeed, 
Sartre suggests that psychology has created a confusion on this matter where 
none should exist, arguing that ‘someone who had never studied psychology’ 
would be ‘greatly surprised’ if asked: ‘do you sometimes confuse the image of 
your brother with his real presence (5)?  Sartre, then, argued for the integrity of 
the boundary between image and percept. Regardless of the position it takes, 
though, L’Imagination offers a summary of how the relationship between image 
and percept had been theorised in Western philosophy and psychology up until 
the 1930s (covering a wide range of writers from Descartes to Edward 
Titchener). The work, then, would have given Beckett an early grounding in the 
theoretical approaches that had been taken to the image. 
In terms of his own writing, Beckett’s literary work betrays an interest in 
the ‘pseudohallucinatory imagery’ that, as Holt notes, is frequently ‘brought on 
by prolonged isolation or inactivity’. In the novella The End, for example, 
Beckett produces what Ulrika Maude calls an ‘experiment into detached and 
autonomous forms of subjectivity through a form of sensory deprivation’ (Maude 
2009, 39). Here, the narrator lies flat on his back in a disused boat covered by a 
lid, seeing ‘nothing except, dimly, just above my head, through the tiny chinks, 
the grey light of the shed’ (Beckett 2000, 28). This state seems to bring on a 
peculiar experience of imagery: 
Enough, enough, the next thing I was having visions, I who never did, 
except sometimes in my sleep, who never had real visions, I’d remember 
except perhaps as a child, my myth will have it so. I knew they were 
visions because it was night and I was alone in my boat. What else could 
they have been (30)?  
The narrator, here, is able to maintain the distinction between ‘real visions’ and 
reality, reasoning that he knew the things he was experiencing ‘were visions’ 
because he still felt his self to be alone in his boat. Nevertheless, in the final 
question (‘what else could they have been?’), there is the sense of a cognitive 
debate over how the experience should be classified. The narrator also 
questions why, at this point in time, he was having ‘real visions’ when he does 
not remember having done so before. Beckett, here, seems to hint that a recent 
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occurrence in the narrator’s life has caused him to have ‘real visions’ but this 
hint, is invalidated as soon as uttered. The novelty of the visions is brought into 
question even as the narrator suggests that the visions are novel: ‘I was having 
visions, I who never did, except sometimes in my sleep, who never had real 
visions’. It is, of course, tempting to read this passage biographically and 
suggest that, like his narrator, Beckett was wrestling with the question of how to 
categorise and evaluate personal experiences of ‘real visions’. However, rather 
than arguing for an identification between Beckett’s own experience and that of 
his narrator, I merely want to point out that two concerns begin to emerge in 
Beckett’s post-war writing. First, there is a growing interest in moments in which 
the boundaries between perception and imagery seem to blur and, second, 
there is an engagement with the question of how to categorize or denominate 
these experiences.  
 From all this, it seems reasonable to conclude that, by the late twentieth 
century, Beckett had a fairly well established interest in the ways in which the 
boundaries between perception and imagery might be blurred. His early reading 
shows an interest how the relationship between image and percept had been 
theorised and this interest can be seen to carry into his aesthetic experiments. It 
is my contention that, in his late prose, Beckett would develop these interests 
further, conducting a sustained investigation into the nature of mental imagery 
while using the questionable status of the mental image to produce powerful 
moments of opacity in his creative writing. There are definite points of contact 
between Beckett’s work and the psychological discipline – even though Beckett 
is working to slightly different ends. To demonstrate these points of comparison 
and contrast, we might read the opening of Holt’s article on mental imagery 
alongside the opening of Beckett’s late prose work, Company. Holt:   
Consider the situation of a man whom I shall call “S”. He is lying on a bed 
alone, in almost complete darkness and silence. There is nothing to see, 
hear, taste, smell, or do. But as he lies with eyes closed, he sees a good 
deal more than darkness. He begins to notice vague luminous patterns 
appearing before him, in intricate geometrical design, fading, brightening, 
coming, and going. Suddenly, a face emerges from this background with 
startling clarity, only to be replaced an instant later by an animal's head. 
Dreamily, S watches the succession of pictures that emerge before him, 
179 
 
growing gradually more vivid, complex, and thematic. Soon he has lost 
touch with external reality, being instead completely involved with these 
illusory phantoms of the dark (Holt 1964, 254). 
Beckett: 
A voice comes to one in the dark, Imagine. 
To one on his back in the dark. This he can tell by the pressure on 
his hind parts and by how the dark changes when he shuts his eyes and 
again when he opens them again. Only a small part of what is said can 
be verified. As, for example, when he hears, You are on your back in the 
dark. Then he must acknowledge the truth of what is said. But by far the 
greater part of what is said cannot be verified (Beckett 2009a, 3). 
In both of these passages, a narrator gives us the imperative to construct a 
scene in which a man lies in the dark, seeing and hearing things that might be 
perceptual or imagistic. Each passage, then, can be seen as a kind of prose 
experiment investigating the capacity to imagine an experience in which the 
boundaries between perceptual and imagistic material is troubled. This, though, 
is where points of contrast start to emerge. Holt’s narrator tells us that the 
apprehended material is definitely imagistic – that the man ‘has lost touch with 
external reality, being instead completely involved with these illusory phantoms 
of the dark’. Thus we are given an objective picture of what has occurred and 
asked to make a judgement on it: ‘You are a psychologist; here are your data; 
what do you make of this kind of report’ (Holt 1964, 254)? Beckett, by contrast, 
never gives us this full a picture. Instead we are left with an account of the 
protagonist’s perspective. Moreover, the protagonist is concerned not with the 
question of whether the voice is a percept or an image, but whether the 
statements it makes are factual. We are told to imagine the voice, but the voice 
is never classified as an image or a percept. Thus, where the psychologist gives 
out the data, Beckett leaves us to imagine the experience in its full opacity. 
However, in spite of these differences, the passages are comparable insofar as 
they investigate the questions of how far the image is distinct from the percept, 
and the ways in which this distinction might be conceived and expressed. The 
remainder of this chapter will be concerned with this investigation. First, through 
readings of psychological experiments conducted by Chevez Perky and 
Stephen Kosslyn (as well as philosophical critiques by Sartre, Gilbert Ryle and 
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Zenon Pylyshyn), it will outline the scientific and theoretical debates that 
occurred on this topic in the twentieth century. Then, through readings of Ill 
Seen Ill Said and Worstward Ho, it will position Beckett’s work in relation to 
these debates: considering how the debates around imagery might nuance our 
understanding of Beckett’s work, and how Beckett’s work strives to produce a 
vocabulary with which to discuss mental imagery. 
 
Wording the Image: Theoretical Debates 
 
When, in the above-discussed passage, Hamlet tells Horatio that he thinks he 
sees his father, some confusion ensues. Having recently seen the ‘image’ of 
Hamlet’s deceased father out in the world, Horatio initially presumes Hamlet to 
be having the same experience. But Hamlet’s words have misled Horatio. The 
father that Hamlet sees is not out in the world but in his ‘mind’s eye’. Hamlet is 
able to say that he sees his father while, at the same time, holding that ‘I shall 
not look upon his like again’ (Shakespeare 2015, 33). He can say that he sees 
his father without really seeing him and this creates a misunderstanding. There 
are a number of ways in which we might analyse this situation. We might take 
the passage to exemplify a flaw in language, pointing, for instance, to the fact 
that the same signifier – ‘methinks I see my father’ – can be used to signify two 
distinct experiences. Or, we might suggest that Hamlet’s failure to verbally 
distinguish the two experiences is rooted in the nature of the experiences 
themselves – that the distinction between perceptual and imagistic experience 
is not always pronounced. In one analysis we are concerned with the nature of 
Hamlet’s experience, and in the other we are concerned with the words that he 
uses to describe it. Though I will move away from the case of Hamlet, the 
remainder of this chapter will be concerned with both of these analyses. All the 
authors I will look at in what follows are concerned both with what is happening 
when one sees something in the ‘mind’s eye’ and with the words that we use to 
talk about it. In this way, they can all be seen as part of a sustained 
reconceptualization of the image in twentieth-century Western culture. 
 Though (as was noted in the last chapter) the concepts of imagination 
and imagery were of concern to many writers in the 1800s, there was a feeling 
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in early twentieth-century psychology that these terms had been defined with 
insufficient rigour. This can be seen at the beginning of Chevez Perky’s 
experimental study of the imagination. Perky acknowledges that ‘the word 
imagination and its cognate forms are familiar both in everyday speech and the 
technical language of psychology’ but suggests that there is little agreement in 
what ‘experiences’ are ‘denominated’ when these terms are used (Perky 1910, 
422-3). For example, it is noted that within psychology there is a general 
consensus that the imagination must be concerned with images ‘but opinion 
differs on what constitutes an image’ (426). Perky’s problem, here, is not so 
much that there have not been important findings regarding the nature of 
imagination and imagery, but that this study has not been ordered in a way that 
gives the topic a ‘distinctive mark or marks of a reliable kind’ (427). Psychology, 
for Perky, is lacking a vocabulary with which to discuss the topics of imagery 
and the imagination. Perky’s experimental study, then, aimed to produce more 
concrete understandings of imagination and imagery by defining these concepts 
in relation to other psychological phenomena. 
 Though unable to give a satisfactory account of what was meant by the 
word ‘image’, Perky certainly seems to have had a pretty clear idea of the 
nature of the image and how it was experienced. The first experiment of her 
study – ‘A Comparison of Perception with the Image of Imagination’ – showed 
that, for Perky, the mental image (or image of imagination) is distinguished by a 
number of qualities. In this experiment (as already mentioned) Perky attempted 
to ‘build up a perceptual consciousness under conditions which should seem to 
the observer to be those of the formation of an imaginative consciousness’ 
(428). There is the implication, here, that the experimenters know what an 
‘imaginative consciousness’ is like and can replicate it by manipulating the 
perceptual world. Though I discussed the findings of Perky’s experiment in the 
last chapter, it might be useful here to give a more thorough account of her 
method. The way in which Perky attempted to produce the required effect 
showed a creativity that borders on the artistic. She attempted to imitate images 
by making use of a dark room that was helpfully placed at the centre of the 
Cornell Laboratory (428). This dark room had a window that looked out onto the 
main laboratory room and it is in this window that Perky would present the 
objects that participants were being told to imagine (429). This window was 
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dressed in such a way as to give the object (what Perky adjudged to be) 
imagistic qualities. For example, she put tissue paper in the window and shone 
a faint light of a colour matching the colour of the object that was to be imagined 
(428-9). Thus, when an observer was to imagine a banana, the window would 
be endowed with a slight yellow colour. It was important to Perky that this would 
not be suggestive of light: ‘the open square should appear just noticeably 
colored, without there being any such glow or shine upon the glass as could 
suggest the presence of a source of light behind it’ (429). Also, she attempted to 
‘soften’ the edges of the forms and worked to produce an effect in which the 
forms would ‘oscillate or flicker into view’ (430). Thus, in the experiment, 
subjects were asked to imagine: a tomato, a book, a banana, an orange, a leaf, 
and a lemon (429). But, as they were asked to imagine each object, a faintly 
coloured, flickering, blurry version of this object would appear in front of them. 
The experiment’s question was whether these shadowy perceived forms would 
be mistaken for images of imagination. In Perky’s hypothesis, then, the image is 
a faintly coloured, flickering and blurry thing but, apart from these qualities, it is 
essentially experienced in the same way as a percept.  
 The results, to some extent, validated this hypothesis. Perky drew the 
conclusion that the perceived forms were passing as imagined forms: ‘we find, 
in brief, that a visual perception of distinctly supraliminal value may, and under 
our conditions does, pass – even with specially trained observers – for an 
image of imagination’ (433). However, this overarching conclusion is perhaps 
less informative than the specific accounts that were given by the observers. 
From the reactions described by Perky, it does not seem that the observers 
identified the objects as images with any certainty. Instead, more often than not, 
the experiences described seemed to be novel and difficult to categorise. There 
was a tendency to indicate that the images were somehow different from those 
of the imagination, but this was often put down to the novelty of the conscious 
attempt to imagine. When asked whether they had ever had a similar 
imaginative experience, a subject would ‘usually reply that he could not 
remember that he had; but then, he had never tried’ (431). On a similar note, 
one subject with ‘extended practice in the observation of images is described to 
have been ‘confused’: ‘at first he thought the figures imaginary; then he 
speculated whether they might not be after-images of some sort, or akin to 
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after-images’ (432-3). Finally, the passage goes on, he defined the images as 
such:  
It seems like a perception, though the attention is more active than in 
perception; yet I feel sure that it is there, and that I did not make it; it is 
more permanent and distinct than an image (433).  
Perky suggests that this observer’s eventual detection of ‘permanence and 
distinctness’ in the form was ‘unluckily, due to faulty technique’ in the 
presentation, but I would argue that this observer’s comments are indicative of a 
general trend in the responses. The objects, it seems, were often experienced 
as a novel form somewhere between the percept and the image. This has been 
observed by Segal and Nathan (1964) in their replications of the Perky 
experiment. The experiments show, they argue, that ‘there is a region of 
experience where the distinction between self-initiated imagery and the 
perception of an external event is uncertain’ (Segal and Nathan 1964, 385). 
Perky’s experiment, then, effects a blurring of the boundaries between image 
and percept but does not permit us to identify the former with the latter. 
 Via Edward Titchener’s Text-book of Psychology (1910), the findings of 
Perky’s experiment came to the attention of a very sceptical Jean Paul Sartre. 
In The Imaginary (1940), Sartre alludes to Perky’s experiment when stating that 
several ‘absurd experiments have been conducted to show that the image has a 
sensory content’ (Sartre 2010, 52).86 These experiments, Sartre argues, ‘would 
make sense only if the image were a weak perception. But it is given as image’ 
(52, emphasis in original). Sartre’s critique seems to oscillate between tackling 
the questions of what the mental image is and how it is experienced. For Sartre, 
the idea that a mental image ‘has a sensory content’ is absurd because the 
content of a mental image ‘has no externality’ (52). By this he seems to mean 
that a mental image cannot have a sensory content as it does not produce 
effects on the outside world. Thus, when one claims to see a mental image, one 
is not truly seeing it because it is not out there to be seen. For Sartre, ‘one sees 
a portrait, a caricature, a spot: one does not see a mental image’ (51, emphasis 
in original). He draws a clear ontological distinction between the image and the 
percept. However, Perky’s experiment itself never argues that the mental image 
                                                          
86 Sartre never directly refers to Perky but quotes Titchener’s account of her experiment. 
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is a perception but merely concludes that, given particular conditions, an object 
of perception can pass for an image of imagination. She is not denying that 
there is an ontological distinction between image and percept. Instead her 
argument is phenomenological; she is arguing that, on occasion, both image 
and percept can produce a similar experience.  
Sartre, though, does not accept this phenomenological contention. He 
has held from the beginning of The Imaginary that mental images ‘present 
themselves to reflection with certain marks, certain characteristics that 
immediately determine the judgement: “I have an image”’ (4). In this line of 
thought, the image has a fixed ‘essence’ which means it cannot be mistaken for 
a percept (4, emphasis in original). A large part of this ‘essence’ is linked to the 
image’s apparent detachment from the sensory world. ‘To see an object’, Sartre 
argues, ‘is to localize it in space, between this table and that carpet, at a certain 
height on my right or on my left’ (52).  This process of localization, he goes on, 
does not apply when one is apprehending an image: ‘my mental images do not 
mix with the objects that surround me’ (52). This process of localization is 
crucial because Sartre grants that, in certain cases, the image can begin to 
resemble the percept. For example, Sartre notes that hypanagogic images87 
can take on the ‘features of objectivity, clarity, independence, richness, 
externality, which are never possessed by the mental image and which are 
ordinarily characteristic of perception’ (37). But even in this case Sartre 
maintains that the image is not mistaken for a percept because ‘it is not 
localized, it is not anywhere, does not occupy any place among other objects, it 
simply stands out on a vague ground’ (37). A large part of the ‘essence’ of 
Sartre’s image, then, can be found in the ‘vague ground’ on which it is seen to 
reside. What is notable about Perky’s experiment, though, is the degree to 
which it sought to present the image on this ‘vague ground’. Like the images 
that Deleuze recognises in Beckett’s work, the objects of Perky experiments 
were presented in a kind of ‘any-space-whatever’; a faintly lit window, dressed 
with tissue paper in the centre of a laboratory (Deleuze 1995, 10). Perky’s 
perceptual objects, then, seem to capture a large part of what Sartre calls the 
‘essence’ of the image, so it is not absurd to think that they might be 
                                                          
87 The imagery experienced just before one goes to sleep. 
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experienced as images. An ontological distinction does not preclude a 
phenomenological overlap. 
This, combination of ontological distinction and phenomenological 
overlap raises a question of language that has troubled numerous philosophers. 
One might understand the percept and the image to be distinct entities but still 
speak of them using the same terms. We have already noted, for example, that 
the term ‘see’ in Hamlet is used to refer to both perceptions and images of 
Hamlet’s father. Gilbert Ryle takes up this point in The Concept of Mind (1949). 
Ryle argues that ‘to see is one thing’ and to ‘picture or visualise is another’, but 
questions how this difference is articulated (Ryle 2009, 223). For Ryle, the 
linguistic problem is not so much the one that plays out in Hamlet in which we 
are momentarily not sure whether Hamlet is claiming to see his father in the 
world or his mind’s eye. Instead, Ryle’s concern is with the very notion of a 
‘mind’s eye’ – the notion of a place in which mental images are said to exist: 
The crucial problem is that of describing what is “seen in the mind’s eye” 
and what is “heard in one’s head”. What are spoken of as “visual 
images”, “mental pictures”, “auditory images” and, in one use, “ideas” are 
commonly taken to be entities which are genuinely found existing and 
found existing elsewhere than in the external world. So minds are 
nominated for their theatres (222). 
Ryle’s, here, is not denying that the perceptual language that is commonly used 
to describe imagery reflects a phenomenological overlap. Nor is he suggesting 
that the concept of visualising or picturing is not ‘a proper and useful concept’ 
(225). He is, however, concerned that this way of using language has created a 
‘tendency among theorists and laymen alike to ascribe some sort of an 
otherworldly reality to the imaginary and then to treat minds as the clandestine 
habitats of such fleshless beings’ (222). The linguistic problem then, for Ryle, 
lies in acknowledging the phenomenological overlap between perception and 
imagery without implying that the image exists in a private world that parallels 
that of the perceptible.88 This problem, for Ryle, produces a kind of linguistic 
                                                          
88 Ryle’s critique reads interestingly alongside the passage from Murphy in which Beckett’s protagonist is 
seen to explore the ‘private world’ of his mind (Beckett 2009c, 71-2). Though this space is defined as a 
‘world’, there is an attempt in Murphy to distinguish it from the physical world. The passage may be 
seen to represent the type of Cartesian dualism that Ryle rails against. But, as Dirk Van Hulle argues, it 
may also be seen as a parody of Descartes’ distinction between mind and body (Van Hulle 2014, 207). 
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strain. He observes that people express both the phenomenological overlap and 
the ontological difference between perceiving and imaging ‘by writing that, 
whereas they see trees and hear music, they only “see” in inverted commas, 
and “hear” the objects of recollection and imagination’ (223). Thus, in order to 
describe a process in which one seems to see without really seeing, one has to 
seem to say one has seen without really saying it.  
 Both Ryle and Sartre, then, warn against treating mental images like 
pictures in the head. Ryle, for example, notes that if a person says that he is 
‘picturing his nursery, we are tempted to construe his remark to mean that he is 
somehow contemplating’ a ‘paperless picture’ of that nursery in the private 
‘gallery’ of his mind (224). This, Ryle implies, is to take a metaphor too far, 
creating a false understanding of what the image is. However, in spite of Ryle’s 
concerns, the analogy between pictures and mental imagery continued to form 
the basis for a significant body of empirical research. In a well-known evaluation 
of this empirical approach, Zenon Pylyshyn suggests that most psychologists 
who write on the subject of imagery lean heavily on a ‘picture metaphor’ 
(Pylyshyn 1973, 8). The whole vocabulary of imagery’, Pylyshyn continues, 
‘uses a language appropriate for describing pictures and the process of 
perceiving pictures. We speak of clarity and vividness of images, of scanning 
images, of seeing new patterns in images, and of naming objects or properties 
depicted in images’ (8). This tendency, Pylyshyn suggests, may harm 
understandings of the topic ‘by discouraging certain kinds of fundamental issues 
being raised and by carrying too many misleading implications’ (8). He points to 
the way in which ‘using the imagery vocabulary’ has led to the assumption that 
‘what we retrieve from memory when we image, like what we receive from our 
sensory systems, is some sort of undifferentiated (or at least not fully 
interpreted) signal or pattern’ (8). Using perceptual language is seen to draw 
psychologists into the assumption that we use processes like those of 
perception when apprehending imagery. For Pylyshyn, this is an inaccurate 
assumption. He argues that the mental image comes to us ready interpreted 
and can contain ‘only as much information as can be described by a finite 
number of propositions’ (10-11). Thus, ‘it is much closer to being a description 
of the scene than a, picture of it’ (11, emphasis in original).  
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 Pylyshyn’s argument was taken up by Stephen Kosslyn who, in a 
discussion of a series of experiments on the representation of information in 
visual images, accepts the point that ‘it is not very reasonable to treat images 
like photographs in the head’ (Kosslyn 1975, 342). Kosslyn has a slightly 
different metaphor in mind. He moves towards a ‘computer graphics metaphor’ 
in which the visual image is understood to ’bear the same relationship to its 
underlying structure as a pictorial display on a cathode ray tube does to the 
computer program that generates it’ (342, emphasis in original). In this line of 
thought, the products of perception ‘are stored in long-term memory in an 
abstract format, and must be acted on by processes that serve to generate or to 
produce an experience of an image’ (342). Here, the ‘underlying structure’ is not 
experienced; one merely apprehends the ‘pictures’ that this structure generates. 
Kosslyn, though, maintains the metaphor that draws imagery alongside 
perception. For example, he invokes the concept of a ‘mind’s eye’ but considers 
it as a kind of processor that analyses ‘the material arrayed in mental images’ 
(342). The processes performed by the mind’s eye, in this account, are 
experienced similarly to the experiences encountered during perceptual 
processes. For example, according to Kosslyn, a mental image needs to be 
classified (e.g. identified as big/small, 2 legged/4 legged) and the mind’s eye 
does this through use of the same procedures that one would use to classify a 
perceptual object: ‘the same procedures may be appropriately applied to 
classify both internal representations arising during perception which are 
experienced as a visual percept, and internal representations experienced as a 
visual mental image’ (342). Kosslyn, then, not only acknowledges the 
phenomenological overlap between perception and mental imagery but 
scrutinises the ontological distinction. He argues that both the ‘visual percept’ 
and the ‘visual mental image’ are ‘internal representations’ which may be 
classified in similar ways. 
 I hope this summary has shown the degree to which the mental image 
was reconceptualised over the course of the twentieth century. The century saw 
a prolonged attempt to identify the kinds of experiences that are denominated 
when the term mental image is used, and also an investigation into the kinds of 
psychophysiological processes that underlie these experiences. Not only this, 
but we have seen a continual dissatisfaction with the language that is being 
188 
 
used to describe mental imagery and the search for new metaphors with which 
to discuss the topic. In the next part of this chapter, it will be my argument that 
Samuel Beckett’s work should be seen as part of this movement. Texts such as 
Ill Seen Ill Said and Worstward Ho, I will argue, may well be read as an attempt 
both to investigate what the mental image is, and find a way of wording it. 
 
Beckett’s Eye of the Mind 
 
Earlier in the chapter I suggested that Beckett’s engagement with the imagery-
perception debates should be seen in a theoretical but also an aesthetic 
context. I noted that Beckett was part of a Shakespearian tradition that is 
interested in the aesthetic potential that exists in between the categories of 
perception and imagery. But I also cited Beckett’s reading of Sartre to suggest 
that he took an interest in twentieth-century theoretical debates on the 
relationship between imagery and perception. This position might be outlined 
more clearly with reference to a passage from the second act of the 1961 play 
Happy Days in which Beckett alludes to an ‘eye of the mind’: 
Winnie: That is what I find so wonderful, a part remains of one’s classics, 
to help one through the day. (Pause.) Oh yes, many mercies, many 
mercies (Pause.) And now (Pause.) And now, Willie? (Long pause.) I call 
to the eye of the mind… Mr Shower – Or Cooker. (She closes her eyes. 
Bell rings loudly. She opens her eyes. Pause.) Hand in hand, in the other 
hands bags (Beckett 2006, 164-5, emphasis in original). 
Winnie, here, seems to be picturing, in her mind’s eye, a couple named Shower, 
or Cooker, who stand, hand in hand, ‘gaping’ at her (165). Thus, the passage 
might be seen to dramatize a performance of image production and so engage 
with the theoretical debates outlined above. However, there is something else 
going on here. Winnie’s performance of image production is situated amid a 
discussion of her ‘classics’. The gap between Winnie’s concern with ‘one’s 
classics’ and her production of visual images, here, is bridged by the phrase: ‘I 
call to the eye of the mind’. This phrase, as various critics have noted, is drawn 
from the beginning of W. B. Yeats’s play At the Hawks Well (1916) which, Van 
Hulle and Nixon note, Beckett ‘clearly admired’ (Van Hulle and Nixon 2013, 37). 
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In addition to this, S. E. Gontarski notes that the phrase suggests Hamlet’s 
vision of his father (Gontarski 2014, 237). Although the passage might be used 
to exemplify Beckett’s interest in the process of image production, it also alludes 
to an aesthetic canon. The theoretical discussion cannot be severed from the 
aesthetic tradition in which Beckett is writing. 
 However, the fact that Winnie’s performance of image production is 
bound up in an aesthetic tradition should not lead to the conclusion that Beckett 
was not interested in imagistic processes themselves. It has been all too 
tempting for literary critics, I would argue, to focus on the fact that Beckett 
alludes to Yeats or Shakespeare when writing on the mind’s eye and ignore his 
evident interest in what ‘the eye of the mind’ does. Indeed, Beckett’s use of 
Yeats in Happy Days might be used to augment the contention that Beckett was 
heavily concerned with imagistic processes. When James Knowlson wrote to 
Beckett in 1972 questioning why he alluded to Yeats, Beckett responded: 
The “eye of the mind” in Happy Days does not refer to Yeats any more 
than the “revels” in Endgame [refer] to The Tempest. They are just bits of 
pipe I happen to have with me. I suppose all is reminiscence from womb 
to tomb. All I can say is I have scant information concerning mine – alas 
(Knowlson 1983, 16). 
As James Olney observes, ‘there is much more going on in this passage than 
mere acting out by an author reluctant to comment on his work for an academic 
critic’ (Olney 1998, 241). Beckett, I would argue, is not only giving an account of 
his creative process but also conceptualising the processes behind mental 
imagery. Indeed, I would link Beckett’s conceptualisation with Kosslyn’s account 
of the way in which mental imagery is apprehended. By conceiving of the 
phrase ‘the eye of the mind’ as a bit of pipe ‘I happen to have with me’ Beckett 
seems to be indicating that the phrase had been perceived and was being 
stored somewhere in the back of his mind – Kosslyn might say in long term 
memory. In this way it is understood, not as an embedded part of Yeats’s play, 
but as an isolated chunk of language – a verbal image. During writing, it seems, 
the phrase came to the fore of Beckett’s mind (his conscious experience) and 
was used to connect two sections of the text. However, Beckett’s statement 
suggests that his recollection of the phrase does not imply a pristine recollection 
of the context from which it came. The auditory image is seen to come to the 
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mind’s ear as a decontextualized entity. This works in parallel with Winnie’s 
performance of image production in the play. For Winnie, the image of Mr and 
Mrs Shower, or Cooker, ‘floats up – into my thoughts’ but she cannot 
contextualise the image and so asks Willie if the names ‘evoke any reality’ for 
him (Beckett 2006, 156). For Beckett, as for Winnie, imagery is felt to float up 
into consciousness without having been wholly contextualised or categorised. 
 In Happy Days the images that Winnie calls to the eye of her mind are 
eventually fleshed out and contextualised. They are said to stand ‘hand in hand’ 
gaping at her and eventually become recognisable as a kind of commentating 
theatrical audience, asking each other what the action is ‘meant to mean’ and 
whether Winnie has ‘anything on underneath’ (165). Here, I would argue, the 
imagistic blurs into the perceptual. Though the Showers (or Cookers) are, of 
course, always being imagined by Winnie, there is a movement in which they go 
from being imagined as images to being imagined as autonomous entities. To 
paraphrase Sartre, they are endowed with a kind of externality. There is a 
movement between the understanding that what one calls to the ‘eye of the 
mind’ only exists as imaged, and the temptation to endow it with a fleshly 
presence (albeit an imagined one). This becomes a major concern in Beckett’s 
late prose. At the beginning of Ill Seen Ill Said, for example, the eye of the mind 
is invoked when the figure of a deceased woman is said to appear for an eye 
that has ‘no need of light to see’ (Beckett 2009a, 45).89 From this it seems easy 
to conclude that the woman is being apprehended as an image by the mind’s 
eye. However, the text does not allow us this stable view of the figure. Later in 
the text, a perceiving eye is invoked (‘the eye of flesh’) and this requires us to 
imagine the figure as both image and percept. For example, we are told that 
she intermittently disappears and is ‘no longer anywhere to be seen. Nor by the 
eye of the flesh, not by the other’ (51). The figure cannot remain a pure image 
and this creates a blurring: 
Already all confusion. Things and imaginings. As of always. Despite 
precautions. If only she could be pure figment. Unalloyed. This old so 
dying woman. So dead. In the madhouse of the skull and nowhere else 
(53). 
                                                          
89 Critics such as Adam Piette have also equated this eye with the mind’s eye (Piette 2011, 283-5) 
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As in Hamlet, confusion has arisen out of the different senses in which one can 
use the verb ‘see’. The narrator suggests an understanding that the woman only 
exists in ‘the madhouse of the skull’ but, ‘despite precautions’, percept and 
image, ‘things and imaginings’ cannot be kept distinct. The notion of 
‘precautions’, here, may bring to mind the anxieties that we have seen 
articulated by Ryle and Sartre. However, in the context of Ill Seen Ill Said there 
is the sense that the blurring of image and percept is inevitable. Here we might 
return to Ulrika Maude’s discussion of vision in Beckett’s work and particularly 
her analysis of the way in which Beckett’s approach relates to the ideas of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault. Along with these philosophers, 
Maude argues, Beckett is interested in the way in which the visible and invisible, 
real and imaginary can interrupt – or mix with – one another. Drawing on 
Foucault’s idea of the heterotopia, she suggests that within Beckett’s work 
‘different categories that cannot occupy the same space seem nonetheless to 
coexist’ (Maude 2009, 40). In Ill Seen Ill Said the projections of the eye of the 
mind, and the eye of flesh, seem to coexist with one another creating a 
heterotopia in which the percept and the image intertwine.90 This idea is also 
present in Perky’s experiment when one of the observers is described to 
perceive the object in front to him, but also endow it with imaginary qualities. 
Perky presented blank cardboard cut-outs but one observer embellished them 
through imagination: ‘the tomato was seen painted on a can, the book was a 
particular book whose title could be read, the lemon was lying on a table, the 
leaf was a pressed leaf with red markings on it’ (Perky 1910, 432). The observer 
is seeing both image and percept in the same space and time. In this way, Ill 
Seen Ill Said may be profitably seen as part of a broad twentieth-century 
investigation into the way in which image and percept might be adjudged to 
overlap. 
The image production of Happy Days is developed along a slightly 
different path in Worstward Ho. Here another hand-holding pair appears in a 
mind’s eye – or, in this case the ‘staring eyes’ of a ‘head sunk on crippled 
hands’ (81-2). The narrator of Worstward Ho, however, moves to differentiate 
this image from the one that Winnie describes in Happy Days. Recall that 
Winnie’s images are seen ‘hand in hand, in the other hands bags’. Contrast this 
                                                          
90 For another discussion of this, which also takes in ‘Long Observation of the Ray’, see Connor 1992). 
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with a description of the hand-holding pair in Worstward Ho: ‘Hand in hand with 
equal plod they go. In the free hands – no. Free empty hands’ (Beckett 2009a, 
84). There is a resistance, here, to the process of fleshing out that happens in 
Winnie’s imagination. But this does not mean that the images (or ‘shades’ as 
they are described in the text) are left un-interpreted. On the contrary, the next 
time the image of the hand-holding pair emerges it is interpreted in great detail:  
Backs turned. Heads sunk. Dim hair. Dim white and hair so fair that in 
that dim light white. Black greatcoats to heels. Dim black. Bootheels. 
Now the two right. Now the two left. As one with equal plod they go. No 
ground. Plod as on void (86). 
This process, I would argue, exemplifies the kind of procedure of classification 
that Kosslyn attributes to the mind’s eye. Certain attributes of the image are 
identified and information is produced, we are told how the figures are 
positioned and coloured. The ‘shade’ is being processed in a way that one 
might process a percept. However, the text resists the temptation to place these 
imagistic figures in a mental world. The shade does not plod on the ground but 
‘as on void’. The figure is interpreted by a mind’s eye but the space it inhabits, it 
is made clear, is not a perceptual world but a space of the mind. The 
phenomenological overlap between perception and imagery is acknowledged 
here, but the text resists fleshing out the image. 
 At issue in Worstward Ho, then, is a kind of mental space which appears 
for the mind’s eye but is not wholly there. I contend that a major concern in the 
text is with finding a vocabulary with which to discuss the apprehension of this 
space. In this way, Beckett seems to develop Ryle’s observation that people 
express the difference between the mind’s eye and the senses of perception ‘by 
writing that, they see trees and hear music’, but only ‘see’ and ‘hear’ images. To 
repeat the dilemma that was encountered in Ryle: in order to describe a 
process in which one seems to see without really seeing, one has to seem to 
say one has seen without really saying it. Beckett, I would argue, goes further 
than Ryle in attempting to construct a vocabulary with which to negotiate this 
dilemma. This begins with the assertion that the bodies and places that are 
invoked in the text are not wholly there: ’Say a body. Where none. No mind. 
Where none. That at least. A place. Where none. For the body. To be in’ 
(Beckett 2009a, 81). We are given the image of a body but this body is no 
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sooner evoked than negated. We are required, almost simultaneously, to both 
construct it and be aware that it is not really there. It might be argued, that this 
procedure does something similar to the inverted commas that Ryle observes in 
common language. In Ryle, as in Beckett, there is a concern with the process of 
saying that something is being seen while also saying that it is not there. 
But Worstward Ho goes a step further than this. There is an attempt to 
re-appropriate the word ‘see’ itself so that, when one encounters it within the 
text, it is clear that a particular type of seeing is being described. We are in 
effect told how to read the verb ‘to see’: ‘See for be seen. Misseen. From now 
see for be misseen’ (84). I want to finish this chapter with an attempt to unpack 
this fairly difficult concept. By this point in the text, it has been made clear that 
all the shades are being seen but this seeing is not an act of perception. Instead 
the shades are apprehended in the stare of a head sunk on crippled hands. 
However, because the things that this entity sees exist within its own stare, 
when it sees it is also always seeing itself; being seen. The things that it ‘sees’ 
do not exist as external entities, but merely as internal shades. It is seeing 
things that are not there. As Sartre puts it in The Imagination, the scene in 
question ‘does not exist in fact; it exists as imaged’ (Sartre 2012, 4, emphasis in 
original). The text effectively tries to create a system in which a mental image 
cannot be read as a percept, even though the two phenomena may share many 
qualities. Worstward Ho, then, may well be read as an attempt to find a 
vocabulary that acknowledges the phenomenological overlap between imagery 
and perception while maintaining the ontological distinction. Thus, we might 
characterise Ill Seen Ill Said and Worstward Ho as differing approaches to a 
similar topic. Each I would argue investigates the distinction between the eye of 
the mind and the eye of the flesh, seeing and ‘seeing’. However, where Ill Seen 
Ill Said investigates a movement in which these entities blur into one another, 
Worstward Ho pursues a language that would serve to maintain the distinction 
between the percept and the image. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have placed Beckett’s interest in the relationship between 
percept and image within a theoretical and also an aesthetic tradition. Beckett, I 
have argued, is interested in finding a vocabulary with which to differentiate 
things that are imagined from things that are perceived, but he is also interested 
in how a representation that is portrayed as ‘percept’ affects us differently to 
one that is portrayed as ‘image’. This is perhaps best exemplified in the 
description of the second shade: 
Hand in hand with equal plod they go. In the free hands – no. Free empty 
hands. Backs turned both bowed with equal plod they go. The child hand 
raised to reach the holding hand. Hold the old holding hand. Hold and be 
held. Plod on and never recede. Backs turned. Both bowed. Joined by 
held holding hands. Plod on as one. One shade. Another shade (Beckett 
2009a, 84). 
I have read this as a description of an image but it also, of course, seems to 
represent a moment of intersubjective intimacy. The child expresses the need 
for the other by holding the old man’s hand and this is reciprocated by the old 
man’s holding onto the child’s hand. This makes it hard to disagree with Alain 
Badiou’s observation that there is a ‘muted emotion’ and ‘a powerful and 
abstract tenderness’ in the passage (Badiou 2003, 104). Crucial here is the 
point that the emotion perceived by Badiou is ‘muted’ and the powerful 
tenderness is ‘abstract’. What is apprehended makes Badiou feel strongly but 
the thing he feels is not wholly there. This, I would argue, is down to the notion 
that what is being seen is, in fact, being misseen as an image, or shade. The 
intimacy is an image occurring in the stare of a skull (whose ‘crippled hands’ 
may be deemed to indicate an incapacity for this intimacy). The scene is 
described to be both there and not there, and so are the feelings that are 
derived from it. Beyond the theoretical difference between percept and image, 
Beckett is interested in a realm of affective indeterminacy: the vivid but faint 
feelings that exist in between imagery and perception.  
 
 
195 
 
Chapter 6 
Isolation and Imagery in Company 
 
A common myth to accrue around the life of Samuel Beckett, James Knowlson 
writes, is ‘that he was a latter-day hermit living a reclusive life in his seventh 
floor apartment on the boulevard Saint-Jacques in Paris’ (Knowlson 2003, 1). 
This myth, by Knowlson’s account, has an element of truth to it. He notes that 
Beckett ‘certainly loved silence, solitude and peace’, and ‘detested intrusions 
into his private life’ (1-3). On the whole, however, Knowlson portrays Beckett as 
a fairly outward-facing character with many close friends, a strong interest in the 
politics of his time, and a tendency to become ‘totally engrossed’ in sports 
broadcasting (1-35). What does seem clear from Knowlson’s portrait, though, is 
the extent which Beckett recognised ‘silence and solitude’ to be ‘vital for his 
writing’ (1). But exactly how did Beckett’s writing make use of solitude? Was it 
simply the case that Beckett, like many of us, needed peace and quiet in order 
to work productively? Or, was there something in the nature of Beckett’s work 
which made ‘silence, solitude and peace’ particularly important? In this chapter, 
I want to approach this question through a consideration of the concept of 
isolation and, in particular, how isolation is linked to mental imagery, 
hallucinatory experience and the creative imagination.  
Over the last two chapters, we have frequently seen the extent to which 
Beckett’s later work is populated by moments where mental images seem to 
arise for individuals as they rest alone in darkness or gloom. In chapter 4, 
through a reading of Nacht und Träume, I suggested that this motif might be 
seen in a Romantic, but also a scientific context. On the one hand, I argued that 
these instances could be seen as moments of revelation or aesthetic 
inspiration, but, on the other, there was often the sense of a stimulus-response 
experiment – a sense that Beckett’s protagonists were simply responding to a 
particular set of psychophysiological conditions. This chapter will develop this 
observation by arguing that Beckett’s work operates in between two approaches 
to the concept of isolation that became prominent in twentieth-century culture: 
an empirical approach in which isolation is conceived as a stimulus, or 
instrument, that is likely to affect the human in certain, measurable ways; and a 
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phenomenological approach in which isolation is a condition that might facilitate 
unpredictable and extraordinary experiences and states of being. Focusing on 
the 1964 novel How It Is and Company, I will suggest that Beckett produced 
prose experiments that challenge readers to hold both approaches 
simultaneously. In Beckett’s writing, I will suggest, isolation is both a site of 
inspiration and an affective, often distressing psychophysiological environment. 
The chapter will begin with a summary of the existing critical discourse on the 
role of isolation in Beckett’s work. Then, reading Beckett’s prose alongside the 
work of phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty and a range of scientific 
investigations of isolation, I will put forward my own view of Beckett’s aesthetics 
of isolation. Finally, I will consider the wider ethical and political implications of 
Beckett’s use of isolation, questioning what kind of knowledge might be drawn 
from Beckett’s experiments, and how this knowledge might be put to use. 
 
The Isolated Artist 
 
It would be difficult to overstate the prominence of isolation in Beckett’s writing. 
One encounters in Beckett’s work both examples of physical isolation – a 
succession of figures positioned alone in rooms or cells – and a rhetoric of 
spiritual isolation or solitude in which it is commonly pronounced that 
intersubjective communication is illusory and every human is ultimately alone.91 
As Shane Weller puts it, ‘Beckett’s oeuvre is arguably governed from first to last 
by a belief in the radical isolation of the individual’ (Weller 2009, 34). This 
concern with isolation seems closely linked to Beckett’s view of the artist. Art, 
Beckett argues in Proust, ‘is the apotheosis of solitude’ and the ‘artistic 
tendency is not expansive but a contraction’ (Beckett 1999, 64). The artist, in 
much of Beckett’s writing seems defined by a capacity to embrace isolation and 
explore what he calls, in his 1954 homage to the painter Jack B. Yeats, ‘this 
inner real where phantoms quick and dead, nature and void, all that ever and 
never will be, join in a single evidence for a single testimony’ (Beckett 1983, 
149). Beckett, then, certainly seemed to value the artist’s attempt to explore 
                                                          
91 A view put forward most overtly in Beckett’s interpretation of Proust: ‘We are alone. We cannot 
know. We cannot be known’ (Beckett 1999, 66) 
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‘inner’ realities over the capacity to communicate with clarity, or analyse social 
relations. But, at the same time, radical isolation is often seen as an affliction in 
Beckett’s work. In Proust, for example, he speaks of an ‘irremediable solitude to 
which every human being is condemned’ (63). And in The Unnamable solitude 
is described as something that the narrator did not choose but has been given 
and has ‘to make the best of’ (Beckett 2009d, 389). For Beckett, then, isolation 
seems to function as an undesirable condition ‘to which we are condemned’, but 
also a situation which the artist must accept and explore. 
 This complex attitude towards solitude and isolation has prompted a 
significant amount of critical debate. For some, Beckett’s emphasis on radical 
isolation has been taken to support the view that he was an individualistic – 
even solipsistic – writer. Here, Beckett is easily incorporated into a literary-
historical narrative that emphasises the unsociable, inward-looking nature of 
literary modernism. As Dirk Van Hulle recognises, there is a common account of 
literary history which opposes the ‘inward-facing’ modernism of writers such as 
Beckett, James Joyce and Virginia Woolf with the observational realist writers of 
the nineteenth century. In Van Hulle’s terms, ‘whereas the realist writers were 
said to concentrate on the external world, the modernist project was often 
presented as an attempt to “enter” the characters’ minds’ through artistic 
techniques such as the interior monologue or the stream of consciousness (Van 
Hulle 2014, 1-2). Though – as Van Hulle does –  we might challenge this 
version of literary history, it certainly manifests in the critical history of Beckett’s 
work. George Lukács, for example, draws a distinction between modernist or 
avant-garde writers such as Joyce and Beckett, for whom isolation is a 
universal condition, and a ‘realistic literature’ in which man is a social animal 
and ‘solitariness is a specific social fare’ (Lukács 1963, 17-26). Furthermore, 
beyond the version of humanity that modernist writers represent, there is a 
question of modernism’s relationship to the reading audience and the literary 
market place. There is a familiar (though again frequently disputed)92 argument 
that the nineteenth-century novelists were much more embedded in the 
business of literature than the modernists. As Lawrence Rainey suggests, for 
                                                          
92 Rainey argues, for example, that ‘Anglo-American literary modernism was unusual in the degree to 
which its principal protagonists interacted with one another through shared institutional structures’, 
and that the movement’s ‘interchanges with the emerging world of consumerism, fashion, and display 
were far more complicated than often assumed’ (Rainey 1998, 7). 
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some ‘hostility to mass culture’ is the ‘salient characteristic’ of modernism, 
whereas nineteenth-century writers such as Dickens are seen to have held a 
degree of confidence ‘about the beneficent effects of literature’s dependency on 
“the people”’ (Rainey 1998, 1-2). To adapt a distinction made by Pierre Bordieu, 
modernism is frequently associated with the ‘charismatic image of artistic 
activity as pure, disinterested creation by an isolated artist’, where the writing of 
the naturalist novelists is seen to be more heavily concerned with audience 
(Bordieu 1993, 34).  
 But even arguments that draw a distinction between Beckett’s writing and 
that of earlier modernists seem to emphasise the solipsistic nature of Beckett’s 
work. This is observable in Martha Nussbaum’s critique. In Nussbaum’s 
account, Beckett projects voices that ‘express isolation and despair’, and are 
‘intolerant of society and of shared forms of thought and feeling’ (Nussbaum 
1988, 226; 252). The solipsism of Beckett’s literary voice, Nussbaum argues: 
is so total that we get no sense of the distinctive shape of any other lives 
in this world. An implicit claim is made by these voices to be the whole 
world, to be telling the way the world is as they tell about themselves’ 
(250).  
For Nussbaum, though, this characteristic of Beckett’s work is not typically 
modernist; she contrasts the solipsism of Beckett’s work with other writers that 
are often thought of as modernist (or proto-modernist) such as Henry James or 
Virginia Woolf’ (250). These novelists, she suggests, may present voices that 
express the same sentiments as Beckett’s narrators but their works cannot be 
reduced to these voices, as Beckett’s can. For Nussbaum, ‘not all persuasive 
voices speak Moran's [a narrator of Molloy] language’ and Beckett’s work is 
deficient for its incapacity to find other persuasive voices (250). Beckett’s artistic 
explorations of the ‘inner real’ are seen to lose touch with the fact that other 
realities exist. 
 Nussbaum seems to suggest that Beckett’s emphasis on solitariness is 
rooted in a desire to escape worldly activity and the influence of society. Here, 
as Russell Smith points out, Nussbaum’s critique of Beckett ‘seems constrained 
by her demand for straightforwardly realistic treatment of ethical material’ (Smith 
2009, 1). She suggests, for example, that Beckett’s works present ‘an absence 
of human activity that seems foreign to our experience of emotional 
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development’ (Nussbaum 1988, 250). For Nussbaum, the seeming inactivity 
and isolation of Beckett’s protagonists – the fact that they are rarely seen to 
partake in recognisable social situations – gives the sense that all worldly 
activity is unimportant.93 Furthermore, she argues that Beckett’s work shows a 
loathing of ‘social construction’ and ‘the whole idea that a group can tell me who 
and what I am to be and to feel’ (Nussbaum 1988, 251). This loathing, she 
contends, is rooted ‘in a longing for the pure soul, hard as a diamond, individual 
and indivisible, coming forth from its maker's hand with its identity already 
stamped upon it’ (252).94 In this account, Beckett’s use of isolation is rooted in a 
desire to endow his voices with pure individuality by detaching them from the 
pollutants of social construction. 
Now, as commentators such as James Knowlson (1996), James 
McNaughton (2009) and Mark Nixon (2011) have noted, Beckett undoubtedly 
showed a strong distaste for the rigid social systems and propaganda that he 
encountered in Nazi-occupied Europe (and to some extent the Ireland of his 
youth). In light of this, it would not be surprising if his work showed a degree of 
wariness regarding ‘social construction’. However, Nussbaum’s jump from 
recognising this wariness to the contention that Beckett’s work longs for the 
‘pure’, ‘indivisible’ isolated soul is a large one. Obviously, Nussbaum’s critique 
was written before the publication of Knowlson’s biography (and then Beckett’s 
own correspondence), and so fails to address the discrepancy between the 
unsociability of Beckett’s protagonists and the author’s own substantial 
engagement in society. But Nussbaum also seems to ignore the element in 
Beckett’s work which portrays isolation, not as a condition to be strived for, but 
one ‘to which we are condemned’. Another body of criticism, though, has 
registered the degree to which isolation is an affliction in Beckett’s work and 
argued that this aspect reveals a more sociable and political Beckett. This line 
of criticism arguably begins with Theodor Adorno (1991), but has continued in 
                                                          
93 This absence of activity affirms Nussbaum’s idea that there is a ‘deeply religious sensibility’ in 
Beckett’s work ‘for we have at all times the sense that mere human beings are powerless to make, on 
account of the fact that there is something very much more powerful in this universe that does all the 
making’ (251). This view is hard to accept. It seems to suggest that Beckett’s failure to represent social 
activity in a novel implies the belief that all worldly activity is pre-determined by a higher being and 
therefore unimportant. 
94 Another important point, here, is the influence of James Joyce who, Beckett said, made him ‘realize 
artistic integrity’ (Bair 1990, 73). In a sense Nussbaum seems to adjudge Beckett’s unsociable narrators 
to work in the tradition of the Joycean artist – the classic example being Stephen Dedalus, who tries to 
‘fly by’ the nets that the society of Ireland flings at ‘the soul of a man’ (Joyce 2000, 171). 
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more recent discussions by Terry Eagleton (2006) and David Lloyd (2011). For 
these critics, the isolation that we find in Beckett is historically particular; it is a 
symptom of modernity rather than a necessary condition of human existence. In 
Lloyd’s reading, for example, Beckett’s erosion of human relations does not 
reflect a timeless ‘“human condition” in the face of which ironic resignation is 
enough’, but instead registers and castigates a modernity which has reduced 
the human subject to the extremes of deprivation (Lloyd 2011, 215). Weller 
finds in this line of criticism ‘an attempt to deliver up a Beckett whose politics 
might be endorsed by those on the Left and, in particular, those who consider 
not only totalitarianism but also capitalism to be responsible’ for suffering which 
might have been avoided (Weller 2009, 33). Here, he also glosses the 
argument (made by critics such as H. Porter Abbott) that the ‘political charge’ of 
Beckett’s work is countered by a metaphysical or ontological one – that 
Beckett’s protests against the wrongs of society are overridden by the sense 
that there is something wrong with the universe as a whole (34). What we might 
infer from this critical debate, then, is an idea of the ambivalent role that 
isolation plays in Beckett’s work. As Mark Nixon recognises, a question Beckett 
frequently asked himself when travelling was that of whether he was making a 
journey from or a journey to – an escape or a pursuit (Nixon 2011, 223). With 
regards to isolation, he seems to have been interested in both the inward and 
the outward journey. On the one hand, Beckett seems interested in exploring 
the isolated condition but, on the other, Beckett’s use of isolation might betray a 
desire to escape a more-or-less unsatisfactory society. 
What one might also detect in the critical debate surrounding Becket’s 
use of isolation is a distinction between physical or phenomenological, and 
social or spiritual isolation – that is between being unable to sense and register 
others and the outside world, and being unable to truly relate to, or be with, 
them/it. But I would suggest that Beckett is interested in the overlap between 
these different types of isolation. So much is evident in Molloy as the 
protagonist questions how he reached old age: 
Thanks to moral qualities? Hygienic habits? Fresh air? Starvation? Lack 
of sleep? Solitude? Persecution? The long silent screams (dangerous to 
scream)? The daily longing for the earth to swallow me up? Come, come. 
Fate is rancorous but not to that extent (Beckett 2009d, 75). 
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‘Solitude’, here, seems to connect what we might call physical deprivation 
(‘starvation’; ‘lack of sleep’) and social and metaphysical ‘persecution’. Like 
starvation, the narrator seems to speculate, solitude might have a (positive?) 
physiological affect, but it is also linked to existence in a world in which ‘fate is 
rancorous’ and it is ‘dangerous to scream’. Alys Moody picks up on this theme 
in her discussion of hunger in Beckett’s post-war work. For Moody, these works 
present starving characters that are ‘in the process of moving into themselves 
and out of history’ (Moody 2012, 272). In this way, hunger is seen as part of a 
move towards physical isolation (272). However, Moody continues, ‘insofar as 
the character’s isolation springs from their starvation, it is already inscribed with 
unavoidable historical echoes’ of rationing in war-time France and the famines 
and hunger strikes of Irish history (272). Beckett’s characters are seen to move 
towards starvation and physical isolation but, for Moody, this move is always a 
‘nod to history’ and sociability. Thus, within Beckett’s texts, a particular 
protagonist’s physical isolation is never proof of an inward turn on the part of the 
writer. Instead, there is a constant twist of orientation. Moody summarises: 
‘starvation in Beckett promises hermeticism but feeds back into history, only to 
deny its own historicity’ (272). Isolation, then, seemed to offer artistic and 
phenomenological possibilities for Beckett, but his interest in isolation should 
not be detached from social and metaphysical dissatisfaction. 
 
The Phenomenology of Isolation 
 
From his homage to Jack B. Yeats (discussed above) it seems that Beckett 
valued isolation insofar as it enabled the artist to occupy a realm in which a 
series of seeming opposites (‘quick and dead, nature and void, all that ever and 
never will be’) combine in a ‘single testimony’. There is the sense that, in 
isolation, one does not have to categorise experience and make clear 
distinctions between what is alive and what is dead; what is outside and what is 
inside; what is real and unreal. Isolation seems to enable a study of the nature 
of conscious experience that resists falling into a dualistic pattern of thought. 
Dirk Van Hulle picks up on this in his discussion of Beckett’s relationship with 
Cartesian and post-Cartesian models of mind. In early works such as Murphy, 
Van Hulle argues, Beckett can be seen to critically engage with – and parody – 
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‘a Cartesian model of the mind as an interior space’ (Van Hulle 2014, 188-9). 
However, it is Van Hulle’s contention that, from the 1940s onwards, Beckett 
began to explore ‘an alternative model of the mind in terms of a mingling of 
“inside” and “outside”’ (203). In this respect he reads Beckett within a wider 
post-Cartesian movement that takes in Daniel Dennett’s ‘multiple drafts’ theory 
and the more recent notion of an ‘extended mind’ (198-206). This process, he 
argues, can be seen to develop through the genesis of The Unnamable but is 
more fully incorporated into the structure of the later texts (206). To exemplify 
this, he cites the late prose text ‘Ceiling’ (1981) which, in Van Hulle’s reading, 
describes: ‘a gradual transition from an unconscious condition to a state of 
consciousness through a series of paragraphs that differ slightly from each 
other, but also show several corresponding elements’ (206, emphasis in 
original). What is crucial about this text, for Van Hulle, is the way in which 
Beckett ‘“extends” the mind by making neural processes interact with an 
external element’ (206). Beckett is able to produce a ‘patient study of the dimly 
conscious mind’, Van Hulle argues, by showing the way in which the 
environment of a white ceiling plays an ‘active role in driving the cognitive 
process of coming to’ (207). In this process, he suggests, ‘the mind is not some 
“inside” separated from an “outside” but an interaction between – for instance – 
a bed ridden organism and the ceiling above’ (207). Consciousness is portrayed 
as a ‘constant process’ which is stably located in neither neural processes nor 
external elements, but formed out of an interaction between both (207). 
Van Hulle’s reading is, to my mind, very persuasive but it does raise a 
question. He notes that the external environment in ‘Ceiling’ plays an active role 
in driving cognition in spite of the fact that it is ‘deliberately reduced to just a 
ceiling’ (207). But if Beckett is so interested in the external environment’s 
capacity to drive cognition, why does he make this deliberate reduction? Why is 
he concerned with the interaction between a bed-ridden organism and a white 
ceiling and not, for example, a lawyer and a busy courtroom? This returns us to 
my original question of why ‘silence, solitude and peace’ were so fundamental 
to Beckett’s work. In the case of ‘Ceiling’, Van Hulle seems to suggest that the 
choice of a dull white ceiling may be related to Beckett’s vocation as a writer, on 
account of the impression that it is ‘easily translated into the dull white of the 
paper’ (207). This explanation opens up some interesting possibilities – which 
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Van Hulle explores in the context of Beckett’s final piece of writing ‘what is the 
word’ (1989) – but it does not account for the prominence of physical isolation 
across the oeuvre. For my part, I would suggest that the isolated setting of 
works such as ‘Ceiling’ is crucial because it does not demand an active 
response from the ‘bed ridden organism’. If the ceiling were replaced by, for 
example, the angry face of another, or a scream, this patient study of 
consciousness would not be possible as one would be forced to classify the 
stimulus and act accordingly. As it is though, the narrator is able to make a kind 
of phenomenological reduction in which the ceiling is allowed to remain a ‘dull 
white’ which hovers between void and nature, the internal and the external. 
However, though he often presents environments in which the human 
individual is exposed to minimal sensory input, Beckett’s protagonists frequently 
encounter phenomena that are more lively than the dull white of a ceiling. For 
an example of this, we might return to the voice that ‘comes to one in the dark’ 
in Company (Beckett 2009a, 3). As discussed in the last chapter, this voice may 
be deemed internal or external, image or percept, and in this way it can be seen 
to explore the questions of internality and externality that we have seen in 
‘Ceiling’. But the voice is, of course, distinct from the ‘dull white’ in that its 
externality seems to imply the presence of another subject in the dark with the 
protagonist. In Company, though, the protagonist does not simply judge that the 
voice belongs to someone else – that he is being spoken to by another. Instead, 
he speculates, the voice might be speaking to another that is in his vicinity: 
He cannot but sometimes wonder if it is indeed to and of him that the 
voice is speaking. May not there be another with him in the dark to and of 
whom the voice is speaking? Is he not perhaps overhearing a 
communication not intended for him (4)? 
Crucial, here, is the idea that the voice does not simply belong to another 
individual. Rather it has its own particular ‘traits’, and its own motives for 
speaking. The voice, to give some examples, comes to the protagonist ‘now 
from one quarter and now from another’; ‘another trait’ is its ‘repetitiousness’; 
and it also sheds a ‘faint light’ when it speaks (8-11). Furthermore, in terms of 
motive, the protagonist speculates that the voice might be trying to ‘kindle in his 
mind’ a faint uncertainty, or ‘plague’ him with ‘mere sound’ (4-5). The voice, 
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then, is not simply the expression of another’s presence; it is itself experienced 
as a presence out in the world. 
 Given that the protagonist’s encounter with the voice does not follow 
what one might call the ordinary rules of perception, it is tempting to suggest 
that Company portrays a kind of hallucinatory experience. Making this 
assessment, though, requires us to further define the phenomenology of 
hallucination. Now, a number of twentieth-century phenomenological 
philosophers would consider hallucinatory experience. As we saw in the last 
chapter, Sartre considers hallucinations and hypnagogic images in The 
Imaginary. But for a fuller account we might turn to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945). With regards to hallucinatory experience, 
‘the all-important point’, Merleau-Ponty suggests, ‘is that the patients, most of 
the time, discriminate between their hallucinations and their perceptions’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, 389). Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, it is too simplistic to say 
that to hallucinate is to mistake image for percept, fantasy for reality. Rather, 
one needs to study the hallucination as an experience that has its own 
particular traits or qualities. The hallucination, then, might be seen to exist on a 
level that is distinct from the image or the percept. ‘Hallucinations’, Merleau-
Ponty argues, ‘are played out on a stage different from that of the perceived 
world, and are in a way superimposed’ (395). Thus the hallucination can follow 
its own rules. Merleau-Ponty cites instances in which individuals have the 
impression of constantly ‘being seen naked from behind’, or ‘seeing 
simultaneously in all directions’ (396). These observations certainly resonate 
with the extraordinary ‘traits’ that are attributed to the voice encountered in 
Company: for instance, the voice’s mysterious capacity to ‘change place and 
tone’ in the ‘course of a single sentence’ (Beckett 2009a, 9). As in Merleau 
Ponty’s account of the hallucination, Company’s voice might be seen to play out 
on a stage different from that of the perceived world’. But what Beckett seems 
to be interrogating in Company is our capacity to tolerate the voice as an 
existent on this stage. The opening line of the work gives out the imperative to 
‘imagine’ the voice as it comes to one in the dark; the text seems to require its 
reader to imaginatively experience this voice (3). Rather than dwelling on the 
ways in which the voice is not a perception, the text asks us to focus on what it 
is. 
205 
 
Beckett, then, often seems to use isolated environments in order to 
explore realms of experience that do not fit neatly into either the perceptual or 
the imagistic. Because of this I want to suggest that his work might be seen 
within a line of twentieth-century thought that includes phenomenologists such 
as Merleau-Ponty, but also – slightly unconventional – experimental scientists 
such as John C. Lilly. Though perhaps best known for his research on human-
dolphin communication, Lilly is notable for his development of the ‘tank isolation’ 
technique (TI) in the 1950s. This technique (now commonly used for both 
therapeutic and recreational purposes) saw individuals inhabit a darkened, 
sound-proof tank which was filled with a solution of Epsom salts and water, 
allowing ‘the body to float supine, with head, arms, legs and trunk at the 
surface’ (Lilly 1977, 17). Put simply, the method attempted to isolate the 
individual’s body, as far as possible, from the stimulations of external reality. 
The aim of this bodily relaxation, for Lilly, was a kind of mental exploration. To 
paraphrase Murphy, the body was brought into an abeyant state, ‘so that the 
mind might move’ (Beckett 2009c, 71). In this state of physical isolation, or 
relaxation, individuals commonly report unusual pseudo-sensory experience. In 
the case of vision, Lilly states that one might go ‘into a completely blacked out 
space’ in order ‘to be free of all light stimulation’, but this does not completely 
isolate ‘the observer from “the light”’ (Lilly 1977, 34). One is still likely to see 
light even when it is not there. This, he reasons, is because: 
There are persisting central process visual activities all one has to do is 
open one’s eyes in the dark and look. Immediately one sees peculiar 
cloudlike phenomena, or one may see points of light, flashes of lightning 
etcetera, depending on one’s present state (34). 
This phenomenon can be very vivid. Lilly notes that ‘in special states of being 
[…] one can begin to see light levels comparable to a well-lighted room’ (35). 
This type of experience, he continues, ‘is commonly called “hallucination”’ but 
Lilly is wary of this term. By Lilly’s account, ‘visual displays’ such as these ‘are 
what one actually sees when in a well-lighted room’; it is merely that most 
individuals are ‘not used to’ the ‘natural process’ by which ‘one’s biocomputer’95 
produces these displays in complete darkness (35). For Lilly, then, one never 
                                                          
95 The ‘biocomputer’ is the name Lilly gives to the network of systems and processes that give rise to 
one’s experience.  
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sees an unmediated external reality but merely a ‘visual display’ which is 
derived from external and internal sources. Thus, the illuminated scene one 
sees in the darkness of the isolation tank may be derived from mainly internal 
sources but that does not make the visual experience any less real.  
 Sound, for Lilly, works in a very similar way. Even in isolation, he argues, 
‘the acoustic sphere is found to be filled with information from one’s own 
biocomputer’ (37). In Lilly’s view, then, sounds and voices can derive not only 
from external sources, but also central processes. This idea that one still gets 
the experience of sensory stimulation, even when objectively deprived of it, 
resonates with Beckett’s portrayals of physical isolation. Ulrika Maude observes 
that, even as Beckett’s characters ‘endeavour to cut themselves off from 
sensory experience’, they continue to ‘interact with their surroundings, or to 
create phantom landscapes with which to interact’ (Maude 2009, 46). It might 
be suggested that this process plays out in Company as the narrator speculates 
about the emergence of sounds: 
The odd sound. What a mercy to have that to turn to. Now and then. In 
dark and silence to close as if to light the eyes and hear a sound. Some 
object moving from its place to its last place. Some soft thing softly 
stirring soon to stir no more (Beckett 2009a, 11).  
The protagonist, then, seems to hear vague sounds in his state of isolation and 
this phenomenon is also noted in Lilly’s experiments. Lilly argues that, ‘in 
isolation, some people hear very high-pitched whistles, others hear popping 
sounds like bacon frying or rumblings, hissings, and so on’ (Lilly 1977, 37). 
Again, Lilly does not say that these sounds are not really heard, but merely that 
they inhabit an individual’s ‘sonic display’ (Lilly 1977, 37, emphasis in original). 
For Lilly, though, the fullest experience of the isolation tank comes when one 
ceases to question what is (or is not) out there and begins to focus purely on 
the phenomena itself (279-80). Again, isolation is seen to enable a kind of 
phenomenological reduction in which one moves beyond questions of internality 
and externality.  
Crucial about the sounds that are described in the text of Company, 
though, is the sense that they are not quite heard. They seem to exist between 
presence and absence. This is evident in the fabric of the text. The clipped style 
of the prose means that one has to fill in words in order to determine what tense 
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is being used. When talking about the sounds, the narrator might be interpreted 
to use a clipped version of the future unreal conditional. One might read it as 
follows: ‘What a mercy it would be to have the odd sound to turn to’. In this 
reading the sounds are not (and have never been) heard but the narrator is 
speculating about what their effect on the hearer would be. Alternatively, one 
might interpret the sentence as being written in the present or past tense, which 
would imply that the sounds are being (or have been) heard: ‘What a mercy it 
is/was to have the odd sound to turn to’. This flickering between presence and 
absence is also observable in the description of the sounds themselves – ‘softly 
stirring soon to stir no more’. The sounds described in the text become difficult 
for the reader to categorise. 
Here, then, the peculiarly textual nature of Beckett’s experiment with 
isolation becomes apparent. As a work of fiction, Company never presents us 
directly with sounds and voices, only ‘sounds’ and ‘voices’ – words on a page 
that have to be read, interpreted, and represented in the reader’s 
consciousness. Beckett’s experiment, I would argue, is not only concerned with 
the protagonist’s experience of isolation, but also the process by which the 
reader represents it: the way in which the words of the text are ‘heard’ in the 
reader’s inner real and how the phenomena described in the text are imagined. 
Thus a distinction must be drawn between Beckett’s experiments and those of 
Lilly.  For Lilly, the crucial moments of experimentation occur within the isolation 
tank. These situations, he suggests, allow one to enter new ‘domains of 
feeling/thinking/emoting’ (Lilly 1977, 70). Acts of writing, in this account, can 
only attempt to represent the experiences; they are not, themselves, a part of 
the experiment. Writing, though, is much more crucial to the Beckettian 
experiment on isolation. In Company, the protagonist’s experience of physical 
isolation is formed through an interaction between text and reader. The 
character is only isolated insofar as one imagines this state of isolation. Thus, 
even as Beckett’s text enacts a kind of isolation experiment, his experimentation 
is fundamentally sociable. It depends on a text and a reader combining to 
produce a particular type of imaginative experience. Beckett’s prose, then, is a 
medium through which we might explore the novel phenomena that derive from 
physical isolation, but we do not experience isolation in Beckett’s text. Rather, 
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isolated experience in Company is something that needs to be explored 
imaginatively. 
Another point of contrast between Beckett’s literary experiments and the 
experiments of Lilly seems to reside in the extent to which each author 
embraces isolation, and endows it with the potential to bring about self-
revelation. In the case of Lilly, isolation seems to be a state of being that, if fully 
embraced, offers up stark self-revelatory potential. For Lilly, isolation allows one 
to move past the ‘dichotomized situations’, in which one is occupied with 
questions of internality and externality, and penetrate into ‘deeper levels’ of 
consciousness (279). In these deep states of isolation, Lilly argues, ’thought 
and feeling take over the spaces formerly occupied by external reality’ and 
‘one’s basic needs and one’s assumptions about self become evident’ (280). To 
an extent, this idea of an isolation in which one penetrates ‘deeper levels’ of the 
self resonates with the rhetoric of the early Beckett, for whom ‘the only possible 
spiritual development is in the sense of depth’ (Beckett 1999, 64). However, 
there is a distinction to be made between the early and the later Beckett here. 
Where Lilly is – in an almost Romantic way – continually interested in the 
possibility that isolation might allow ‘further penetration’ to deeper levels of 
consciousness, the isolation of Company is, in Steven Connor’s terms, much 
more ‘material or finite’ (Connor 2014, 8). The seemingly isolated figures of 
Beckett’s writing (and any other aesthetic work) are ultimately never alone; they 
have to be continually imagined, perceived or observed by authors, readers and 
viewers. Where Lilly writes of isolation as a ‘special mental state’ which, ‘to be 
appreciated must be experienced directly’, Beckett’s isolation is always 
grounded by questions of what can be imagined and communicated (Lilly 1977, 
280). Though an aesthetic of isolation may have held self-revelatory potential 
for Beckett,96 self-revelation was clearly not the only aim of Beckett’s writing. To 
paraphrase Bordieu, Lilly’s experiments with isolation are closely connected to 
the charismatic image of disinterested exploration, whereas Beckett’s are 
always working with conceptions of an imagining audience. 
 
                                                          
96 An idea supported by the semi-autobiographical detail that is included in Company. James Knowlson 
writes: ‘Company comes closer to autobiography than anything Beckett had written since Dream of Fair 
to Middling Women’ (Knowlson 1996, 651). 
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The Isolation Instrument 
 
There is, however, another side to Beckett’s experiments with isolation. The 
solitary figures in Beckett’s writing are rarely just phenomenological explorers; 
they are often also portrayed as vulnerable bodies being exposed to the 
psychophysiological effects of isolation. Perhaps the most striking example of 
isolation playing this double-headed role can be found in part one of How It Is. 
The opening of the novel presents us with an individual, the narrator, who 
recalls inhabiting a dark, muddy environment with nothing for company but a 
coal sack which holds some tins. The narrator summarises this environment as 
follows: ‘the sack the tins the mud the dark the silence the solitude’ (Beckett 
2009b, 4). In this isolated environment, we are told, a few ‘images’ of another 
life flicker ‘on an off’ (4). These images, the narrator suggests, are somehow 
linked to the life he led before entering the mud and the dark, but he tends to 
describe them as images rather than memories: ‘I haven’t been given memories 
this time it was an image’ (7). These images are described to give a kind of 
aesthetic pleasure. One, for example, is described as ‘a fine image fine I mean 
in movement and colour blue and white of clouds in the wind’ (21). And another 
seems to portray an idyllic scene in which a teenage figure (who the narrator 
perceives to be his younger self) walks hand in hand with a girl and a dog in 
‘glorious weather’ (23). These images tend to appear suddenly without the 
narrator’s intending to produce them and, in this sense, Beckett seems to be 
presenting mysterious moments of aesthetic inspiration. However, as was the 
case in Nacht und Träume, the materiality of this process of image production is 
consistently emphasised. First, apprehension of the ‘fine image‘ is linked to the 
position of the narrator’s body: the image is seen to be triggered by the 
narrator’s lying face down in the mud with his tongue lolling out (21). Second, 
the narrator sometimes describes pissing and shitting images out (5). And, third, 
the images seem to appear and disappear in a way that frequently recalls 
lighting technology: one of the images, for example ‘goes out like a lamp blown 
out’ (11). Again, the Beckettian image may be linked to a kind of Romantic 
inspiration, but it is also represented as a fundamentally material response to a 
particular set of conditions.  
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 In How It Is, though, things are complicated further. The structure of the 
work means that it is difficult to read the drama of image production that is 
described in part one without reference to the events of parts two and three. At 
the beginning of the text, we are told that the narrator will describe three states 
– ‘before Pim with Pim after Pim’ – and How It is forms around these three 
states of being (3). The narrator is isolated in the first part but in the second part 
he will have the company of Pim – though in the final part of the novel the 
narrator recants his story and states that he has always been alone.97 Thus the 
story of solitude described in part one is influenced by what was to come after it: 
the narrator’s encounter with Pim. Much critical discussion of the text has 
focused on what the narrator does with Pim, and what he does is administer a 
kind of ‘training’ that aims at making Pim ‘speak’ and ‘sing’ (59). When the 
narrator finds Pim he is lying ‘dumb limp lump flat’ in the mud but the narrator 
makes it his aim to ‘quicken him’ by teaching Pim to perform certain tasks when 
exposed to a selection of painful stimuli (44): 
Table of basic stimuli one sing nails in armpit two speak blade in arse 
three stop thump on skull four louder pestle on kidney 
 five softer index in anus six bravo clap athwart arse seven lousy same 
as three eight encore same as one or two as may be (59). 
Various commentators have recognised the link between this process of training 
and the systematic methods of interrogation and torture that were deployed by a 
number of countries in the twentieth century and after. David Lloyd suggests 
that Beckett would have heard about many instances of violent interrogation 
during his lifetime and, for Lloyd, this context partly accounts for the ‘prominent 
place assumed by scenarios of interrogation, incarceration and even of torture’ 
in Beckett’s oeuvre (Lloyd 2011,198). More particularly, Adam Piette has 
recently shown the degree to which stories of French soldiers administering 
torture during the Algerian war are likely to have framed the genesis of How It Is 
(Piette 2016b, 151-3). Here, Beckett’s writing is seen to confront a wide range 
of political and ethical questions but it seems hard to deny that the narrator’s 
training of Pim is also informed by certain methods of psychological 
experimentation. The narrator seems to be interrogating Pim – trying to get 
                                                          
97‘only me in any case yes in the mud yes the dark yes that hold yes’ (Beckett 2009b, 128) 
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words out of him – but he is also mapping his responses to a ‘table of basic 
stimuli’. 
Given the events of the late twentieth and early twenty first century the 
link Beckett seems to draw between violent interrogation and psychological 
experimentation is very suggestive. As I touched upon in the last chapter, there 
was a strong connection between post-Second World War methods of 
interrogation and certain branches of psychology. Various interrogation 
programmes are known to have drawn on a body of psychological research 
which studied how the human being might be broken down and made compliant 
by specific sets of psychophysiological conditions. This body of research is 
frequently traced back to the, now infamous, sensory deprivation experiments 
carried out by Donald Hebb at McGill University in the 1950s and 60s. Typically, 
these experiments involved participants ‘donning goggles, earmuffs, and 
mittens’, and spending ‘hours and even days in isolation’ with the effects of 
these conditions being constantly monitored (Raz 2013, 380). As Mical Raz 
notes, Hebb’s work was closely tied to Cold War security interests and the 
findings of sensory-deprivation research were incorporated into the CIA’s 1963 
KUBARK Counter Intelligence Interrogation manual (382). Furthermore, it has 
been concluded that the methods laid out in the manual were put to use across 
the world, perhaps most infamously by the British government when 
interrogating suspected members of the Irish Republican Army in Ulster in 1971 
(Shallice 1972, 385; Raz 2013, 387-8).98 Now, I know of no evidence to suggest 
that Beckett was aware of the historical links between certain types of 
psychological experimentation and violent interrogational techniques, but for 
some insight we might return to Beckett’s notes on behaviourism. From his 
reading of Woodworth, Beckett would have been familiar with the idea (put 
forward most forcefully by John Broadus Watson) that, through programmatic 
manipulations of a human subject’s environment, the psychologist might be able 
to exert fundamental control over that subject. Watson, Beckett notes, made the 
assertion ‘that, given control of a healthy child’s environment, he could turn him 
into anything he chose’ (TCD MS 10971/7/10). The crucial point about this claim 
                                                          
98 These methods were also deployed very recently by the United States military at Guantanamo Bay 
(Koenig 2015). 
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is that Watson asserts that the psychologist can not only manipulate human 
action, but also determine identity –  what that human is.  
 Beckett, then, was familiar with the idea that the manipulation of a 
subject’s sensory environment could work to alter them in fundamental ways 
and I suggest that this way of thinking is crucial to Beckett’s portrayals of 
subjectivity in How It Is. In particular it is crucial to the drama of image 
production that the narrator describes in part one. As noted above, the narration 
of the text comes in the aftermath of the narrator’s training of Pim and this fact 
alters the status of the images that are encountered in the first part of the novel. 
This is because, as David Lloyd puts it, the images described in part one, ‘or 
ones akin to them’ are elicited from Pim in part two (Lloyd 2011, 201). Thus, the 
images of part one ‘are explicitly not subjective images’ but seem to be shared 
between subjects through a process of ‘training’ or sensory manipulation (201). 
The images, for Lloyd, ‘represent not the depth of the narrator’s subjective 
world’ but fragments of another’s story (205). One might question how and why 
these images have been shared, and the text does not map this out in any 
systematic way.99 However, while acknowledging these ambiguities, I would 
argue that the text evidences Beckett’s interest in the ways in which a human 
subject’s image of their own life can be manipulated or brought into question. 
How It Is might be seen to explore the process by which a subject is broken 
down to the point that they have no inner reality, only ‘bits and scraps’ of a life 
that may or may not be their own (Beckett 2009b, 3). 
 If How It Is shows a slightly abstracted interest in the processes by which 
external phenomena or beliefs might be imposed on the human subject’s sense 
of inner reality, a much more concrete interest was developing in other 
contemporaneous settings. As Raz notes, from the 1950s onwards there was a 
growing cultural concern (in the United States and elsewhere) with the idea that 
certain techniques could be used to manipulate human subjectivity. Within the 
Cold War context, for Raz: 
Communist trials, prisoners’ false confessions, and the fear of secretly 
turning citizens against their own country, epitomized in the 1959 classic 
                                                          
99 Though in part three the narrator speculates about a large system of ‘nameless solitaries’ who 
endlessly engage in the processes of torment and suffering that he has described. And posits a scribe 
named Kram who documents and enables this system (Beckett 2009b, 100-126). 
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novel, The Manchurian Candidate, quickly established “mind control” as 
a topic of public fascination. Thus, the newly coined term “brainwashing” 
emerged as a significant concern for military officials and the lay public 
as newspapers, books, and movies depicted the psychological dangers 
American prisoners of war faced (Raz 2013, 380-1). 
Within experimental science, this cultural fascination with ideas of ‘mind control’ 
and ‘brainwashing’ is most clearly evidenced in Ewan Cameron’s research on 
‘psychic driving’ – a technique in which a ‘therapist’ attempts to bring about 
changes in a ‘patient’ through the ‘continued replaying, under controlled 
conditions, of a cue communication’ (Cameron 1956, 703).100 In effect, a human 
subject is exposed to a single stimulus until the message carried by that 
stimulus is seen to be internalised and govern their behaviour. As Cameron 
puts it: ‘by driving a cue statement one can, without exception, set up in the 
patient a persisting tendency for the cue statement’ (703). Thus the technique 
attempts to displace internal thoughts with external messages. Here then, in 
contrast to Lilly’s TI technique, the aim is not sensory isolation exactly; the 
subjects are exposed to a stimulus. However, Cameron theorises that, when all 
other stimulation is taken away, the selected stimulus will penetrate subjects 
and, in effect, become a part of them. This is evident when he stipulates that the 
cue communication should be played through headphones:    
This causes the patient to experience the driving with much greater 
impact, the more particularly since he frequently describes it as being like 
a voice within his head. For instance, one patient said: “I've heard 
enough. It goes right through my head.” Another reported: “It's too close; 
it's horrible; I hear all the stuttering” (706). 
There is a belief that, if presented in a certain way, a set of sensory stimuli can 
be used to make a human subject accept that certain external beliefs and 
experiences are their own. 
 Without suggesting that Beckett was familiar with experiments such as 
Cameron’s, I propose – following critics such as Adam Piette (2016a) – that we 
might read a number of Beckett’s prose experiments on isolation within this 
                                                          
100 The work was funded by the CIA through a cover organization named the Society for the 
Investigation of Human Ecology (Raz 2013, 383). 
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Cold War context. Certainly the narrator’s voice in How It Is (first ‘without 
quaqua on all side then in me’) seems to resonate with Cameron’s notion of a 
penetrating ‘cue communication’ (Beckett 2009a, 3). But perhaps a more 
focused investigation of the penetrating, manipulative voice might be found in 
Company. As we have seen the protagonist of Company recognises that the 
voice has its own traits and intentions. There is the sense that it somehow 
exists out there and is trying, through ‘repetitiousness’, to penetrate the 
protagonist’s inner reality – it wants the protagonist to accept it as his own: 
Another trait its repetitiousness. Repeatedly with only minor 
variants the same bygone. As if willing him by this dint to make it his. To 
confess, Yes I remember. Perhaps even to have a voice. To murmur, 
Yes I remember (Beckett 2009a, 9). 
The obvious question here is one of whether the voice is ever internalised, and 
the text seems to hint that it is. In the final passage of the novel, the voice 
seems to cease to be company and the protagonist is back in solitude. The 
words spoken by the voice, it seems, were not those of another but his own: 
Till finally you hear how words are coming to an end. With every inane 
word a little nearer to the last. And how the fable too. The fable of one 
with you in the dark. The fable of one fabling of one with you in the dark. 
And how better in the end labour lost and silence. And you as you always 
were. 
Alone (Beckett, 2009a, 42).  
There is obviously a degree of equivocality here. Taking a literal reading, one 
might suggest that the voice is simply in the process of coming to an end. And 
one might also interpret this as a metafictional moment in which the events 
described in the text are revealed to be an author’s ‘fable’. But one might also 
suggest that the protagonist has internalised the voice. It seems hard to deny 
that Company is interested in how a voice might cease to exist as an external 
stimulus, and move into what the early Beckett calls the protagonist’s ‘inner 
real’.  
But beyond questions of what exactly happens to a particular 
protagonist, Beckett’s interest in Company seems to reside in the reader’s 
imaginative perspective: how we encounter the events that are described in the 
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text. Returning to the distinction made in the ‘Psychology Notes’, Beckett’s text 
produces a situation in which one is caught between a perspective that focuses 
on experience and a perspective that focuses on performance – what one might 
call a first-person and a third-person perspective. On the one hand, we are 
encouraged to make a phenomenological reduction and imaginatively 
experience a repetitious voice buzzing around us as we lie in the dark. But on 
the other, there is a pressure to produce a theory about what is really 
happening, analyse the protagonist’s performance, and perhaps make 
inferences about the effects of isolation and darkness on the human organism. 
From the outset, the text draws attention to its use (or lack thereof) of the 
second, third and first person: ‘Use of the second person marks the voice, That 
of the third that cankerous other. Could he [the protagonist] speak to and of 
whom there would be a first’ (4). Here, we are not only given a set of rules by 
which to make sense of the text. Beckett is also asking a question of how we 
respond to the situation we read about, and experimenting on our perception of 
the human subject. On the one hand, readers are required to survey the 
situation that is described objectively, but on the other they are encouraged to 
imaginatively inhabit the vacant first-person perspective. Is ‘he’ an individual 
perspective encountering a specific set of phenomena, or a psychophysiological 
entity responding to an isolated environment? 
 
Conclusion: Isolated Knowledge 
 
This chapter has argued that, through his prose, Beckett performs experiments 
on the nature of human isolation. Beckett’s writing, I have suggested, is 
interested in how states of isolation produce moments in which internality and 
externality, percept and image, fantasy and reality, are seen to collapse into 
each other. But if Beckett’s prose can be seen to work towards knowledge of 
isolation, how might we define this knowledge and how might it be put to use? 
As we have seen much of the research carried out on states of isolation in the 
latter part of the twentieth century was adapted for acts of violent interrogation 
(if not produced with these uses in mind). And from the 1970s onwards this has 
been a grave concern for many psychologists. Perhaps the first article to 
address this concern was Tim Shallice’s 1972 work on the relationship between 
216 
 
the interrogation techniques that were used by the British government in Ulster 
and sensory-deprivation research. Concluding that the interrogation techniques 
were strongly linked to psychological research, Shallice suggests that the 
scientific community must evaluate sensory-deprivation research and ‘see what 
its positive contribution has been and is likely to be’ (Shallice 1972, 400). 
Sensory deprivation, Shallice notes, is ‘an intuitively interesting method which 
allows endless possibilities for variation because of its complexity’, and so he 
can see why many would want to carry out research in the field (400). However, 
he questions whether methods of sensory deprivation are ever likely to produce 
significant theoretical gains for the wider scientific community and, given these 
doubts, argues that any research on the topic should be discouraged or strictly 
monitored (400-3). A mere interest in how the human responds to states of 
isolation and sensory deprivation, Shallice suggests, does not justify research 
that enhances the effectiveness of torture. Citing the case of the atomic bomb, 
Shallice argues that in some cases the ‘failure to discover’ is preferable to a 
scenario in which a discovery causes major harm (402).  
 Given this context, how might we frame Beckett’s experiments on 
isolation? It seems absurd to imagine members of the CIA studying How It Is or 
Company and adapting the events that are described into a set of interrogation 
techniques.101 This, one might suggest, is partly because of the overt sense of 
impenetrability that colours Beckett’s texts (the lack of punctuation in How It is, 
for example), and partly because there is always a hint of allegory around 
Beckett’s portrayal of isolation. Additionally, though, it is difficult to imagine 
Beckett’s texts being put to use because of the way in which they refuse to 
sever the third-person from the first-person perspective. It is difficult, in 
Beckett’s texts, to imagine the effects of isolation on a human subject without 
inhabiting the perspective of that subject.  
Here we are faced with two ethical concerns that are frequently raised 
with regards to scientific experimentation. First, there is the idea that a scientist 
should not expose subjects to conditions that they would not be willing to 
experience themselves. Many of the scientists that founded methods of sensory 
                                                          
101 This is not to say that the CIA did not perceive a political power in literary culture. As Frances Stonor 
Saunders’s landmark work on the ‘cultural cold war’ shows, the CIA funded literary culture in the hope 
of nudging the intelligentsia of Western Europe away from its lingering fascination with Marxism and 
Communism towards a view more accommodating of “the American way”’ (Saunders 1999, 1)  
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deprivation and physical isolation defended the integrity of their work by pointing 
to their own first-hand experiences. John C. Lilly, for example, contrasts his 
experience-based research on ‘physical isolation’ with the work of those 
interested in ‘sensory deprivation’ (Lilly 1977, 65). The latter term, he argues, 
‘was invented by those psychologists who did not do self-investigation and who 
did experiments on subjects, expecting a “deprivation state” in the isolated 
circumstances’ (65). Similarly, John Zubek, one of the most prolific researchers 
in the field, distanced his research from psychological torture by emphasising 
that he himself had spent significant amounts of time in the isolation chamber 
(Raz 2013, 390). The ethical defence seems to reside in a collapsing of the 
distinction between experimenter and subject. Zubek and Lilly encourage us to 
identify them not only as experimenters/torturers but also experimental 
subjects/victims, a notion that brings to mind Beckett’s emphasis on what Adam 
Piette terms the ‘inseparability of torturer and tortured’ in works such as How It 
Is and 1983’s play What Where (Piette 2016b, 152).102 Beckett’s experiments 
on isolation, I would argue, find an ethics in their refusal to detach the 
perspective of experimenter from that of the subject – the measurable effects of 
isolation from the question of how it feels to be alone. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is the question of how far 
experimenters want the knowledge produced by their experiments to be applied 
to other situations. Regardless of their own first-hand experiences, the 
experiments of Lilly and Zubek produced tangible results (techniques and data) 
that could be used to benefit, but also torture, human subjects. For instance, 
though Lilly’s experiments were carried out with an emphasis on 
phenomenological exploration, Shallice recognises that ‘if used as an 
interrogation technique’ Lilly’s method ‘would be a really potent stressor’ 
(Shallice 1972, 399). Beckett’s textual experiments on isolation, by contrast, 
cling to a degree of intangibility. They might produce knowledge but it is a 
knowledge that is tightly bound to experience and one that resists being put to 
use. The knowledge that we might obtain from Beckett’s experiments on 
isolation cannot be reduced to the instrumental kind; we cannot simply gather it 
from Beckett’s texts and apply it to other situations. Rather, Beckett is producing 
                                                          
102 For other perspective on Beckett’s refusal of the split between torturer and tortured, see Miller 
(2000) and Salisbury (forthcoming). 
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an experimental, textual environment in which an instrumental perspective is 
pitted against a more phenomenological one. This characteristic, I would argue, 
betrays Beckett’s mistrust of the way in which society uses knowledge – a 
sense, most clearly evident in How It Is, that if knowledge is tangible then it will 
inevitably be used for harm. Shallice sees the failure to discover certain facts 
about the human response to isolation as ethically preferable to a scenario in 
which these discoveries are used to harm. Beckett, by contrast, continually 
investigates the effects of isolation on human subjects, but his experiments, I 
argue, are made ethically defensible by their intangibility – the strains they place 
on the imagination. Beckett’s texts, then, might be seen to produce knowledge 
of isolation, but it is always an isolated knowledge. 
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Conclusion 
Experimental Beckett 
 
This study has sought to specify a way in which Samuel Beckett might be 
thought of as a scientifically experimental writer, rather than solely as a writer of 
the avant-garde, or one who is simply innovative. I have suggested that Beckett 
produced aesthetic experiments that combine with a great deal of psychological 
experimentation in working towards an understanding of what it is to experience 
and perform in the world. Here, I do not aim to exclude other accounts of 
Beckett’s writing. In arguing for the existence of an experimental Beckett, I do 
not deny the existence of an innovative or avant-garde Beckett, any more than 
a study of Beckett the novelist denies the existence of Beckett the poet. But I do 
hope that this study will help to nuance critical discussions of the nature of 
Beckett’s contribution to literature and a wider culture. The ever expanding body 
of criticism that surrounds Beckett’s work frequently recognises that Beckett’s 
method is ‘experimental’ but all too often one wonders what is meant by the 
term. I hope that this study will prompt more thoroughgoing definitions of what 
Beckett’s writing does. Surely, there are times when Beckett seems to be 
challenging mainstream culture in a way that corresponds with the term avant-
garde. And he undoubtedly produced many formal innovations that prompted 
re-assessments of what a play, novel or poem can look like. This study, though, 
has called for a distinction to be drawn between these senses of 
‘experimentation’, and the more scientific sense in which Beckett is seen to 
produce meticulous studies of certain processes or phenomena. 
 It should also be stressed that the type of experimentation I perceive in 
Beckett’s writing is very different from earlier versions of the literary experiment. 
The experimental Beckett is clearly distinct from Zola’s notion of an 
experimental novelist, who observes social facts and imaginatively acts upon 
them, with the aim of obtaining scientific knowledge of an individual or society. 
Rather than what we might call a social-realist experimentation which seeks to 
represent individuals and their communities, Beckett’s experiments focus on the 
means by which humans attempt to make sense of the world – the ruptured 
‘lines of communication’ that he identifies in his 1934 review article ‘Recent Irish 
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Poetry’ (Beckett 1983, 70). In Not I, as we saw in chapter 1, this takes the form 
of an experiment on speech perception which interrogates the strenuous 
process by which we attend to, comprehend and interpret the spoken word. But 
Beckett’s experimentation goes beyond the question of verbal communication. 
That Time, for instance, investigates how the face functions (or fails to function) 
as a medium through which meaning is transmitted. Crucial, here, are the 
concepts of attention and inattention. Working in a tradition that includes Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Sigmund Freud and a wide range of other experimental and 
therapeutic psychologists, Beckett’s experiments are concerned with the 
human’s limited capacity to perceive, register and recall sensory stimuli. Beckett 
draws particular attention to the spatio-temporal limits that underpin the 
human’s capacity to attend to the world. As well as these questions of attention, 
Beckett also produces experiments that bring into question the human subject’s 
capacity to distinguish between image and percept, fantasy and reality. In his 
later work, and particularly late prose works such as Company, Ill Seen Ill Said 
and Worstward Ho, Beckett can be seen to reach for a language that registers a 
phenomenological overlap, but also an ontological distinction, between that 
which is perceived in the world and that which is apprehended in the mind’s eye 
or ear. I do not doubt that Beckett’s work is consistently concerned with more 
traditionally literary questions regarding the construction of narratives and the 
production of self. But in his later work, I have argued, he takes up another 
related concern: the processes by which the human subject attempts to register, 
categorize and denominate sensory and pseudo-sensory phenomena. 
 This study has also repeatedly emphasised the degree to which 
Beckett’s aesthetic experiments were grounded in the historical circumstances 
and discourses that surrounded him. Beckett’s experiments on attention, for 
example, along with those of many psychologists, are closely bound up in a 
modernity that increasingly emphasises the human subject’s capacity to 
efficiently perform perceptual, interpretive and emotional labour. In That Time, 
for example, we saw Becket writing against a Stanislavskian tradition in which 
the human subject is expected to ‘deep act’ in order to manufacture a sense of 
spontaneity. And in chapter 3’s discussion of Footfalls I argued that Beckett 
questions how the pressure to produce a story of self can distract from present 
experience. Similarly, the second section of this study sought to contextualise 
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Beckett’s study of mental imagery. Chapter 5 placed Beckett’s late prose within 
a twentieth-century context in which there was continual debate (in 
psychological and philosophical circles) around the relationship between 
perception and mental imagery. Moreover, in chapter 6, I traced a link between 
Beckett’s interest in the disorientating psychophysiological effects of isolation, 
and a Cold War culture that became engrossed by ideas of manipulation and 
brainwashing. As well as these socio-economic and theoretical discourses, this 
study has also suggested that Beckett’s experiments register the ethical 
concerns of the period in which they were produced. The concern with 
instances of non-seeing in Footfalls, for example, is closely linked to a post-
Second World War culture in which there was significant concern with the 
failure to witness. What, it was questioned, causes human subjects to miss 
atrocities that one would expect them to perceive and act upon? Distraction? 
Traumatic Repression? Wilful denial? I argued that Beckett’s experimentation 
wrestles with this question.  
In contextualising Beckett’s experiments in such a way I hope this study 
has offered up a new way in which to discuss the relationship between 
Beckett’s work and works from other disciplines. Studies of Beckett’s work often 
lean heavily on an empirical approach which places emphasis on finding out 
exactly what Beckett read, or a comparative perspective which merely points 
out resemblances between Beckett’s work and that of certain philosophers or 
scientists. This study has made use of a great deal of the empirical work, and it 
has undoubtedly pointed to a number of formal resemblances. But I hope I have 
also shown how Beckett contributed to, and drew from, the intellectual and 
ethical environment of his period.  
 Of course Beckett’s experiments are not merely concerned with a 
theoretical or ethical view of the human. They are, it should not be forgotten, 
works of art which seek to effect certain types of aesthetic pleasure. What this 
study’s comparison between Beckett’s aesthetic experiments and the discipline 
of experimental psychology has shown, however, is the degree to which Beckett 
questions whether psychological labour can produce aesthetic pleasure. As I 
argued in chapter 2, this question undergirds much modernist art, but the 
strains involved in comprehending Not I’s fast speech or managing one’s 
attention in That Time bring it to the fore. Similarly, the later prose seems to 
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derive much of its power from the reader’s struggle to adjudge what in the text 
to imagine as ‘real’ and what to imagine as ‘imagined’. It is not merely that one 
has to work hard to obtain aesthetic pleasure from Beckett’s aesthetic 
experiments; the aesthetic potency of Beckett’s writing seems to reside in the 
human’s capacity to perceive their own psychological labour and question 
whether it is worth, to paraphrase The Unnamable’s frequently-quoted 
resolution, going on with. 
In making this argument, I seem to produce a Beckett that is heavily 
concerned with the responses of his audience and some would dispute this 
account. There are, of course, many stories to suggest that Beckett was 
uninterested in the experiences of his audience. One thinks of Walter Asmus’s 
recollection that, during the production of the television play What Where, 
Beckett wanted the action recorded so faintly that it would only be registered by 
the recording studio’s advanced technology – the audience would not have 
been able to see anything on their television screens. Here Beckett claimed not 
to care what the audience would see so long as he himself felt the required 
effect (Asmus, Uhlmann and Denham 2013). But in spite of these sentiments, 
Beckett continued to put his experiments out there long after there was any 
financial necessity for him to do so – and long after he had won enough social 
esteem to last a lifetime. This suggests he was interested in producing 
experiences for others, even if he did not show any major interest in 
investigating these experiences. Here, it might be useful to define the level on 
which Beckett was interested in audience responses, and the type of knowledge 
that he sought to obtain from his experiments. It is clear that, through 
experimentation, Beckett sought to discover his own personal responses to 
particular sets of stimuli. And it also seems that Beckett wanted to know what 
kinds of psychological processes and experiences could work in an aesthetic 
context. But what Beckett does not do, at least in any programmatic way, is 
collect data from his audiences in order to make generalised conclusions about 
the processes and experiences with which he is evidently concerned. Beckett, 
then, produced a large number of aesthetic experiments but their interpretation 
is left largely, as he wrote in a letter to Alan Schneider: ‘for those bastards of 
critics’ (Harmon 1998, 24).  
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In a recent discussion of the relationship between scientific and poetic 
experimentation conducted with neuroscientist Sophie Scott, the poet James 
Wilkes argues that, in poetic experimentation, the experiment and the data ‘are 
joined together’ (Wilkes and Scott 2016, 333). Where in science one performs 
an experiment and obtains results which then have to be interpreted, the poet’s 
results, in Wilkes’s view, ‘are the experiment’: ‘anything that people find out 
about the possibilities for literature or for lived experience is known in the 
performance, or the hearing, or the reading of the poetry’ (333). This view of 
aesthetic experimentation is persuasive insofar as it emphasises the degree to 
which the knowledge acquired through the aesthetic experiment is ‘an 
experiential one’ (333) However, it does seem to ignore the fact that poems, 
plays, and works of fiction are, themselves, psychophysiological stimuli that 
affect us in certain ways, and are thereby always capable of producing data. 
The extent to which this data is collected and interpreted (and by whom) is 
another question, and different writers and artists are likely to hold more or less 
interest in the data that their experiments produce. Beckett devised experiments 
that investigate processes such as perception, attention and mental imagery, 
but he did not collect data from these experiments in any systematic way. It is 
not so much that experiment and data are joined together in Beckett’s work. 
Rather, Beckett carefully designs experiments but does not systematically 
collect and interpret the data that these experiments produce. In summary, 
then, I argue that Beckett performs scientifically-informed aesthetic 
experimentation, but not fully-fledged scientific research. His works can be 
defined as experimental insofar as they position and stimulate human bodies in 
ways that might allow us to better understand our complex, but partial, 
experiences of the world. 
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